Risk Security Assessment

Interoperable Communication as crucial emergency response tool

2010-03-24T18:03:00.000-07:00

Georgia new interoperable communication system (Courtesy: Georgia Tech Research News)

Finally I took the time to conclude this post about one of the pillars of emergency management, interoperable communication.
Interoperability is a property referring to the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together (inter-operate). The key aspect of the emergency response mechanism is the capability to bring together different responders and their apparatuses in order to work in a coordinated manner on the same platform or different communicating platforms.
In this post I want to debate around the importance of the interoperable communication as one of the emergency management milestones.
Interoperability is an important issue for law enforcement, fire fighting, EMS, and other public health and safety departments, because first responders need to be able to communicate during emergencies. Traditionally, agencies could not exchange information because they operated widely disparate hardware and radio apparatuses that were incompatible. Even the advanced agencies' information systems such as computer-aided dispatch systems (CAD) and records management systems (RMS) functioned largely in isolation, so-called "information islands." Agencies tried to bridge this isolation with inefficient, stop-gap methods while large agencies began implementing limited interoperable systems. These approaches were inadequate and the nation's lack of interoperability in the public safety realm become evident during the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center structures. Further evidence of a lack of interoperability surfaced when agencies tackled the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina disaster.
To reach interoperability agencies should dialog on same platform-based systems. First responders have complex needs for specialized equipment and personnel and communications infrastructure is one of several critical priorities. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) assists first responders through the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance
Program (CEDAP). Since 2005, CEDAP has provided $69.7 million in equipment and
Equipment training to law enforcement agencies, fire, and other emergency responders.
But structure is not all. Procedures and a tired approach to communication must be shared and agree upon. Communication plans at both horizontal (among agencies/operators on the ground) and vertical level (from local to regional to national) should be designed.
Other important concept related to successful interoperable communication is redundancy.
Communication means must be multiple, of different nature and connected with different networks as well as promptly available. Such approach is considered vital when the environmental conditions created by the emergency related event are such that the most common means could be out of service (land line, cellular phone, emails, etc). I remember that when I was working with the UN, every mobile unit to be compliant with the Minimum Operating Standard Security (MOSS) needed to avail the following systems: Cellular phone, satellite phone, VHF/UHF radio, HF radio. Other redundant communication means are Voice over IP, emails, land line, amateur radio etc.
Such redundant system has to be maintained operational and regular drills should be conducted to test them as well as the capability of the operators to handle them. I recall during the conduction of Risk Security Assessment, the most common problems were the most (apparently) simple once too: batteries not charged, chargers not available, missing sim cards (for sat phones), operators scarce knowledge of use of radio apparatuses as well as call signs and communication procedures, etc.
Drills are absolutely important to keep the network maintained and operators refreshed.
The impression I have is that emergency entities have accomplished great results in these recent years on the path of interoperability but a lot yet remain to be done. Just to mention one example: Hurricane Katrina (2005) death toll: 1836, Hurricane Gustav (2008) death toll: 0. Both hurricanes hit same area. I don’t want to speculate on the causes of failure and success of the mentioned rescue operations but it’s evident that interoperable communications played a key role in 2008. Analysis of responses to hurricanes and whether related catastrophic events could be interesting topics for future posts.

Hurricane Gustav - Satellite photo (Courtesy: philantromedia.org)

My role in Emergency and Preparedness

2010-03-02T16:46:00.000-08:00

After one month of absence from this blog I finally decided to dedicate this post to my new position.
December 21st 2009, it was my first day as Deputy Director Emergency and Preparedness with New York State, Department of Health. I left the United Nations World Food Programme where I was working as Senior Field Security Officer, specialized in Security Risk Assessments and Risk Management. As you probably know reading my previous articles I have been deployed in several countries in almost all continents (excluding Oceania). I am so thrilled to have embraced this new challenge in New York.
I have finally the chance to enrich my professional expertise through a different emergency perspective/approach compared with the one I was used to while working in developing countries with the UN. As UN planner and risk assessment specialist I had to take into considerations factors like political instability, terrorism, criminality, social/economic insecurity etc, common elements in developing countries. These elements heavily influence the emergency/security/response planning and implementation. The final emergency structure which will emerge will have to provide the proper safety and security features to those humanitarian operators deployed everywhere in the world.
Here in New York the above mentioned factors are almost inexistent so that the planner can dedicate all the available resources and his/her own energies to the core business, the protection of the people, the structures, the assets under his/her responsibility when a disaster hits. The unfortunate sad events of 9/11 and the Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how important are planning, preparedness and training. I have decided to approach the concepts of emergency, safety, security and preparedness commenting real life cases, not related to my job/profession. This way the objectivity and the "right distance" from the events will be preserved in order to provide a unique perpective as my vision of the future of emergency management.

I

Sri Lanka - August 2009 - Security considerations and mitigating measures

2010-01-21T18:40:00.000-08:00

I have been in Sri Lanka the summer of 2009, as Security Manager for a large International Organization. This post is intended to briefly describe the post war situation and analyse the best mitigating measures in order to reduce tensions and stabilize a complicated situation which affects an entire population.
After three decades of a mainly ethnic war that has seen a combination of asymmetrical warfare activities, the Government announced victory over the LTTE - Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (some Government officials stated victory over “terrorism”) on 18 May 2009. The latter part of the past two years has seen an intensified conventional war in the Northern part of the country (Wanni) as well as asymmetrical warfare tactics that mainly constituted suicide bombings, assassinations, disappearances, abductions, intimidation the denial of basic human rights such as freedom of movement and freedom of speech (as manifested in the suppression of the national media). The war efforts resulted in large numbers of displaced civilians across the East and the North of which the past six months was probably the most intense. It resulted in massive casualties (dead and injured of which a large percentage is maimed and disabled for life) amongst both the Tamil population in the North and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) security forces. It leaves a Tamil people highly traumatized and a population bitterly divided along the ethnic fault line.
When I was there during the summer 2009, for the 262,000 internally displaced persons IDPs confined to IDP camps in Vavuniya, security risks associated with poor living conditions – in particular insufficient water supply, sanitation and waste disposal were resulting in significant health risks and growing dissatisfaction amongst the displaced community. The capacity of health services to address the needs of both the local and displaced populations was overstretched and added to general security and protection risks. Other protection and security challenges included site congestion, military presence, limited access to justice and family separation. Further, lack of freedom of movement resulted in an almost total dependence on humanitarian assistance and extreme frustration within the IDP community.

Considerations

In the immediate aftermath of the military conflict, it was expected that the Government shifted its focus from the military campaign (which dominated their strategic approach) to a lasting and acceptable political solution. The Tamil population will not accept a position in which they will be dominated by the Sinhala majority and in which they feel that their basic human rights are ignored. It is to be expected that the Government would be reluctant to accept international cooperation to achieve this paramount objective.
The current military victory has brought some level of unsustainable stability. It would have to be strengthened by infrastructural development to stimulate economical growth which, jointly with a political solution, social harmony has a greater probability to succeed.

One of the most significant mitigating measures to counter the breeding of a new resistance would be a high trustworthy reconciliation program by the Government and a transparent/ participative process towards a new political dispensation that would accommodate the Tamil people to their satisfaction. Whether this process will be implemented and how are elements which remain to be seen.

Reinforced concrete SL Army bunker in the proximity of Trincomalee Beach (East Coast)

SL Navy Bunker facing the Mannar Lagoon (West Coast)

Ecuador part 2: Crime, Natural Disasters, Road Conditions

2010-01-12T16:17:00.000-08:00

Crime:
The highest area of concern is the common crime though the police and the law enforcement agencies are doing their best to reduce it. Good results have been achieved but a lot remain to be done. The most common crimes are petty thefts and robberies usually following and armed aggression. The micro criminality trend in Quito is increasing despite the fact that the government has recently increased the number of police agents on the ground cutting their number from Embassies and International Organizations. The targets are usually those individuals carrying rucksacks, bags or cases. Cellulars and laptops are the most wanted objects by thieves. Cars are targeted as well. Usually victims are not killed if they do not react. The express kidnap is a “specialty” of the locations along the Pacific Ocean coast. Frauds and credit card cloning are two common crimes as well.
During my visit in Ecuador I received an interesting intelligence analysis very detailed and based on updated figures, prepared by the local branch of an international security company.
The threat from common criminal elements is considered HIGH in certain areas; violent crime is a serious and growing Movements after dark should be avoided.
An other element which can trigger social unrest is the widespread xenophobia against Colombians. Ecuador hosts 500.000 displaced Colombians, out of which 50.000 as refugees. This figure will be probably incremented up to 200.000 in the next future. The anti Colombians feeling is invigorated when crimes are organized by them against local populations in Ecuador. Along the border, the presence of Colombian prisoners in the Ecuador prisons reaches 90%.

Organized crime:
The organized crime in Ecuador is often strictly connected with drug related activities. Such international organizations are composed by Ecuadorian, Colombia and Peruan and are active in the northern areas of Carchi, Sucumbíos and Esmeraldas. These regions face infiltrations of Colombia guerrilla elements such as FARC, Aguilas Negras, etc. as well as narco traffickers. Ecuador is used by guerrilla as a place where fighters can rest since the Ecuadorian Army counter guerrilla activities are never as efficient as the Colombian ones. The guerilla presence in the northern regions of Ecuador has hugely affected the local economies. Guerilla fighters can pay cash for their accommodations, services, needs thus creating an economy fully dependent from their presence. Furthermore, part of the enormous quantity of drugs product in Colombia and Peru’ is transported via trucks towards the Ecuadorian coast in order to be shipped.
UNDSS country advisor is concerned that WFP vehicles could be used by narco traffickers hiding among the food packages some drugs. There is no evidence so far but it could be considered as potential threat. To figure it out about how big this phenomenon is, one should look at the quantity of cocaine confiscated by the Ecuadorian law enforcement agencies annually, about 30 tons.
A large number of Ecuadorian peasants live in the areas nearby the Colombian border and cross the border every day or spend a period in Colombia to cultivate coca plantations. They are skilled and relatively well paid compared with the salary earned in the mother country. Along with this group of people across the border several illegal or semi legal (tolerated by the authorities) activities take place. Particularly there is a quite large smuggling of gasoline and petroleum, stolen illegally creating holes in local pipelines, cement and sulfuric acid. These elements are vital for the drug laboratories to refine and produce cocaine. Milk is sold to those working in the laboratories in order to reduce the intoxication produced during the refining process, while inhaling intoxicating vapors. Indeed, several towns and villages rely completely on commerce, smuggling and logistic activities to support guerrilla. The gas cylinder is sold illegally in Colombia at 10 times more its price in Ecuador, which by the way has a subsidized price.

Several professional killers, Colombian and Ecuadorian, are always available to offer their services to those involved in narco activities.
A high number of arms and weapons are smuggled as well across the border.
As stressed, in Ecuador operate international criminal organizations composed by Colombian, Ecuadorian and Peruan. The FARC also improved its ties with local indigenous populations helping the drug traffic.
Young tourists are often involved in transportation of drug in their rucksacks or suitcases.
Money laundry is the most evident fact about the dependence of this region on illicit activities. New and shining luxury buildings are built in the Lago Agrio surroundings and other northern localities.
It must be said, finally, that large families are widespread in villages across the border both in the Ecuadorian and Colombian sides.

Natural Disasters:
The Earthquakes and tremors are the most concerning natural disasters in Ecuador. The last deadly one, actually two strong earthquakes with magnitude 6.1 and 6.9 affected Ecuador, March 5th 1986. It created a serious socioeconomic problem for the country and triggered hundreds of associated geologic hazards—massive landslides, subsidence, liquefaction, impoundment of rivers, and other effects common to earthquakes that have occurred in similar settings. In spite of the seriousness of this structural damage, the economic and social losses directly due to earthquake shaking were small compared with the effects of catastrophic earthquake-triggered mass wasting and flooding in the area adjacent to Reventador Volcano. Rock and earth slides, debris avalanches, and debris and mud flows E of the Andes resulted in the destruction or local severing of nearly 70 km of the Trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline and the only highway from Quito to Ecuador's eastern rain forests and oil fields.
Another natural threat is provoked by the presence of the Volcano Guagua Pichincha whose capital Quito wraps around its eastern slopes. In October of 1999, the volcano erupted and covered the city with several inches of ash. It threats the city indirectly since its principal crater is opened towards west. Other two volcanoes are active in Ecuador: Reventador and Cotopaxi.
The landslides affect the generally country during heavy showers mainly along the highway connecting Quito and the Pacific coasts which can be affected by flooding as well.
The risk posed to WFP by natural disasters can be assessed as medium.

Red Cross volunteers, assist victims of natural disasters in Ecuador (courtesy Dipnote)

Road Conditions:
Traffic is generally chaotic in Ecuador. There is a low respect for the transit rules as well as for traffic local police.
Some cases of police corruption related with car incidents have been reported.
The phenomenon seems to be increasing after the introduction of a new stricter traffic law enforcement rule. According with it police can now arrest preliminarily a driver involved in an incident and the car be confiscated. To avoid such rigid measures some policemen can be available to “adjust” their report.
The lack of trust in the police is generally associated with their lack of action and investigation results.
The justice system appears to be corrupted too increasing consequently the level of impunity.
In Ecuador, the risk of a fatal accident appears to be medium. The hazard presented by road travel is assessed as high.

MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE AND CASEVAC PLAN
Medical care facilities are widespread in Ecuador. Adequate medical and dental care can be readily obtained in the major cities of Ecuador. In smaller communities services are limited, and the quality is variable. Ambulances, with or without trained emergency staff, are in critically short supply. Serious cases must be evacuated to the Ecuadorian mainland for treatment.

Ecuador. Beautiful country facing different degrees of insecurity.

2009-12-30T15:23:00.000-08:00

I visited Quito, Ecuador between March and April 2009 during a Security Risk Assessment mission. I had to evaluate type and dimension of threats, the vulnerabilities of the Organization I was working for (weaknesses and strengths) and finally assess their programme characteristics and priorities. In this post I am going to describe briefly the Country form a different point of view focusing on levels of security applied to different regions. In a second post I will treat the details of threats posed by common crime, organized crime, terrorism, natural disasters, road conditions and casevac/medevac. Obviously my posts, as discussed at the very beginning of my blog, do not contain confidential information of any kind and reflect my own view of the security situation in the country.
They want to present a different approach to countries which focuses mainly on security and safety.
Ecuador is the smallest of the Andean countries. It has the highest average population density in South America and the highest percentage of Native Americans. It is one of the two South American countries (with Chile) that have no border with Brazil. As its name indicates, Ecuador extends over both sides of the equator line. It is bordered in the North by Colombia (700 km) and in the East and South by Peru (1420 km border), in the West by the Pacific Ocean (2,237 km of coastline.)
Being on the equator gives the country its peculiar weather conditions, it also allows it to have 12 hour day year round.
Ecuador has three main geographic regions, plus an insular region in the Pacific Ocean, which is the first element of heterogeneity:
La Costa, or the coast, comprises the low-lying land in the western part of the country, including the Pacific coastline.
La Sierra ("the highlands") is the high-altitude double belt running north-south along the center of the country. Between the double range of the Andes, there is a high altitude (2000-3000 meters) basin, which includes main old Ecuadorean cities (from north to south: Tulcán, Ibarra, Quito, Latacunga, Ambato, Riobamba, Cuenca, Loja.
La Amazonía, also known as El Oriente ("the east"), comprises the Amazon rainforest areas in the eastern part of the country, accounting for just under half of the country's total surface area, though populated by less than 5% of the population.
The Región Insular is the region comprising the Galápagos Islands, also on the Ecuador line, some 1,000 kilometers west of the mainland in the Pacific Ocean.

Security Phase/Security Level (at time of my visit):
In Ecuador four different security phases have been activated in different areas of the country. I am going to use a system based on letters, from A (lower level) up to F (higher level of insecurity). The level system used (created by me) here has the only purpose of showing the different degrees of security within the different regions of the country and is described as follow:

Northern Border with Colombia:

Level D:
1. Following towns belonging to Province of Sucumbíos in the Northern Border with Colombia are under level D: Palma Roja, Santa Elena, Puerto Rodríguez, Santa Rosa, General Farfán, Dureno y Pacayacú.
2. Following towns belonging to district of San Lorenzo (Province of Esmeraldas) in the Northern Border with Colombia are under phase 3: Palma Real, Ancón, Mataje, Tambillo y Pampanga.
3. All the rivers in the Northern Border with Colombia are also under level D.

Level C:
Province of Sucumbíos, with the exception of the towns mentioned in point 1, above, which are under Level D.

Level B:
1. The Province of Carchi, with the exception of the rivers in the Northern Border, is under level B.
2. City of Esmeraldas and district of Eloy Alfaro in the province of Esmeraldas are also under level B.
Volcanic activity of Tungurahua:
Province of Tungurahua:
1. The towns of Pondoa and Juive Grande, belonging to the district of Baños are under level B.

2. The towns of Cusúa and Chacanco, belonging to the district of Pelileo are also under level B.

Province of Chimborazo:
1. The towns of Bilbao, Paligtagua, Yuibug, Clocontus, belonging to the district of Penipe are under level B.
2. The towns of Cahuají, Cuso, Chazo and La Palestina, belonging to the district of Guano are also under level B.
When visiting these areas, it is recommended to get fresh informations about the actual security situation.
Level A:
The rest of the country including the capital Quito.

SECURITY SITUATION – THREAT ANALYSIS
Safety and Security – overview:
With the signing of the Peace Agreements with Peru in 1998, Ecuador overcame one of the biggest obstacles in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy since its birth as an independent Republic.
After a Colombian forces attack against an illegal guerilla camp on the Ecuadorean side of the common border, Quito severed diplomatic relations with Bogota. The tension is a political one between the two governments, since populations on both sides of the border are mixed and maintain a long tradition of brotherhood, even against their respective capitals (especially for their complicity in a large range of smuggling activities.) Nevertheless, the Ecuadorean stance is to fight against all raid or attack in its territory, either from legal or illegal forces. For that purpose, the government is reinforcing (at high cost) its military and police presence in the northern area, affecting illegal activities (of the majority of the population), but trying also to bring development with the “Plan Ecuador”, designed for peace and social and economic growth, in contrast with “Plan Colombia” (designed against illegal groups and activities.)
Ten years after establishing peace in the south, the concern is now in the north.
The diplomatic relation with Colombia was broken two days after the Colombian military attack on a guerilla camp on March 1st, 2008 in Ecuador, in which the second most important FARC commander was killed.
That event has even more urged a new Ecuadorian defense policy which included a reinforcement of the northern border area (around 8,000 soldiers) and an effort to modernize equipments.
As mentioned, Ecuador faces several security challenges listed as follow, in decreasing order:
road traffic accidents, criminality, street robbery, street assault, house break-in, office break-in, office occupation, vehicle break-in, earthquake, volcanic activity, floods, landslides, domestic violence, rape, fraud, counterfeit money, car theft, street or road blockade, kidnapping, hostage taking.

Riot Ecuadorean Police escorting a public gathering in the centre of Quito.

Author during the SRA in Ecuador.

Ayacucho - Peru. Travelling in harsh terrain conditions

2009-12-03T21:19:00.000-08:00

The town of Ayacucho is located in the south-central Andes of the country.
It lies in quiet and calm area since Shining Path terrorist movement based once here had been defeated by Governamental forces in the eighties. In fact, Ayacucho was one of the most important strongholds of Shining Path in the past. The threat of a potential terrorist activity is low but precautions must be taken during travel missions. Traveling by road especially at night is dangerous. The areas potentially at risk are the Provinces of La Mar and Huanta. Overland travel from Ayacucho to San Francisco is not recommended.
The area has experienced some assaults by local criminal gangs of youngsters who usually prefer to operate during night time or early in the morning. The methodology used to attack buses and cars is well known: one of the members of the gang lies down in the street pretending that he had an accident so that the bus stops and get assaulted. In the meantime the local criminals rob the passengers of their belongings. The level of threat related to common criminality in the Ayacucho surroundings, is medium.
The office I visited in town during my RSA is located in an area called Huamanga which enjoys a low level of criminality.
The threat posed by earthquakes and water floods is very low in this area.
The local roads connecting Ayacucho and the neighboring rural communities, which are regularly used by local populations, are not paved and very dangerous. There are no side road protections and roads are often narrow. Several bends make the driving even more challenging. If a vehicle is coming the other way, our vehicle must stop trying to maneuver using the little road side space if present.

Ayachucho surroundings: local community involved in an UN funded agricoltural project (food for work)

In the rural areas the road conditions are even poorer than in town. Most of the local roads are not paved and in some instances operations are cancelled if weather conditions render part of the routes too dangerous for travel. There is high risk of car accidents though the number of cars circulating is scarce. The accident could be generated by landslides, or softness of terrain, as well as an impact with another car. If a mechanic problem takes place, (my recommendation) the driver must stay with the car while the passenger looks for help. The environment can be dangerous due to harsh natural conditions of the terrain and the lack of radio coverage in the Ayacucho Region. There is a high risk to be assaulted during night hours. There is no cellular network up in the mountains as well so that the only communication means is the Sat phone. The risk of an accident by road travel is assessed as high.

Author while travelling between Ayacucho and Huancavelica at around 4700 mt. above sea level, sorrounded by glaciers.

PERU: General security situation, considerations from my Risk Security Assessment

2009-11-29T18:35:00.000-08:00

I visited Peru in February and March 2007 while conducting a Risk Security Assessment mission. The materials used to prepare this blog post have been updated and carefully reviewed in order to provide an idea about the actual security context in Peru.

SITUATION:

Peru is suffering from an increase in crime from simple muggings through to violent kidnapping; mostly confined to urban areas and within the poorer districts during the day but widespread after dark. The current government is slowly becoming increasingly popular, despite of the economic situation declining and local crime rising. Regarding the terrorism groups who used to frighten Peru, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru, both have been almost successfully fought in the Eighties and right now some old militants are trying to reorganize themselves. Those trends are channeling themselves towards the big drug traffic ants as the military-like expertise they can offer is very useful to protect illegal cocaine laboratories and the transportation of the final product. It has to be borne in mind that Peru is the second largest coca producer in South America, after Colombia. Urban driving conditions are appalling and at present they are assessed of being probably the greatest threat to staff in Peru. One of the most common security challenges to personal security is related to the use of taxis. There are almost no road regulations and police is literally not “visible” on the streets. Often illegal taxi drivers put on their car a Taxi sign. It has been reported that a massive quantity of false circulation documents as well as driving permits are fake and easy to obtain, since there is a flourishing market for false documents in Lima.
Furthermore, driving schools often “sell” driving license without performing any practical exams or oral/written tests.
Kidnapping can be considered a high risk factor in Peru, above all for foreigners travelling in Peru.
Often the victim is forced to withdraw money from ATM machines, usually before and after midnight so that the cash amount is double as it refers to two days. The phenomenon is popularly called Millionaire Walking (Paseo Milionario). It is recommended to use secure taxi company before arriving in country. Local staff is required to attend to a specialized security awareness training in addition to the basic security training. This is primarily due to deal with the threat of kidnapping and being involved in a car accident in very remote areas with no communication and close medical facilities.

SECURITY SITUATION - THREAT ANALYSIS
President Alan Garcia is at his second mandate as president of Peru. People are slowly but steadily increasing their support of his administration since he is giving clear signs that he wants to do something concrete to help the poor conditions of his country. For example, he is the author of a law which will ask the major mine companies to pay a “volunteer contribute” (several million of dollars) to organizations involved in fighting hunger in Peru since the State program organizations waist up to 40% of the available resources. If those political actions will help Peru to improve or if this will be a barely cosmetic political move it is not clear.
There are still concerns over renewed insurgency activity from the Shining Path (SL) guerrilla group having them join the drug traffickers with their support in security.

Peru is the second largest producer of cocaine in South America after Colombia. Here coca plantations are not illegal, but coca farmers must accept to sell part of the production to a State owned company. The quantity to be sold is minimal so that the great majority of it is then illegally purchased by drug dealers. The system does not help the fight against drug smugglers as the cultivations are not illegal and it is very difficult to define the line between legality and illegality.
The areas of biggest concern are, however, the common criminality and road accidents. Common criminality is widespread in the country with a peak level in the periphery of Lima. Law enforcement agents are not visible, and according to the official data, are not doing enough to fight this phenomenon. The second area of concern is related to car traffic and accidents. As said, there is a high risk of becoming a victim of a car accident, since there is little order and respect of road regulations. In Peru public transportation managed by government or local authorities does not exist, but it has been left to private companies and individuals. There is little control on authorizations and documents so that virtually anybody who owns a car or a minibus can be a taxi or public bus driver. Furthermore, a long time passes between vehicle technical inspections increasing the risk of mechanical breakdowns and incidents due to the lack of maintenance. The parliament has recently approved a law which forbids the importation of used cars older than five years. The high taxes to buy a new vehicle (50% of the price) have created a stagnant situation which do not facilitate the replacement of older models.

Author posing with a local community involved in an agriculture based project in the Handahuaylas area.

Peru has a working relationship with Brazil, although this has been strained by US aid packages to Lima. However, Peru is a member of MERCOSOR trade region, which is dominated by Brazil, bringing the countries closer together. Bolivia is a close partner, largely due to mutual concerns over Chile. Whilst Peru and Chile have been historic rivals, the current relationship is reasonably amicable, although the dispute over maritime borders is still alive. The two countries are working together on border security and anti-terrorist operations. Border disputes with Ecuador remain a source of tension, although outright combat seems unlikely.

The once special relationship with Japan has been strained, following the flight of Garcia predecessor, Alberto Fujimori, to Japan in 2000 and the associated international pressure on Japan to extradite him for murder. Fujimori undergone a trial, has been accused of several imputations and is now in prison. His daughter Keiko, actual Peruvian politician, is planning to run for President of Peru in 2011. How this element could change the feeling of the Peruvians about a possible return of the former President remains to be seen.
Peru’s relationship with the US has had a rocky past but is now close, particularly with large US funding for narcotics and security operations. However, many in Peru are critical of the US for failing to address fundamental trade and social problems within the country through their funding packages. There appears to be some credible information that international terrorists are present in the country but it is not known to which organization they belong; their activities seem to be linked with drugs, financing and false documentation.
The wave of internal terrorism, which Peru suffered in the 1980s and 1990s, has largely passed, but it has not completely disappeared. Remnants of the Shining Path (SP) movement (estimated at around 300 fighters and an unknown number of political activists) are still active in the Apurimac, Ene and Lower Huallaga Valleys. SP was responsible for the US embassy bombing in 2002. A group of terrorists also abducted gas pipeline workers near Toccate in the Ayacucho Department on 9th June 2003. In addition, the Garcia government, despite of his increasing popularity, remains disliked on basic reforms, which gives the potential for protests and strikes if the economic and social situation worsens. There have been recent protests by coca farmers over crop eradication by US-funded anti-narcotics operations and there are signs that the farmers are becoming increasingly militant in their opposition to the government’s support for US actions. In fact the project of restructuring coca plantations with other cultivations has given low results in terms of production and prices. The United Nations are also seen as a threat by the coca farmers and the SP who have an interest in coca production being the major security provider.

Off road trip on the Andean Mountains to Huancavelica.

PUERTO LEMPIRA – THE MOST FASHINATING AND CHALLENGING FIELD LOCATION IN HONDURAS

2009-11-17T04:13:00.000-08:00

Navigating the waterways around the Puerto Lempira swampland (Honduras).

I am finally able to get back on track updating my Security Risk Assessment blog. I have been very busy lately with several professional projects and evaluations. I hope I will be able to regularly inform you through the columns of my blog about international challenges and security threats.
I visited Puerto Lempira – Honduras during my SRA in April 2009. Puerto Lempira is a very peculiar city due to its geographical and orographical conditions. It’s located in the Mosquitia Region, in the south of the country, bordering Nicaragua. A large part of this region includes swampland-like area featuring several rivers, creeks, natural canals and lakes. The large lagoon facing Puerto Lempira town represents the main water access both to open sea and internal canals.
To carry out its mission the humanitarian international organization I was working for had at its disposal two light boats and two cars. Two local indigenous communities, Uanpusirte and Auas, receive from the organization via boat food and of combustible to help with expensive navigation costs. The great majority of the assisted communities are located along water ways, few in the inner land. The weather conditions are generally good but the rainy season (between July and December). The area is normally very affected during this period by tropical storms and sporadically by hurricanes. The local autochthon ethnic group is Miskito and the most spoken language is Miskito even if the official one is Spanish. Most of the populations understand Spanish. The area is generally calm and few are the crime related episodes reported. The communities are watching their neighborhoods. During the night hours some cases of common crime events were recently reported (little robberies mainly).

Organized criminal activities:
Organized crime is present and its core business is drug trafficking. Several air, sea and land routes cross this region. Traffickers are almost invisible though everybody seems to perceive their presence.
The local communities are involved in the drug business only when a go-fast boat or a tourism private airplane loaded with cocaine coming from Colombia, crashes or faces direct threat by law enforcement agencies and their drug charge is left on the ground. Local populations rapidly take advantage of the situation catching as much content as possible. Police often remains with empty hands. Only boats or the aircrafts are recovered.
Narco traffickers lately buy at “fair” price the drug from the communities.
The general perception is that this is a great opportunity to those poor communities almost disconnected from the rest of the world.
Our local staff have never felt directly threaten from such trafficking. Our boats are clearly marked.
The threat in the Gracias a Dios region posed by organized crime can be assessed as low/medium.

Eating coconuts before the navigation mission on the Caribbean shores

Threat mitigations measures
The level of acceptance of the organization within the local populations is high. Indeed the clearly marked official vehicles and boats help to be recognized. The staff in charge of the Puerto Lempira office are well known and respected.
Contracted motorists conduct our boats along the water ways, canals, lagoon, rivers and open sea. They are very skilled and their knowledge of the area is depth. Staff travel, if possible, always with a representative of the government counterpart of the Ministry of Education who is well known as well. It is mandatory to obtain a navigation permit from the Port Authority prior every trip by boat. The permit includes names of those using the boat, the itinerary and other relevant details. Staff usually call our point of contact in the municipality they are about to visit in order to get fresh security information.
Best time frame to conduct field operation between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM.
Finally, the good and appropriate personal behavioral conduct of the staff is a further element to consider within the general mitigation measures.

Demonstration / political:
At present, there is no obvious potential for politically motivated violence.
The local departmental branch of Ministry of Education has been recently blocked by protesters, usually teachers. The protests are not violent and usually last one day. The current threat of violent demonstration is assessed as low.

Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is low.

Medical Emergency:
In Puerto Lempira is active a public hospital. The two clinics present in the region are located in Gracias a Dios and Dos Leones. Every single municipality has a health centre in which basic emergencies can be treated. Cuban doctors are working in these centers along with Honduran doctors according with an agreement between the governments of Honduras and Cuba.
Only one ambulance is available at Puerto Lempira which often is not operative. Those who need emergency medical care are transported to hospitals with private vehicles or boats. Local populations are very collaborative when a medical emergency occurs. Our staff as well has often helped to transport people to hospital putting at disposal the boat as only available transportation means in the area. In this case the procedure envisages that the passenger signs a discharge of responsibility form allowing staff to transport him/her by official boat/vehicle.
Poisoning snakes are infesting the area and everybody here can be exposed to the risk of being bite.
The risk for staff to not receive adequate medical assistance is high because of the lack of basic medical service in the region, the harsh geographic condition.
Fire
The risk of injury from fire is assessed as low.

Road Travel
As mentioned above, the most used transportation means are the boats. Nevertheless some communities are assisted visited by car since they are located in the mainland (very harsh swampland-like environment).
There are absolutely no paved roads and their maintenance is virtually inexistent. In some cases there are no roads at all and staff drive in the wildness to reach the inner communities. Driving during the rainy season can be very difficult/harmful. The organization’s cars are equipped with special “Tractor” high grip tires.
The hazard posed by road condition is assessed as high.

Boats:
Boats are stored along the lagoon shore at motorist location.
Boats, to be fully compliant must have the following features:
Ø Fire extinguishers
Ø Second emergency engine on board
Ø Bengala signaling rockets
Ø First aid kit
Ø Radio systems including sat phones
Ø Life vests suitable for adults and children.
Ø GPS system

Emergency food transported by an Honduran military helicopter after hurrican strike.

Food transported via boat to the indigenous communities within the lagoon.

San Pedro de Sula (Honduras) – National economy catalyst in light of the actual political crisis

2009-10-25T18:31:00.000-07:00

San Pedro is definitely the most important economic centre of Honduras. In San Pedro, dynamic town famous for its brilliant economy, few successful businessmen have reached an incredible powerful economic dimension. Such success has enable them to take part at the political debate as one of the most influential lobby.

Zelaya, the ousted President, at the beginning of his Presidential career was part of the “club” of industrials and businessmen loyal to the US influence in Central America. He received their blessing and political support. During the first part of his mandate he managed the country stimulating, reinvigorating and improving the existing trade relationship with the US. The US has a specific interest in the country which hosts the largest US military base in Central America (Palmerola). But something happened. A “new” destabilizing element took the upper hand and marked a dramatic shift in the management of the foreign affairs of Honduras. Chavez and his ALBA (left wing inspired organization of Bolivarian States) entangled the Honduran political arena intoxicating first the President Zelaya who dramatically changed his set of political priorities, goals and supporters. This element triggered the famous event that forced Zelaya to leave the country.
The political dynamics behind the scenes are not the main argument of this blog post. Nevertheless it is worth reminding the importance of San Pedro de Sula as main economic site in Honduras, house of lobbyists and ghost decision makers. Which role will be played by San Pedro economic elites before and during next Presidential election remain to be seen.
I visited San Pedro de Sula in April as part of the country Security Risk Assessment, before the political crisis took place. Here some findings regarding the level of criminality, the threats and the instability factors in the San Pedro urban area and in its region.

GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION

Cortes Department (San Pedro surroundings)
General Situation - Crime
The most potentially dangerous sites in terms of presence of criminality are located in the Sulasono Valley. Only few areas can be considered moderately dangerous: Omoa, San Antonio, Santa Cruz Yohoa and San Francisco.
The most frequent criminal acts are kidnappings, express kidnappings (the victim is released in few hours after he/she withdraw money from ATM machine), extortion, assaults and violence connected with narco traffic.
There are areas too dangerous to adventure through in the region, while it is possible/recommendable visit other municipalities only if in company of somebody known in the community or local officials.
Ironically any police escort could dramatically endanger the presence of the visitor.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Organized Crime – Cortes
The crime rate is very high in this area.
People generally do not report criminal acts for two reasons: fear of retaliations from criminals and lack of trust in the law enforcement systems, both police and justice. Besides corrupted police could inform criminal about a report and trigger retaliation.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Urban Department of San Pedro Sula
General Situation – Crime
Usually two different kind of criminal aspects are present here: crime due to social frictions and delinquency (ordinary and common).
Both are fueled by the media which emphasize the culture of fear among people. This situation stimulates the lack of confidence in the police as institution and creates a subculture of isolation (one is alone against crime). This phenomenon motivates people not to report incidents and crime related events.
Drug couriers move freely in the urban departments since San Pedro is part of the large drug corridor from Colombia to the Mexican/US border. Part of the drug shipments are used locally to pay salaries to those supporting their logistic operation.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Organized crime – San Pedro Sula City
Large international organized groups of criminals are operating in town. The leaders are Colombian and Mexican. They are in charge of the transportation across Honduras of large quantity of drug. These groups use local gangs “Maras” to support and defend their activities. Several killers are recruited by drug cartels.
The Maras are used to distract police from other areas where the drug is transported.
Gangs indeed organize skirmishes or crime incidents in order to gather the police out of a different area where narco traficants are managing their operations.
The police and the judiciary system are very corrupted. The impunity reaches very high levels.
Money laundering is a widespread phenomenon as well. The great majority of the victims of homicides are connected with some criminal activities or groups. The price to execute somebody can be as low as $50.
Some peripheral areas of San Pedro represent an attraction for those populations living in other poorer regions. Those villages are the most perilous.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Threat mitigations measures:
Best time frame to conduct field operation between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM.
The Soaso area is considered at high crime risk. Nevertheless the escort of police is not recommended since can be clearly identified.
It has been reported that people has been killed in attempt to steel their cellular phone. For this reason the cellular is used only in not visible areas.
Finally, the good and appropriate personal behavioral conduct of the monitor is a further element to consider within the general mitigation measures.

Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is low.

Medical Emergency:
In San Pedro are located several good medical facilities. In town are available ambulances, clinics and health centers providing basic services.
The fire fighters have an ambulance too.
The risk of not receiving adequate medical cares is assessed as low.

Fire
The risk of injury from fire is assessed as low.

Road Travel
The conditions of the roads in town are very good. The great majority of the urban roads are paved. The traffic can be chaotic. The risk of being involved in a car incident is assessed as low.

Recommendation:
Drivers should attend a 4x4 wheel drive course. Secondly, the defense/offense driving courses should be offered to drivers as advanced courses after completion of the 4x4.
Picture on top courtesy Wiki.

Author visiting a school in the surroundings of San Pedro. Field offices were located within School complex, offered by Ministry of Education.

Honduras, threat analysis just before the change of political leadership

2009-10-06T21:35:00.000-07:00

I visited Honduras in March 2009, just before the change of political leadership in the country. New elections are expected in November. The U.S. won’t recognize a scheduled November election in Honduras without a resolution to the political crisis that began with a coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya in June. On Sept. 27, the de facto government led by interim President Roberto Micheletti banned protests and suspended other civil rights for 45 days and denied entry to an Organization of American States delegation seeking to negotiate an end to the three-month standoff in the Central American nation.
The aim of this post is not to focus on the actual political impasse of the country but to provide a threat analysis prepared just before the crisis. I will closely follow the development of the situation from the pages of this blog providing elements and details regarding possible future new political scenarios and balance of power.

Safety and Security – overview:
The main concern remains the general crime situation which is endemic. Almost all subjects interviewed during this assessment have been involved in or has assisted to common crime actions (robberies, assaults, etc).

Crime:
The threat from common criminal elements is considered HIGH in certain areas; violent crime is a serious and growing problem, especially in zones of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, and to a less degree throughout the country. Pickpockets and purse -snatchers are prevalent in major cities, especially in parts of Comayagüela and the central market surroundings of Tegucigalpa. Movements after dark should be avoided. Highway, road and street robberies, carjacking and assault of pedestrians by armed thieves are still high. Roadblocks and demonstrations on the main highways have decreased. With a total of 3,855 murders in 2007 and a population of approximately 7.3 million people, Honduras has one of the world’s highest per capita murder rates. Two-man teams on medium-size motorcycles often target pedestrians for robbery. There have also been reports of armed robbers traveling in private cars targeting pedestrians on isolated streets.

Organized crime:
There are criminal organizations which are mainly devoted to the drug smuggling/transportation from the southern bordering country Nicaragua to El Salvador and Guatemala, towards the Mexican/US border. In the La Mosquitia area and along the Caribbean coast their activities are carried out with little obstacle posed by law enforcement agencies. Recently has been approved a law which considers the use of soldiers in support of police force. Still the general perception is that the Government has not done enough to reduce criminality and organized crime activities. Results of these activities are homicides, violent actions and revenges among criminal groups to control the drug traffic.
The “Maras” phenomenon, juvenile criminal gangs, is present and affecting peripheral locations. Often it is involved in the protection of drug trafficking routes along the Atlantic coast and in certain internal area.
The direct threat posed from the above described actions can be considered high.

Police – Security Forces:
The Honduran government conducts occasional joint police/military patrols in major cities in an effort to reduce crime. Problems with the judicial process include corruption and an acute shortage of trained personnel, equipment, staff, and financial resources. The Honduran law enforcement authorities' ability to prevent, respond to, and investigate criminal incidents and prosecute criminals remains limited. The Government of Honduras has a very limited presence in Northern Olancho, Colon and Gracias a Dios Departments, which are well known for lumber and narcotics smuggling and violence. While the support of the police to eventually escort official vehicles in at-risk areas is relatively easy to get in the field locations, in Tegucigalpa, due to a scarcity of policemen, it is difficult to obtain.

Natural Disaster:
The most common natural threat to Honduras is posed by frequent but slight earthquakes, mainly in the Southern and Central regions of the country. Hurricanes as well can be dangerous and harmful, producing flooding along the Caribbean coast, according with the season. The towns of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula are particularly weak to flooding due to the lack of properly build infrastructure and a proper urban housing plan. Peripheral towns and villages can face landslides during flooding.
The risk posed by natural disaster is assessed as high.

Social threats:
Protests can arise due to the current socio-economic conditions. This may lead to road blocking though lately this phenomenon is decreasing. Common delinquency is endemic and is becoming a social case too. Organized young gangs and drug criminal group, including immigrants trafficking, are largely affecting the population changing their social behavior and attitudes.

Road Conditions:
The road conditions are generally decent where the roads are paved. Some of the most dangerous stretches for road travel include: Tegucigalpa to Choluteca, because of dangerous mountain curves; El Progreso to La Ceiba, because of animal crossings and the poor condition of bridges from flooding; Route 39 through northern Olancho Department between Gualaco and San Esteban; and Limones to La Union, Olancho (route 41) via Salama and northward to Saba. Hondurans also refer to this latter stretch of road as the “Corridor of Death” because of frequent incidents of highway robbery.
Roads are generally unpaved and/or poorly maintained roads. The traffic in the Capital is totally unregulated and the few traffic police hardly manage it.
The threat of being involved in a car accident is high.

MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE
Medical care in Honduras varies greatly in quality and availability. Outside Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, medical care is inadequate to address complex situations. Support staff facilities and necessary equipment and supplies are not up to international standards anywhere in Honduras. Facilities for advanced surgical procedures are not available. Wide areas of the country do not have a general surgery hospital. Ambulance services are limited in major cities and almost non-existent elsewhere.
The risk of not receiving adequate medical cares is assessed as medium.

CONCLUSION
Honduras is a great country. The high level of crime and the drug related activities unfortunately affect dramatically the everyday life of citizens, visitors and tourists. There is a general lack of trust in the law enforcement agencies as well as in the political and judicial authorities. Impunity is a major unresolved problem in the country.
I will deepen several aspects of the above analysis in my next posts as well as I will mention about interesting field locations.

Navigating the lagoon facing Gracias a Dios (Caribbean Sea)

Vehicle stock in the mud in the proximity of Puerto Lempira

Nicaragua, Rio Coco navigation conditions during food transportation op.

2009-09-30T05:59:00.000-07:00

In this brief post I would like to share this interesting video prepared by UN World Food Programme (WFP) in Nicaragua to promote their humanitarian activities.
I was in Nicaragua (post dated Sept. 2nd 2009) in February 2008, conducting a Security Risk Assessment for WFP. Part of my job was assessing the navigation conditions, providing recommendations according with the Minimum Operating Standard Security (MOSS) adopted generally by the UN. The difficult part was connected with the applicability of the MOSS to rented vessels, not UN property. I could not force the owners of the boats to buy and install all the prescribed safety features (fire extinguishers, GPS, life vests, HF radio etc). Yes one could argue that the Organization could choose a different provider with better equipped vessels. Well, in these areas often there is only one provider, the boats are very basic and navigation can be dangerous. The high quantity of floating debris is another element to be considered while planning the operation. Said that, the staff adopt a security posture and bring own equipment (where possible) in order to mitigate the risk.
In this video the boat (Hercules) has been purchased by WFP and it was properly equipped. It seems to be too heavy and large to be able to reach the remote areas in the Rio Coco region, while it could be useful in the sea or segments of river wide and deep. Hercules have been replaced eventually with smaller and more efficient boats. These new boats comply with the safety rules. During emergencies, by the way, it could be possible that rented vessels can be used due to the dimension of the operation.
Very interesting the food cross loading operation. The community who is helping transporting the food from one point to another of the river is not the final beneficiary. Communities help themselves.
My navigation experience on Rio Coco, one entire day, was conducted on board of a rented smaller boat maneuvered by two very skilled local operators. The food delivery was successful. I am sure my visit helped to increase the navigation safety and security awareness among staff and local boat providers and I believe better safety features have been then adopted.

Panama - Security concerns related to Canal ops and Darien Province

2009-09-22T06:18:00.000-07:00

I conducted my RSA in Panama in March 2009 in Panama City and surrounding areas.
Panama has a developing economy. Outside the Panama City area, which has many first-class hotels and restaurants, tourist facilities vary in quality. The U.S. dollar is the paper currency of Panama, and is also referred to as the Panama balboa. Panama mints its own coinage.
The current security situation in Panama presents no indications that social unrest will rise to a level that would affect its economy. Nevertheless it is advisable to monitor constantly the general security conditions in order to assess any sign that of possible instability/threat to the actual tranquil situation, as outlined below.
All areas of the country outside of the capital are considered low risk with the exception of the southern province of Darien. Darien should not be considered a high risk area but must be kept under control due to the remoteness of the area, the lack of infrastructure and communications, and the sporadic incursion into the area of illegal armed groups from neighboring Colombia. A natural forest covers the border between Colombia and Panama and there are no entry access points between the countries.

Safety and Security – Darien Province:
This area encompasses the Darien National Park as well as privately owned nature reserves and tourist resorts. It has been reported by the local law enforcement agencies that foreign nationals and Panamanian citizens have been the victims of violent crime, kidnapping and murder in this general area. Reliable communications and medical infrastructure are not readily available in the region, which makes travel therein potentially hazardous. Moreover, all around the Panama-Colombia border area the presence of Colombian terrorist groups, drug traffickers and other criminals is common, increasing the danger to travelers. There is increasing evidence that the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization, has increased its operations in Panama’s Darien Province, including in areas far removed from the immediate vicinity of Panamanian-Colombian border. UNDSS advises that the risk of UN Staff members facing dangerous situations due to the sporadic presence of illegal armed groups from Colombia can be defined as “low”. The lack of an established communication system across the region can be mitigated through satellite phones.

SECURITY SITUATION - THREAT ANALYSIS
Economic:
Panama has an economy that has been shaped around the US Dollar. It is efficient and it is based on a number of well established business and commercial activities related mostly with the service sector. This large economic sector represents the 75% of the total GDP and includes the management of the Panama Canal, banking, the Colon free trade zone, insurance, container ports, flagship registry and tourism.
The unemployment level is about 8% and reflects the large oversupply of unskilled labor.
The factor that must be taken seriously into consideration in this analysis is the enormous disparity in the distribution of wealth. In fact 35% of the population lives in poverty and could trigger a higher level of crime and social unrest.

Natural Disaster:
The typical natural disaster which affect the Central America and Caribbean region, earthquakes, flooding and hurricanes do not have a significant impact on Panama.

Social:
Some ethnic groups in Panama can be identified as disadvantaged to others. This phenomenon does not express itself through violence acts or civil disobedience. There is a very high degree of religious tolerance between religious groups.

Crime:
Crime in Panama City is moderate but increasing, particularly because of the activities of youth gangs. The city of Colon is a high crime area. Police checkpoints have become commonplace on weekends on roads in both cities. Based upon reported incidents by local police, the high-crime areas around Panama City are San Miguelito, Rio Abajo, El Chorrillo, Ancon, Curundu, Veracruz Beach, Panama Viejo, and the Madden Dam overlook. Crimes there are typical of those that plague metropolitan areas and range from rapes to armed robberies, muggings, purse-snatchings, "express kidnappings" from ATM banking facilities, in which the victim is briefly kidnapped and robbed after withdrawing cash from an ATM, and petty theft. There have been several targeted kidnappings, including in Panama City.
Several Security Advisors mention that in Panama does not exist the so called organized crime, as the dramatic phenomenon affecting other countries of the region (El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, etc). Neither exist Panamian drug cartels. An interesting trend that should be closely monitored is that of the juvenile gangs. It is growing but cannot be compared with most famous criminal gangs “Maras” existing in Salvador or Guatemala.
The police are fighting local crime with the little means available and the scarceness of resources allocated to internal security. The number of police patrols are insufficient above all in the Canal area, which is a vital asset for the country and yet vulnerable.
The official crime statistics released for the year 2008 report that the number of homicides was 27% higher than 2007 and 49% higher than 2004. The robberies increased 43% in one year.
Panama is used by the Colombian drug traffickers as a land corridor to smuggle cocaine towards the Mexican-US border. This situation brought to Panama some money laundering center intended to clean narcotic revenue.

Police – Security Forces:
Panama does not have its own Army, Navy and Air Force. Law enforcement and the control of public order is the responsibility of the Panamian National Police (PNP). The PNP are the subject of frequent allegations of corruption. PNP is limited by a chronic lack of resources.

Panama Canal:
The canal area can be considered vulnerable. In fact an attack could be carried out through a ship carrying huge quantity of toxic chemicals or other dangerous materials. If the vessel would explode while crossing the Canal, either due to a terrorist attack or an accident, the consequences are difficult to predict.

Author visiting the Miraflores Lock at Panama Canal

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although there are currently no indications that social unrest will rise, it is necessary to monitor the following potentially dangerous situations which could, under specific conditions, influence economy and life in Panama.
· Increased incidence of illegal demonstrations.
· Growing incidence of clashes between social and ethnic organizations of government security forces
· Increasing unrest in the provinces, especially in the Darien, has been observed.

MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE AND CASEVAC PLAN
Although Panama City has some very good hospitals and clinics, medical facilities outside of the capital are limited. When making a decision regarding health insurance, Americans should consider that many foreign doctors and hospitals require payment in cash prior to providing service.

CONCLUSION
The security situation in Panama is generally good but several factors can potentially affect stability and security. The Darien Province is the most concern area in the country. Police should increase the number of its members and improve its specialized unit dealing with drug trafficking and smuggling across the border with Colombia.
Money laundering is another factor that has to be assessed in depth since it seems that part of the hidden economy circulating in Panama City is coming from illicit activities abroad.
The Canal security is finally the strategic key to the success of the Panamian financial system. The Canal brings to the State economy between 5 and 10M USD per day. An attack on the Canal could affect not only internal but the international stability and repercussion on global economy could be dramatic.

Puerto Cabezas (Nicaragua). Challenging security conditions.

2009-09-15T22:07:00.000-07:00

After a pause due to family reasons, here I am again describing one of most challenging field location evaluated in Nicaragua, Puerto Cabezas (including the attached area of Bilwi). This post mentions my navigation experience intended to assess security conditions of crew, staff and assets transported by boat.
In fact, the great majority of every day Organization's activities took place by boat (Rio Coco and Caribbean Sea). The article focuses as well about the importance of satellite phones as one of the most reliable - thus not totally secure - communication means.

Puerto Cabezas is a small port area located on the north east Atlantic / Caribbean coastline, at about 560 km northeast of Managua. There are approximately 27,000 inhabitants of Bilwi. In the municipality of Puerto Cabezas there are 51 Miskito (indigenous) communities which combine with Bilwi's population for a total of 51,000 inhabitants. The city is surrounded by several rivers and lagoons. The official languages of the region are Spanish, Miskitu, Sumo, and English. Spanish is predominately spoken however there is a very large segment of the population who speak Miskito. In all communities, Miskito is by far the predominant language. During the two days trip spent in the Puerto Cabezas area, one entire day has been dedicated to the river route along Coco River. This mission has been conducted to assess the condition of navigation and the quality of boats rented by the Organization. The itinerary travelled was Waspam – Sih Ba by boat (8 hour navigation time). In the above picture, Rio Coco and local communities.

Author visiting the Sih Ba Miskito community, reachable only by boat

The threat:
The main threat in the region is related to the moderate concentration of common criminals while the Mara (gangs) phenomenon is less evident in Puerto Cabezas than in the inner areas. The operations conducted by boat present a high risk due to the river conditions and the large quantity of obstacles and debris floating in the river.
The threat level in and around the Puerto Cabezas is assessed as follows:

Road Safety:
The conditions of the roads to reach the communities around the Puerto Cabezas town, up to Waspan (along Coco River) and in the inner region are very poor, not paved but kept in decent conditions. Due to the scarcity of vehicles, the risk of accidents by road travel is assessed as low.

Communications:
Communications in such complex geographical environment are essential. The four means of communications (MOSS compliant) that must be installed and functional are:

VHF radio set
HF radio set
cellular phone (ideally with different SIM cards in order to maximize the use of the coverage)
satellite phone

In this particular case a fifth communication means was deemed necessary in order to coordinate field work with local communities and improve the emergency respond. In fact, the great majority of the Miskito communities, assisted by the Organization, were using an HF “radio amateur” set which was working with different frequencies. In this case it would be useful to have a proper radio or, infringing the internal rules and agreement with government which assigned to the Organization dedicated frequencies (not recommended), change frequencies on the HF Codan radio apparatus supplied. Such measure can be considered as “preventive” since can be implemented in case of emergency to share security information gained on the ground.

SAT telephones:
There are several models of sat phones available with different features but some older models, even if technically better built, cannot be suitable for the complex environment like the one analyzed here.
In particular the sat phone evaluated in this office location was a Nera model. The Nera sat phone functions well in some circumstances (mainly as a static fixed point communicator). There are however several significant operational problems with its use in the field. It is of the type with a “laptop” type antenna which requires to be pointed directly at the satellite it is trying to communicate with. Any deviation from this line of contact will terminate the communications. This makes it difficult to use on the move. The system is not quick or easy to set up and would be difficult to use in an emergency. The system is not discreet and has caused problems in the past when used in front of naturally suspicious rebels or armed groups at checkpoints. In some cases the groups do not know what it is and this can lead to increased tension. I indeed recommend:
· the use of satellite phone system with a hand held satellite phone for the reasons outlined above. Iridium now has such a product available.
· Every field location should have at least a ready-to-use sat phone handy (SIM card must be placed properly, contract should not be expired, sat must be charged and charger (home/car adaptor) should be always carried with the phone.
· Phones must be transported in proper water-proof bags suitable for boat operations and emergencies.

In the next post I will write about security while operating boats. Puerto Cabezas (Nicaragua) along with Quidbo (Colombia) and Puerto Lempira (Honduras) are all locations which I assessed and currently use boats to carry out their daily duties. So that it is important to understand the security rules and the technical features of the vessels prior any navigation.

NERA Satellite phone with lap top style anntenna. Not recommended for at-risk environment.

Iridium 9555, very efficient sat phone and descreet desing.

Nicaragua, general security situation and (brief) threat analysis

2009-09-02T21:36:00.000-07:00

I conducted the security risk assessment in Nicaragua in February 2008. I inspected the Country Office in Managua as well as all field offices and logistic facilities of a worldwide International Organization (Corinto, Puerto Cabezas, Ocotal, Matagalpa, Siuna). A one day boat trip along the Coco River (Waspam) has been conducted in order to verify the navigation security conditions of staff during implementation of field operations in the Northern areas of the country.
The picture shows (me next to) a gigantic Govt propaganda poster of President Daniel Ortega praising his Populist/Socialist political message in favour of the masses.
Nicaragua, as seen in its regional context, is one of the less dangerous countries compared with its neighbours El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Police coverage is extremely sparse outside of major urban areas, particularly in Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast. Sporadic incidents of highway banditry happen frequently in remote rural areas of north and northwest Nicaragua. In order to reduce the threat of being involved in such criminal event it is recommendable to travel between 6.00 AM and 6.00 PM. Political demonstrations and strikes occur sporadically, are usually limited to urban areas, and occasionally become violent. In the Puerto Cabezas area recently a public protest against local government (Alcaldia) took place. Stones have been launched but the police was able to keep the protest under control.Regarding major organized criminal activities it should be noted that narcotics traffickers often use the Caribbean and Pacific coastal waters. The new luxury houses located in very isolated places show that there is an increment of drug traffic between Colombia and Mexico/US affecting those countries in between.Assaults and armed attacks have been registered in isolated areas, mainly along the route Managua – Puerto Cabezas where overcrowded buses are stopped and travellers robbed.
THREAT ANALYSIS
The greatest area of concern of the internal security is related with several illicit activities conducted by both common and organized criminality. Violent crime in Managua and other cities is increasing, and street crimes are frequent. Pick pocketing and occasional armed robberies occur on crowded buses, at bus stops and in open markets, particularly the large Mercado Oriental, and less frequently at the Huembes market. Gang activity is rising in Managua, though not at levels found in neighbouring Central American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, etc). Gang violence, including robbery, assault and stabbing, is most frequently encountered in poorer neighbourhoods, including the Ticabus area, but has occurred in the neighbourhoods surrounding major hotels, bus terminals and open-air markets.Street crime and petty theft are a common problem in Puerto Cabezas, along both the Nicaraguan Caribbean coast and route Managua – Puerto Cabezas. Lack of adequate police coverage has resulted in these areas being used by drug traffickers and other criminal elements. Taxi drivers and passengers have been victims of robbery, assault, sexual assault, and even murder. It is advisable, before taking a taxi, to be sure that the cab has a red license plate and that the number is clearly legible. The taxi must be properly labelled with the cooperative (company) name and logo. While riding in a vehicle, windows should be closed, car doors locked and valuables placed out of sight.Crimes of opportunity such as car theft, abduction and muggings are ever present. In essence, the high level of criminality has little or no authority and no recourse to Police action in the rural areas is a serious threat to all visitors to, and agencies in, Nicaragua. As mentioned above, almost in all towns (mainly in the centers) the legality and police enforcement have not been fully restored.
Force Majeure:
Hurricanes present a constant threat to Nicaragua during the rainy season which has seen a penetration within the Caribbean Coast in the Puerto Cabezas area. Nicaragua is subject to Earthquakes as well. The last quake in 1972 has partially destroyed Managua. Since the capital lies in the proximity of the S. Andrea fault the exposition at tremors and earthquakes is relevant.

In the next posts I will analyze some interesting aspects of the difficulties encountered by staff deployed in different field locations. Puerto Cabezas represents the most challenging field site for its exposure to hurricanes and its geographic complexity (located on the shores of Rio Coco, facing the Caribbean Sea).

Guatemala - Chapter 2. Overall threat, organized crime and natural disasters.

2009-08-27T05:39:00.000-07:00

With this brief post I conclude my “Guatemala” security considerations. In the previous one I described how impunity and regular criminality affect dramatically security in the country. Here are some hints about the overall threats to the humanitarian organization I was in charge of, the organized crime and natural disasters (hurricanes and volcanoes).

The Threat:
There are currently no known specified threats against humanitarian staff and interests in Guatemala other than the general threats prevalent to all organizations and civilians in the country.
Crimes of opportunity such as car theft, abduction and muggings are ever present. In essence, the high level of criminality and little or no authority and no recourse to Police action in the rural areas is a serious threat to all visitors to, and agencies. As mentioned almost in all towns (mainly in the centers) the legality and police enforcement have not been fully restored.

Terrorist Action:
Currently there are no registered incidents of IED or VBED (Vehicle Borne Explosive Device) in Guatemala. However, the authorities have expressed concern and state that they have in the past monitored Muslim extremists travelling trough Guatemala. There are no officially identified terrorist groups by the Guatemalan Government, even though there are constant confrontation with groups such as the EXPAC (ex paramilitaries), which have in the past made their dissatisfaction known through violent means. Nonetheless the security system on site is constantly in touch with local authorities and the international community to ensure that there is an early warning system in place should the terrorist threat increase. However, the terrorist threat can be assessed as low in Guatemala.

Demonstration / political:
There is no obvious potential for politically motivated violence. The activities of the recent born International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), mentioned in my previous article, backed by UN could increase the risk that international organizations could be targeted by organized crime. So far, the current threat of violent demonstration is assessed as low.

Road Accident:
Road travel in Guatemala is hazardous. Road conditions outside of town range from are generally good. The risk of a fatal accident appears to be high. The traffic is heavy in Guatemala City and the drivers have almost no discipline and respect of road regulations. Defensive driving techniques are a must for all drivers. The hazard presented by road travel is assessed as high.

Organized Criminal Activity:
This is the area of major concern in Guatemala. The Maras (youth gangs – see post dated August 16th) are of particular concern, since they are both involved with major drug operations, people smuggling syndicates and regional Mara turf wars. Additionally, they routinely control zones throughout the Capital, running extortion rackets, which include extensive involvement in the countries public transit system. As a result, it is highly recommended not to ride public buses or enter certain zones of Guatemala City and use only approved taxi companies suitable for official or personal travel. Lastly, organized crime groups have also been linked to kidnappings and “express kidnapping”, which take place frequently in Guatemala. Risk level is high.

Natural disasters/Force Majeur:
Hurricanes present a constant threat to Guatemala during the rainy season which has seen in 2005 (Hurricane Stan) approximately 2000 death. Weak government response, limited resources and a limited infrastructure all aggravate this problem. Guatemala is a geologically active country and earthquakes are also a constant concern, as well as flooding and regular power outages throughout the country. Guatemala has also 22 volcanoes, 4 of which are considered active. Volcanic activity, such as that of Fuego Volcano near Antigua in January 2003, and again in January 2006, has on occasion forced evacuations of nearby villages; the January-February 2000 activity of Pacaya Volcano near Guatemala City also briefly closed Guatemala City's international airport. The threat posed by the effects of an earthquake is assessed as high.
Map of Major Volcanoes in Guatemala. Courtesy: intute.ac.uk

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
· Crime is the biggest single threat to International Organizations in Guatemala. Sensible precautions can drastically reduce the probability of personnel becoming victims. Those most at risk are expatriates especially those recently arrived in country. Road traffic accidents are a serious problem. Sound vehicle maintenance and good driving practices will reduce the probability of accidents.
· Staff working in Guatemala City should keep the lowest profile possible while moving from/to the Capital. In this regard, it is recommendable to use magnetic logos for cars only for official missions or when it is strictly necessary in the field. This would reduce the visibility of the operators and mission and mitigate the risk.
Picture on top: Guatemalan Maras members arrested by special police - Courtesy: Noorlarnet.uoi.no

Guatemala: affected by violent crime and impunity. Is this a never ending tunnel?

2009-08-20T10:42:00.000-07:00

I am writing this post from the Dubai Airport lounge while I am waiting for my connection flight to New York. Just concluded a three months security mission in Sri Lanka where I was in charge of the security of staff, assets and operations of in international organization in the North of the country. I will write soon a post about the challenging security situation in the island. In the meantime, I believe it would be logic continue with the Latin American “chapter” i.e. my security experience in Centro/Latin America in order to give more uniformity to the structure of this blog.
I conducted my RSA in Guatemala in February 2008, visited Guatemala City and the field office located in Jocotan/Los Amates. In that period an interesting debate around the best method (if ever any) to reduce/eliminate the impunity was taking place. Such discussion, both intellectual and political, was stimulated by creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, its Spanish acronym). The United Nations in fact in December 2006 signed an agreement with the Guatemalan Government to set up an independent commission, to investigate illegal armed groups that have been operating in the Central American country with impunity and to help justice officials carry out criminal prosecutions against them. In February 2007, three Salvadoran parliamentarians and their driver were assassinated by senior members of the Guatemalan National Civilian Police, including the head of the organized crime unit. Four of those police officers were themselves subsequently killed while in a high security Guatemalan jail. The incident has demonstrated the extent to which illegal security organizations have infiltrated high levels of state institutions in Guatemala.
The Commission should be able to conduct its own investigations and also help local institutions, particularly the Office of the Public Prosecutor. According with the UN official press report “The Commission currently had about 20 ongoing investigations and had proceeded to criminal prosecution in four cases... One of those involved the massacre of 12 persons and related to the rivalry between organized groups; another case dealt with police corruption and concerned groups that kidnapped children”. Reality is that corruption and impunity are still dramatically affecting Guatemala and its neighbouring countries and the above Commission has noble intention but scarce power.

Author assessing flour mill security measures at Los Amates.

Violent criminal activity continues to be a problem in Guatemala, including murder, rape, and armed assaults against foreigners. The police force is inexperienced and under-funded, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and inefficient. Well-armed criminals know there is little chance they will be caught or punished. Traditionally, Guatemala experiences increases in crime before and during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons.
Large demonstrations occur throughout Guatemala, often with little or no notice, and can cause serious traffic disruptions. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent, and travellers should avoid areas where demonstrations are taking place. The use of roadblocks and/or blocking of public facilities, including the international airport, has increased and demonstrators may prevent tourists caught behind the blockades from leaving.

Poster relating human being trafficking with impunity.

In 2007 particularly virulent rumours of child stealing and of murder for organ harvesting have been reported in several different areas of Guatemala frequented by foreigners. During my visit in the country numerous Guatemalan citizens have been lynched for suspicion of child stealing, and three local women who allegedly facilitated foreign adoptions were attacked by a mob that accused them of kidnapping and killing a girl whose mutilated remains were found near Camotan, Chiquimula (near the Honduran border on the main road leading to the Copan Mayan ruins). In reaction to unconfirmed reports of babies being kidnapped in the El Golfete area of the Rio Dulce (near Livingston, Izabal), residents of small villages in the area remain mobilized and suspicious of all outsiders, including foreigners. I passed by there areas. Talking with the people I perceived an overall distress and a total lack of confidence in the Police and the institutions in general. In Sayaxche, Petén, child stealing rumours escalated into mob action against a Guatemalan couple believed to be involved in child stealing. Mobs have also targeted police, resulting in delayed or ineffective responses by law enforcement.
Due to uncontrolled drug and alien smuggling, the Guatemalan border with Mexico is a relatively high-risk area, in particular in the northern Petén Department. The most dangerous area in that region is on the north-western border in the area that includes the Sierra de Lacandon and Laguna del Tigre National Parks.
My concern was/is that the staff, above all the expatriates, could be targeted to send a clear message to the international community as such and to the UN to stop the investigations of the Commission against Impunity. No attacks have taken place so far but this remains a valid warning since general security situation has not changed. Violent crime, however, is a serious concern due to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and dysfunctional law enforcement and judicial systems.
The number of violent crimes officially reported has remained high in recent years. Incidents include, but are not limited to, assault, theft, armed robbery, carjacking, rape, kidnapping, and murder. Criminals often operate in groups of four or more and are confrontational and violent. Gangs are a growing concern in Guatemala City and rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well armed with sophisticated weaponry and they sometimes use massive amounts of force. Emboldened armed robbers have attacked vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Travel on rural roads always increases the risk of a criminal roadblock or ambush. Widespread narcotics and alien smuggling activities can make remote areas especially dangerous. However, violent criminal activity on the highways continues, and foreigners, among others, have been targeted. Many of the robbery attempts have occurred in daylight hours on main highways. Carjacking incidents and highway robberies are often violent. Private vehicles, taxis and shuttle buses have been attacked. Typically, the assailants steal money, passports, and luggage. In some cases, assailants have been wearing full or partial police uniforms and have used vehicles that resemble police vehicles, indicating that some elements of the police might be involved. Travel after dark anywhere in Guatemala is extremely dangerous.
In conclusion, I would define as the most pernicious threats the virulent violent organized crime and the institutional failure to bring perpetrators of crimes to justice creating thus a denial attitude of the victims' right to justice and redress.
In the next post about Guatemala I will outline the external threat analysis, the organized criminal activities and the natural disaster risk (contingency plans) posed mainly by tropical hurricanes and volcanoes (22 out of which 4 active).

Photo on top: Courtesy totheroots.files.wordpress.com

Maras: juvenile Central American gangs as outcome of poverty and deprivation. Impact on security.

2009-08-16T02:42:00.000-07:00

When I visited El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua I had the chance to face up the phenomenon of Maras, juvenile gangs, that dramatically affects the security of these and other countries, including some areas of the United States.
There are entire territories which are under the Maras control, almost impenetrable to low enforcement agencies and regular citizens. When I conducted my RSA in Central America I discovered that to get into that zones, where permitted, a “war tall” (payment of a fee) was requested. It has been reported that those who refused to pay have been killed on site. Originally, the gang's main purpose was to protect Salvadoran immigrants from other, more established gangs of Los Angeles, who were predominantly comprised of Mexicans and African-Americans. For this reason, the gang initially allowed only Salvadorans to join, but later admitted other Central Americans as members. As I exposed in my previous post it might exist a potential collusion between the Maras and international terrorist groups. It should be noted that in 2005, Honduran Security Minister Oscar Alvarez and the President of El Salvador raised alarm by claiming that Al-Qaeda was meeting with one of the most powerful Mara, MS-13 better known as Salvatrucha and other Central American gangs to help them infiltrate the United States. FBI agents said that the U.S. intelligence community and governments of several Central American countries found there is no basis to believe that MS-13 is connected to Al-Qaeda or other Islamic radicals, although there have been security meetings at ministral level within the Central American governments. In the above picture Honduran Special Police stand over Mara Salvatrucha gang members after anti-gang operation in Tegucigalpa, Courtesy Reuters/Roberto Carlos).
During my RSA trip in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras the Maras were attacking the bus lines in order to bribe the line owners and bus drivers. Drivers and bus staff were assaulted and, in the worst case scenario killed. The most unfortunate event took place in San Pedro de Sula December 23 2004 when a gunmen opened fire on a overcrowded bus. 28 passengers died, six of those were children. In this case specifically the Mara wanted to send a clear message to the government in order to counterbalance the police successful raids anti gangs. MS-13 now has an estimated 25,000 members in Honduras, El Salvador and other Central American nations. I have been in Honduras in April 2009, just before the military coup and it seems to me that little has been done to resolve the gang security problem.To understand why maras are so popular in Central America we have to dig a little in the socio-cultural context of their members. Maras often represent the only possibility to survive in difficult, poor and violent environments. Children and adolescents living in poor deprived and literally abandoned neighborhoods see the Mara as the only possibility of achieving social recognition. To gain access to the gang an initiation ritual must be successfully completed by the aspirant mareros. They can be involved in selling and smuggling drugs, participate in fighting against opposite gangs or commit homicides. Killing is considered by Mara as “regular procedure”, it represents a success (eliminate enemies, counterparts, policemen and suspects) and a personal accomplishment for the killer.

All Central American governments have in a way or another structured and launched their own programme deemed necessary to violently respond to the Mara long arm. The programme have functioned partially since the governments wanted to reduce the imminent risk posed by the gangs but did not address at all the social-cultural-economic unease which is the base for such criminal illicit outcome. The failure to proper consider the context of unrest and poverty using an immediate armed reaction has shown that governments won the battle but not the war against maras. In other words such approach would suggest the recognition of a larger political failure in terms of lack of public assistance, proper education if any, health cares, etc.
If in the next future the governments of the gang-affected countries will not implement a wider holistic approach to their most vulnerable citizens, assisting and taking care of those less fortunate, the Maras will dramatically continue to increase their capability with an evident repercussion on the life of all citizens and on the security in general.

RSA in El Salvador - Security Threats

2009-08-12T22:50:00.000-07:00

I conducted the RSA in El Salvador in February 2008. I visited the Capital City San Salvador and three field locations San Lorenzo, Ahuachapán, Tacuba. In Tacuba I went to see an orphanage of undernourished/abandoned children which received humanitarian support by the Organization I was working for. It was a very touching experience.
The insecurity remains at higher levels and has become one of the most felt problems by the population. The Press and TV News report frequently about crimes, assaults, rapes and other types of violations. The travelers must be aware about risks posed by criminality and should use private vehicles, avoiding (if possible) walking and taking public transportation. Frequently demonstration and protests arise, planned by workers organizations or citizens, due to the deficiency of resources like drinking water, unemployment, high delinquency levels, etc. Such demonstrations have blocked streets and highways in several parts of the country, which can directly or indirectly affect field missions (movement restrictions, etc). The high level of impunity is an element of tension that must be taken into serious consideration as well. The number of Salvadorian deported from the US is estimated in about 200 per month. The great majority of them have been arrested for criminal actions in the United States or because of their status of illegal immigrants. Some civil organizations and NGOs, have questioned the work of the Civil National Police (PNC Spanish acronym) which is deemed generally corrupted. According to a recent country evaluation prepared by UNDP El Salvador, the country has one of the higher crime rates in the region. In fact, it has been estimated that the number of fire guns circulating are about 500.000 out of which 300.000 are illegal, and 80 % of all homicides are committed with fire guns. The above report projects that about 80% of UN personnel or their relatives, families or near friends in El Salvador have directly or indirectly been affected by delinquency acts. Regarding the natural disasters, El Salvador might suffer during the winter time, floods and water-drainages. Furthermore one of the most important natural threats is the earthquakes (last ones in 2001, two quakes). In this regards the country is very vulnerable and only few the buildings can be consider properly “anti-seismic”.

Author visiting an orphanage in Tacuba in order to assess field operators security conditions.

El Salvador participates with his military contingents to the US lead coalition in the Iraq war. The US from their part has given the country a large number of working visas for the Salvadorian people. El Salvador has recently decided to participate to the ALBA, Venezuelan lead alliance (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas), as its Spanish initials indicate, which proposes an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in its Spanish initials), differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization.
The recently elected President of El Salvador, Carlos Mauricio Funes as the candidate of the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) took office on 1 June 2009. He is the first FMLN party leader not to have fought in the civil war. His presidential campaign was highlighted by statements endorsing moderate political policies. He has promised to increase taxes on the rich to pay for programs such as health care in rural areas and crime prevention.
CRIME: The criminal threat in El Salvador is critical. Random and organized violent crime is endemic throughout El Salvador. Political or economic issues in the country may give rise to demonstrations, sit-ins or protests at any time or place, but these activities are most frequent in the capital or on its main access roads. Many Salvadorans are armed, and shootouts are not uncommon. Armed holdups of vehicles traveling on El Salvador's roads appear to be increasing, and several incidents involving foreigners have been reported. The homicide rate in the country increased 25 percent from 2004 to 2005, and El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Both violent and petty crimes are prevalent throughout El Salvador. Armed assaults and carjacking take place both in San Salvador and in the interior of the country, but are especially frequent on roads outside the capital where police patrols are scarce. Criminals have been known to follow cars leaving the international airport to private residences or secluded stretches of road where they carry out assaults and robberies. Armed robbers are known to shoot if the vehicle does not come to a stop. Criminals often become violent quickly, especially when victims fail to cooperate immediately in surrendering valuables. Frequently, victims who argue with assailants or refuse to give up their valuables are shot. Kidnapping for ransom continues to occur, but have decreased in frequency since 2001.
The “Mara” phenomenon:
On various occasions the media has linked some local “Maras” (local gangs) with Al-Qaeda activities or structures.
El Salvador has both Arab and Jewish communities, not large in terms of adherents but powerful, representative and influential. Their members are important merchants and landowners. I will write an article about Maras soon in order to analyze the risks posed by such criminal gangs to security.
Terrorist Action:
Despite the image El Salvador projects outside its borders, as Central American country, there are some factors that indicate that a terrorist action risk cannot be fully excluded. The level of crime is well known. Less, probably, the international implications related with the participation of El Salvador at the military coalition lead by the United States in Iraq since 2003. The military Salvadoran contingent is composed of approx. 380 Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada) members, who are replaced every 6 months. The mentioned Salvadoran military contingent in 4 years of participation at the Iraq campaign has had a total of 6 deaths and about 20 wounded many of them related to military actions. In 2004, El Salvador would have received a direct threat by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization but no terrorist related incidents have took place so far. As of August 2009, all non-U.S. coalition members had withdrawn from Iraq.

San Lorenzo Church, destroyed by a recent earthquacke.

Cucuta (Colombia) – Cross border influence from Venezuela. Security considerations.

2009-08-10T03:55:00.000-07:00

I decided to write this article about Cucuta, Colombian bordering town with Venezuela, following a declaration of the Colombian government which few days ago claimed it found in a raid on a FARC guerrilla camp three AT-4 rocket launchers with serial numbers that connect them to the Venezuelan army. The manufacturer of the weapons, Swedish company Saab Bofors Dynamics, confirmed via the Swedish Foreign Ministry that the serial numbers on the arms matched a sale it made to Venezuela in the 1980s.

Despite the fact that both sides are using such events to fuel their propaganda, I would like analyze here how these two neighbors are “unofficially” connected the and how such relation affects areas like Cucuta.
I visited Cucuta during my long RSA tour in Colombia since there was based a field office which were conducting humanitarian operations in the surrounding areas of Norte de Santander, part of Magdalena region, Catatumbo, part of Boyacá region.
Cucuta is particularly “affected” by the vicinity with Venezuela and such geographic proximity influences the life and the entire economy of the town. The most evident phenomenon is the smuggling of gasoline from Venezuela. At every corner “Pimpineros” (gas smugglers) sell their product without any fear of being caught by the police. There are no regular gas stations in town. Besides, there are several cars with Venezuelan plate owned by Colombians. Vehicles are cheaper in Venezuela due to lower taxes applied on cars.
Colombian armed groups cross the border with Venezuela in order to recover and relax, the borders appear to be porous in different unsurveilled points. Other border-related phenomena are prostitution and smuggling of precious metals and other materials.
Today, Cucuta has become one of the most violent cities in Colombia. Collective violence and organized crime left more than 1,300 people dead yearly (an average of 3.5 people per day). Cucuta’s official homicide rate is calculated at 128 per 100,000 people, nearly as high as that of Medellin, Colombia’s most violent city (184/100,000 people). The police estimate that approx 80% of homicides in Cucuta are linked to the violent conflict and another 20% to common crime. The trend has been followed in San Cristóbal, the Venezuelan border city just forty minutes from Cucuta. Numerous reasons contribute to the sharp increase in violence. First, violence has been on the rise since the early 1990s, when coca cultivation in the northern region of La Gabarra was introduced; subsequently, cultivation, production and illicit trade rose sharply. Second, as the capital of the Norte de Santander department and a border city, Cucuta has developed dynamics in which drug trafficking, poverty, licit and illicit trans-border trade activities, organized crime and common crime are thriving. Third, the escalation of war in the Catatumbo is having an impact on Cucuta. Catatumbo, located between the Colombia’s Andes mountains and the border with Venezuela, is considered one of the most dangerous areas in Colombia. There are extensive illicit coca cultivations and large logistic facilities have been established there by guerrilla groups. FARC and ELN are sharing territory and fighting to control it. This situation forced a large part of the population to leave the area and relocate to Venezuela. Interstate talks are in progress. The aim is to try to solve the dramatic condition of displaced people (IDPs). The Catatumbo area is often impossible to reach due to the high risk posed by guerrilla fighters. Each sign or indication of anything/anyone related to the United States can create an aggressive public reaction against visitors and operations due to the psychological association USA - evil State made by guerrilla activists. Such behavior has not been noted in other areas of Colombia.
Major guerrilla groups are present in the area as well as paramilitaries (former “Autodefensa”) who apparently should have taken the legal opportunity through a government programme to leave the armed groups they use to belong to. The majority of them have instead reorganized themselves acquiring the name of Black Eagle (Aguila Negra). Aguila Negra started a real mafia system which forces commercial activities and private company to pay a price in exchange of security.
To reach such illicit/violent stage they previously eliminated most of local criminals obtaining “de facto” the title of “protectors of security”. Police is not capable to eliminate/reduce this
trend.

Coca transformation laboratory in Catatumbo. Courtesy Radio Santa Fe

The paramilitaries are seeking to consolidate the entire region, including Cucuta. Conversely, urban centers such as Cucuta constitute safe havens for the guerrilla forces, in which they can further develop counterattacks and mobilize combatants. Urban militias (FARC, ELN and EPL) have a strong presence in poor shanties at the city’s periphery. At the same time, other paramilitary groups (Cordoba, Uraba, Cesar blocs) frequently patrol poor urban barrios and engage in social cleansing. There is a clear trend by the guerrilla forces to shift from rural to urban warfare, a new strategy which seeks to undermine Uribe’s security measures. Several oil pumping stations owned by state and private companies are located in this area. The Army is defending State owned facilities while private companies have to pay a price to guerrilla to secure both workers and installations. The pipeline transports oil from this region to the harbors located along the Caribbean Coast.
THE THREAT:
The main threats in the region are related to the high concentration of armed actors and are that of being caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups, being kidnapped and car accidents.
Communication is vital here. Recommended HF, VHF radios, cellular and satellite phones
Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is medium for the Cucuta town and high for the rural areas of the region. The Catatumbo remain an almost inaccessible region (very high risk). The local communities try to deal with terrorists having sometimes the possibility to act as mediators and negotiators, facilitating the dialogue among the parts.
Road Safety:
The conditions of the roads in Cucuta town are good but worsen where IDPs are settled. A high number of motorbikes circulate in town on a daily basis, motorcyclists usually do not respect traffic regulations. The risk an accident by road travel is assessed as high.
Medical Emergency:
Medical facilities in town are good, but the rural areas suffer of lack of medical infrastructures. The risk of not receiving adequate medical attention in Cucuta is assessed as low. Risk is assessed as medium in rural areas. It is fundamental arrange in advance a Medical Evacuation air operation system (MEDEVAC) in order to evacuate eventual severe injured staff.

Quibdó (Colombia): security challenges posed by guerrilla in a complex geographic environment.

2009-08-08T00:39:00.000-07:00

I visited Quibdó during my last RSA mission in Colombia in 2007. The town of Quibdó is the district capital of Chocó in the north west of Colombia. The region has some of the worst national indicators in terms of poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, maternal and child health. The regional capital, Quibdó, shelters more displaced persons per capita – tens of thousands of them – than any other population centre in Colombia.
Along the banks of the nearby Atrato, San Juan and Baudó rivers, hundreds of thousands of mainly Afro-Colombians and indigenous civilians are trapped in the web of war. The armed gangs who control the waterways do not allow them to fish, hunt or gather wood. The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its proximity to, and border with Panama and the Pacific coastline. The area is heavily used for the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and other contraband items. The terrain is very harsh with mountains and thick jungle in abundance. The road infrastructure consists of only two access routes into the region from the east. The main form of transportation is by the complex river network. Visitors to the region are advised to only travel on essential business and by air only.
The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There has been an escalation in these clashes over the last two years as a result of Colombian military pressure in the region. Whilst the town of Quibdó itself is under government control, all other parts of the district are considered extremely dangerous as various armed groups struggle for control in the region.
Whilst there are no formal agreements in place and delivery missions are frequently stopped at illegal checkpoints (often our boat was stopped during navigation in the river), there have been very few incidents of antagonism, violence against staff or theft. It should be borne in mind that, as the military continue to increase the pressure on these groups both in action and logistically, the area can face up an escalation of violence.
Supplies cargos have been stopped by illegal military actors as well as government armed forces apparently to avoid that the shipment could end in the hands of guerrilla.
The phenomenon of displacement of people in this area is massive. Huge areas of wooden and cellophane made houses surround Quibdó’ town. Colombian displaced people have crossed the border to Panama looking for a better future.
The two most important ethnic communities in the area are the Afro-Colombian and the autochthonous indigenous populations. Both of them are conducting a “Pacific Resistance” to guerrilla which forces them to leave their native locations. They passively resist until illegal armed groups start taking actions, killing people. They are forced to share their space with terrorists. Both communities have a territory legally recognized by the State of Colombia.
THE THREAT
The main external threat in Chocó district remains that of domestic terrorist activity. The major internal risk to personnel is river travel and its associated hazards.
The risk of domestic terrorist actions is assessed as high (there may be cross over in this threat area to organized crime).
There is an identified threat to international staff working in the Chocó’ region. This is primarily due to the threat of kidnapping, as westerners are generally seen as a more valuable target than local nationals. The presence of international staff can significantly alter the security profile of an operation.
ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in Chocó in particular. Affluent nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnappings. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Chocó district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers. The armed groups are under continuous pressure from both the military and each other and resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential threat to operations. Very few outsiders visit the region and seldom venture out of Quibdó. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high. Two Army Brigades specialized in antiterrorism and counter-guerrilla are settled in town and have recently attacked guerrilla troops in the area of S. Juan (rural area).
MEDICAL EMERGENCY:
Medical facilities are rudimentary. There is a hospital in Quibdó which offers basic emergency services on a pre payment basis. There are no medical facilities outside of the main towns and very poor means of evacuation from mission areas. The risk of not receiving adequate medical attention at the Quibdó in is assessed as high.

RIVER TRAVELS:

Travel is dangerous. At least 600 people have been killed in the last few years according to the main Afro-Colombian Association, ACIA.
The requirement to travel by river presents some unique risks to the Quibdó operation. There are many diseases present in and around the river areas, including tuberculosis, pulmonary pathologies, diarrhea and yellow fever. A large amount of debris floating on and submerged in the river water can put at risk navigation and is often very difficult to see. This includes dead trees and sunken boats and creates a major hazard to river traffic. The risk of injury or severe illness as a result of river travel is assessed to be high.
I would call the Quibdó Region the hidden treasure in Colombia for its natural beauty and it geographical structure.

Cartagena (Colombia) – RSA surrounded by a beautiful colonial atmosphere.

2009-08-03T08:20:00.000-07:00

Cartagena is a beautiful colonial town. I visited it in 2007 while carrying out my RSA mission in Colombia. Probably the nicest colonial urban area in the Caribbean. It lies along the Caribbean shores in the North of Colombia in a strategic area used by the Spaniards in the XV-XVII centuries to ship to Europe gold and precious material coming form the New World. Despite its nice appearance and its touristic vocation several are the threats to consider while preparing the Risk Assessment related mainly to its surrounding districts (organized crime, drug cartels wars, kidnapping, extortion, etc). There are different security phases for the centre and the periphery. Cartagena centre enjoys a lower secutiy phase (1 in a scale of 5). The town is well guarded and surveilled by regular and tourist police who protects tourists and the related income generated by tourism, while the situation worsens in the suburbs (phase 2). Those areas are affected by poverty and violence. Large camps of displaced people (IDPs) who were forced by guerrilla to leave their villages in the Colombian inner areas have been established here. Same threats affect the bordering districts of Sucre, Atlántico, Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Cesar. The whole area is of strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North and in particular to the ports of the Caribbean coast which are a main transit route for both legal and illegal trade.
The town of Cartagena is a very popular holiday destination for many Colombians with an historic old colonial town (Ciudad Murallada) coupled with beaches and high rise accommodation. On the other hand, the city has some desperately poor areas. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces and the pattern of the conflict follows a similar trend to the rest of the country with the main armed groups struggling for control of territory within Cartagena and control of the strategic routes, fertile drug-crop land and mineral resources in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of people within these districts, as local farmers try to flee the contested areas. As said, the town itself is secure due to high concentration of police and military troops which are trying to preserve intact the flux of tourists. Tourism is the engine of the economy in Cartagena.
There is a huge economic difference between down-town Cartagena and the surroundings (very poor and extended areas). This difference causes social tensions and violence. Internationals visiting the region must be aware about the risk of kidnappings, for both political reasons and extortion. The best mitigating measure is the adoption of a low profile and low visibility while visiting the country. Accidental shooting is another element to consider while analyzing the risk. Although there are undoubtedly many illegal weapons in the region, the risk of accidental shooting in the region can be assessed as medium, low in Cartagena.
Organized Criminal Activity:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in the Northern region. Nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnapping. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Cartagena district, mainly in Cordoba and Monte de Maria areas, including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers, as the government forces are capable of controlling only parts of the area and only the main routes in particular.
Road Travel:
Road travel within Cartagena is normal for a large urban city. There is risk of crime, particularly at night. The road conditions within the town are good. In the rural areas, the road conditions are generally poor on main transit routes. In the project areas many of the local roads are not surfaced and in some instances operations are cancelled when weather conditions render parts of the routes too dangerous to travel. There is high risk of criminal/armed group activity in the rural areas. My recommendation is to travel only in areas with low/acceptable risk. Never take the initiative to adventure in unknown places. Travel always in group. Last but not least bring always your cell phone with you and be sure that police number is promptly available.

This map highlights (red) the high concentration of IDPs in the North of Colombia - OCHA Courtesy

RSAs in Cali – Medellin (Colombia). Security challenges.

2009-07-31T02:33:00.000-07:00

Why compare two different Colombian cities, with different back grounds, different developments and history? It has been deemed interesting put side by side the security contexts of Cali and Medellin for two reasons: both have similar factors threatening stability and security, and secondly I wanted to understand which kind of security measures were adopted in two diverse environments with similar characteristics. In other words, taking into account the slight difference between the two situations, which was the most successful security model adopted?
I conducted my RSA in Cali and Medellin between January and February 2007 and at the first glance both towns appeared very interesting, the people friendly and the quality and quantity of commercial activities amazing.
CALI (Valle del Cauca District): In the area several armed actors (FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, recent armed entities like Aguila Negra, local criminal gangs, etc) are conducting their operations. The town is strategic to control the illicit cultivation of coca as well as for the routes towards the sea to export the final product. The government identified an area in the region (among locations Florida, Palira, Pradera) to facilitate the exchange of rebel prisoners with kidnapped people by guerrilla, trough the programme “Humanitarian Agreement”. The operation so far has not produced the expected results and the programme is currently suspended. In March 2009, the FARC wanted to exchange 22 captured members of the security forces for 500 guerrillas currently held in Colombian and U.S. prisons. The Colombian Government rejected such an exchange and demanded the FARC to unilaterally release their hostages. The FARC is suspected to also hold hundreds of civilians hostage for extortion. They are not part of the proposed exchange.
The centre of the town of Cali is well protected by police but in the surroundings illegal armed groups are almost free to circulate and conduct their business. The main threat in the region is related to the high concentration of armed actors. This factor can endanger travelers who can be caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups. Wrong place and wrong moment.
The town of Cali has been divided in areas controlled by (at least) 20 different criminal gangs. Most of them have direct contact with organized guerrilla armed groups.
The actual government has improved greatly the security of Colombian urban areas, included Cali, leaving peripheries with little order and security. It is recommended to be properly informed about the security situation prior any movement in town since the situation is very volatile. The phenomenon of kidnapping is still high. Kidnappings take place for two main reasons: a “political” one, to put pressure on politician to obtain favors or exchange of “prisoners” or as an extortion to finance illicit activities. Often kidnapped people are sold by local criminal gangs to organized armed guerrilla groups. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high.

Author at Medellin Botero's Park

MEDELLIN (Antioquia District). The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North West. The town of Medellin is surrounded by hills and the region in general is rugged. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There are two distinct areas of conflict: the urban city of Medellin and rural areas in the surrounding district. The main armed groups are primarily struggling for control of territory and control of the strategic routes, mineral resources and infrastructure projects (e.g. hydro) in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas around the district. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of peoples (IDPs). The level of local criminality is high too. Several gangs control urban territory (with limitations in the city center “Poblado”) which are interconnected with guerrilla.
Within the district, local farmers try to flee the contested areas. Many are the illegal armed groups operating in the Antioquia district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban center. The armed groups are under continuous pressure both from the military and from rival gangs. Resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential increase of tension among populations.
Risk mitigation measures recommended for both locations:
Here a check list of recommended security measures for field offices deemed necessary to reduce the risk posed by both drug cartels activities and common criminality:
· Guards: well trained and equipped, ideally armed.
· Alarm: movement/vibration sensors should be installed throughout the office location, including parking lot, fence, etc.
· Video recording surveillance system: active on a 24/7 basis.
· Fence: ideally a proper (wall/barbed wire) high fence should protect premises. On top a signaled electric fence should be mounted.
· Dogs: If possible trained watchdogs can be used to improve security mainly during night hours. Dogs must be trained and properly managed.
· Minimal visibility: the visibility of the office and official vehicles should be minimal. Anonymity will help prevent assaults. Neither office nor vehicles should have external signs and indication about business conducted there.
· Blast Resistant Film (BRF): it is recommended that windows of the office to be treated with BRF.
· Snipers: as an extreme measure one or two member of the guard force can be positioned on top of the roof in strategic position in order to better surveil the activity in the roads in the close proximity of the building. This activity can be organized on a special occasion basis (when a special security threath occurs – political unrest and protests, violent events, criminal activities, etc) or on a regular basis.
· Vehicles: should be armored, equipped with bullet proof vests, helmets, radio communication systems (HF, VHF, cellular, sat phone), GPS tracking system, first aid kit, fire extinguisher, etc.

Natural Disaster Contingency Plan for Volcanic Eruption - Considerations

2009-07-27T03:26:00.000-07:00

This article wants to present the practical features of a Natural Disaster Contingency Plan focused on threat posed by a volcano. A contingency plan is an anticipatory emergency plan to be followed in an expected or eventual disaster, based on Risk Security Assessment, availability of human and material resources, community preparedness, local and international response capability, etc.
It worth remind that since 1980, volcanic activity worldwide has killed more than 29000 people and displaced more than one
million others.
Here I would like to show some aspects of a Contingency Plan prepared to deal the potential eruption and the collateral effects of a volcano (I reviewed/updated such plan when conducted my RSA in the Colombian city of Pasto, located steps away from the active Volcano Galeras - see previous article).
The guidelines here exposed can be considered as baseline for a successful natural disaster contingency plan, as part of a national security plan created to mitigate risks to staff, assets, operations in a given specific field location. The company/organization national security plan should be interfaced with a broader governmental/civil defense plan.
The security officer on the field is usually tasked to liaise with central authorities and make sure that the local contingency plan reflects major evacuation strategies and procedures to be interrelated and implemented at national level as well.
The contingency plan usually takes into consideration three phases of the emergency: the alerting phase, the reacting phase and the protection phase.
The most delicate one is the first phase of the plan. It is absolutely important to pay particular attention to the preparation phase, i.e. to the mechanism that must be put in place before the eruption occurs. Since it is very difficult to predict when a natural disaster will take place or how severe it will be, the only aspect that can be controlled is preparation for a disaster and the respose methodology during and after the disaster. Here a brief check list of items which must be prepared prior any natural disaster emergency.
1. Keep emergency items ready at all times and in one place which is easy to reach and known to the whole staff, i.e.:
· Food: keep a stock which requires little cooking and no refrigeration (electric power may be interrupted);
· Emergency cooking equipment: a small portable gas camping stove is perfect, with spare gas cylinders;
· First-aid kit;
· Blankets;
· Emergency spare clothing;
· Lights, flashlights, pocket torch in working order;
· Portable radio with spare batteries, etc.
2. Take safety measures with respect to valuables (savings, passbook, securities, cash, precious metals, wills, including electronic assets such portable hard drivers, laptops, etc). Particular attention must be paid to info backups. Data backup must take place on a daily basis and hard copies of backups should be stored in a special certified anti natural disaster/fire caveau or safe room away from office location. Banks or specialized companies usually offer such service.
3. In case you are at your residence during the event, know how and where to turn off your electricity, gas, water and central heating oil.
4. Practical evacuation exercises must be organized and conducted in order to improve the staff readiness. Such evacuation plan must indicate a concentration point where staff have to go after the evacuation and establishes clear and effective communication measures. If the disaster takes place after business hours each staff’s family has to make advance arrangements to get in touch with all family members.
5. A shelter can be located in the concentration point in the vicinity of the office building and escape routes must be clearly marked.
6. The main concept behind the natural disaster contingency plan is that unless one is not qualified to give valuable emergency assistance or have been allocated some specific task in connection with the disaster, keep away from disaster areas if you are not already involved. Your presence will only hamper rescue, first-aid or relief work. This is no time for sight-seeing.
7. It is vital to follow the instruction contained in the plan and do not worry public officials with any matters that are not urgent. Your other problems will be dealt with later.
If the natural phenomenon includes an earthquake a different contingency plan apply, which includes features of the classic earthquake contingency plan and the one above. The plan must be carefully prepared by a security professional and staff have to be aware of it and trained on its content.
I will write soon about other specific natural disaster contingency plans which will consider separately the following natural events: earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons and cyclones) with a focus on hurricanes. I conducted RSAs in several Central American/Caribbean countries where the most important threat is posed on a regular basis by hurricanes.
The Natural Disaster Contingency Plan for Volcanic Eruption identifies as well the responsibilities of the respective stakeholders in managing volcanic risk and emergencies.
The second phase, the reactive phase, commences on the completion of the alerting phase activities. During this time all the security procedures must be implemented with special care to the evacuation course of action. The modus operandi related to the evacuation is peculiar of each single location and should follow an accurate previous RSA.
Once reached the concentration point/equipped shelter the third phase takes place. The protection phase can be considered an active/dynamic moment of the plan. At this stage the communication system is working between staff and the identified actors (described in the plan). The internal security structure at national level (if available) or contracted security services can, at this point, provide precise information about a further relocation of staff and assets in a safe area. Such transfer operation can take place via air (normally through helicopters), land or sea (if the location is on sea shores or island).
After the completion of the relocation a second plan has to be implemented: the recovery plan.
I hope this article will be able to give a general understanding of what a contingency plan is and what are the concepts behind it. The scope is once again the protection of staff and valuable assets, regardless the complicated and dangerous environment in which we are operating.

In the chart: the volcano alert levels. Courtesy civildefence.gov.nz

Pasto – Colombia: RSA between natural disaster threat (Volcano Galeras) and drug cartels war

2009-07-25T12:08:00.000-07:00

I conducted a Risk Security Assessment in Pasto in February 2007 and it was one of the most challenging.
Pasto is a nice town in the south of Colombia, not far from the border with Ecuador. Pasto is the major town in the green Nariño region, home of allegedly the best coffee quality produced in the country. The green hills and the perfect microclimate make this region ideal to grow a rich full bodied coffee. In the nearby of the town lies the active volcano Galeras. Seismic activities at a low level have continued at Galeras, with small explosions occasionally dusting nearby villages and towns with ash. The volcano has continued to be well studied, and predictions of eruptions at the volcano have improved. One phenomenon, which seems to be a reliable precursor to eruptive activity, is a low-frequency seismic event known as a tornillo event. These have occurred before about four-fifths of the explosions at Galeras, and the number of tornillo events recorded before an eruption is also correlated with the size of the ensuing eruption. Recently, on February 14, 2009, the volcano erupted and some 8,000 residents were evacuated, and there were no immediate reports of injuries or serious property damage. As in 2005, the city of Pasto was blanketed by a layer of ash after the volcanic explosion (due to the direction of the wind). The local authorities ordered two water treatment plants near Galeras to shut down. On March 13, 2009, Galeras erupted twice. Ash fell on Pasto and some other towns near the volcano, where an evacuation was ordered but reportedly ignored. No injuries or damage were reported.
When I visited the location in 2007, in my RSA report within the natural disaster chapter I described the risk posed by the proximity of downtown office and operations to the volcano. In fact it erupted before my visit and well trained staff were able to evacuate from building precisely and smoothly.
I revised the special “Volcano Galeras” contingency plans and provided recommendation about the conduction of regular practical evacuation exercises in order to mitigate the risk. The next post on this blog is going to be a technical one about Natural Disasters Contingency Plans.
Still the threat is there and in these circumstances timing is essential, regardless the fact that the last eruption took place at one flank of the volcano not involving directly the city.
“Expect the unexpected” is the baseline of every successful RSA.
Regarding the guerrilla factor, it must be said that the area is very strategic for guerrillas and generally speaking for all armed actors. In fact the routes leading from Pasto to the Pacific Ocean are precious for criminal organizations because represent the direct access to the sea and to the departure places to export drugs to Central America or USA.
One of the most famous ports used by drug traffickers is Buenaventura, located miles from the western cordillera of the Andes mountain range and the major city of Cali, the department's capital. Buenaventura has had a notorious history plagued by drug trafficking, violence, and the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In the last two years, the amount of reported homicides has doubled. The murder rate that is 24 times that of New York City, making it a crime rate of 175.2. To counter the violence, the Colombian government has set up a marine Special Forces unit in the worst area of the city. During my visit drug cartels were having an armed confrontation in the city streets.
From Buenaventura drug is loaded on “Go Fast” boats which in hours can reach the Mexican shores transporting up to 5 tons of drug. Usually these boats are refueled during the night by fishing boats. Once mission is accomplished the Go Fasts (worth more than $100.000) are abandoned and the crew can return back Colombia via flight.

Buenaventura is also famous for the handmade submarines which have been created to skip the radar/sonar signals. Those “narco submarine” (also called narco sub, drug sub, Big Foot submarine and Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS)) are home-made marine vessels built by drug traffickers to smuggle their goods. They are used by Colombian drug cartel members to export cocaine from Colombia to the United States. They are typically made of fiberglass, powered by a 300/350 hp diesel engine and manned by a crew of four. With enough cargo space to carry two to ten tons of cocaine, they also carry large fuel tanks, giving them a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 Km). Because much of its structure is fiberglass and it travels nearly below the sea surface, the vessel is virtually impossible to detect via sonar or radar. Narco submarines also have an upper lead shielding to minimize their 'heat signature' and evade infrared sensors. The newer models have piping along the bottom to allow the water to cool the exhaust as the ship moves, making it even less susceptible to infrared detection. About a third of the 600 tons of cocaine coming out of Colombia each year leaves via the Pacific coast and a significant amount is being carried in semi-submersibles. In late January 2009, a Sri Lankan Army task force found three semi-subs being built by Tamil rebels in the jungles of Mullaitivu. With this discovery, the LTTE became the first armed organization to develop underwater weapons. I will write an interesting article about my SRA in the post conflict Sri Lanka soon.
The Nariño region is thus located between the inner Putumayo region and the sea. Putumayo is covered by heavy Amazonic forest in which is cultivated and elaborated a large quantity of cocaine. Besides it serves as safe haven for guerrilla and paramilitaries. The region is difficult to control by government forces. The area is well known for a massive deployment of anti personnel mines used by guerrilla to protect their coca cultivation areas and presence of transformation labs. Pasto can be considered a middle risk site for the reasons exposed above.
Pasto represented a security challenge for two main reasons above exposed: natural disaster threat and presence of guerrilla and drug cartels. As said, the next article will explain how to make a successful assessment of threats posed by natural “force majeure”. Regarding the guerrilla factor, the argument will be divided in different chapters and exposed in future posts.

This semi-summersible is 20 mts long and 5 mts wide.It can transport up to 10 tons of cocaine (street value $700m) - Courtesy darkgovernment.

Road assessment: a building just destroyed during drug cartels war on the route Pasto - Buenaventura

RSA in Colombia - Bogota'

2009-07-22T03:41:00.000-07:00

I have decided to write few articles about the Risk Security Assessment I conducted in Colombia in January – February 2007 for two reasons: first of all, I visited eleven towns in the country so it would be too reductive summarize such an interesting mission in few lines, secondly the general security context is very complex and deserves a fairly deep explanation.
My task was to conduct an evaluation of the risk both at Bogota country office and at each field office location level, performing RSA and thus providing recommendations about how to improve security measures according with the MOSS (Minimum Operating Standard Security).
For obvious confidential reasons I cannot provide details of such mission, besides it would be very boring for readers. Far more interesting is reading these posts as considerations made by a traveler who knows about security.
Let’s start then describing the general security context in Colombia.
Everybody knows that Marxist guerrilla groups began their insurgency in the early 1960s. An estimated 10,000 rebels remain active in various areas. The largest is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), followed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and a splinter group of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). The former right-wing paramilitary groups number an estimated 5,000 to 7,000, were accused of widespread human rights abuses. Few years ago the Colombian government came out with a plan intended to offer to criminal groups an interesting package to stimulate them to leave their illegal activities through a special rehabilitation program (providing jobs, offering salaries etc). The program did not work as expected. In fact, some of them came back to their illicit activities adopting the name of Black Eagles (Aguila Negra), others took apparently advantage of the government offer, but started in parallel then their own local criminal gang, only few returned to legality. Both former paramilitaries and guerrillas rely on the cocaine business to finance their operations.
Colombia is widely regarded as one of the main drug producing countries of the world and a major distribution route. Drug money is used for political and criminal assassinations and for political acceptability, and clashes between guerrilla groups and the army, police and drug gangs, are almost daily occurrences within Colombia. Travel to areas reported to grow and process drugs represents a high risk to personal safety.
Illegal armed groups are accused of deliberately displacing civilians, often to benefit wealthy patrons.
These Internal Displaced People are assisted by the international community through International Organizations, NGOs, etc.
Statistically Colombia is quoted as the country with the highest rate of violent deaths in the world. These are committed every 20 minutes bringing the total to 45,000 per year of which 97% remain unsolved. 61% of all kidnappings, are also carried out in Colombia.
This was the context in which I conducted my RSA.

Ecuadorean soldiers carried away the bodies of Colombian guerrillas killed by the Colombian military during a raid of a rebel camp in Ecuador. The raid set off a diplomatic crisis. Courtesy NY Times.

Bogota’ was for me a real surprise. A very nice town modern and developed. The main threat in Bogotá area remains that of local crime (robbery, credit card cloning etc). The security in general has improved lately thanks to an agreement promoted by the Government, between the Armed Forces, Police and private security companies. Such document promote a better cooperation of the security forces on the ground, giving to thousand private security operators same prerogative as police only when an emergency takes place. In practical terms the number of security “eyes” on the Bogota’ streets tripled. The number of attempted kidnappings and crime related events and dramatically reduced.

Two suburbs of the town are considered “critical” from a crime stand point: Soacha and Ciudad Bolivar. In these two areas is high the presence of IDPs who left their homes located probably in rural areas, forced by guerrilla to leave. They relocated in very precarious conditions in the nearby of large cities, including Bogota.
Just a couple of practical suggestions for those travelling in town, besides the basic security precautions that anybody must adopt when out of home country. When catching a taxi be sure that it belongs to a known “certified” company. Furthermore, as soon as the taxi arrives, pretend to make a call (fake) to somebody saying loudly to wait for you, and that you are arriving with the taxi plated (mention the plate). You could even ask ID card to the driver, if he refuses call another (certified) taxi.
Don’t take the risk to travel between cities in Colombia by car. The car could be attacked in isolated areas. Better fly, flight tickets are generally cheap and the service on board of the Avianca, the national flight company, is very good.
Enjoy Bogota’ its people, its pure Latin brilliant night life, its food and tradition.

Lebanon 2006. Providing security during the conflict. Memories.

2009-07-11T11:14:00.000-07:00

This is the first of a series of posts regarding my professional career and my field security experiences in different countries.
I accepted a challenging assignment offered by an International Organization the day just after the beginning of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (a Shi'a Islamist political and paramilitary organization based in Lebanon), July 13th 2006. I was requested, as Senior Field Security Officer, to go on site and perform a security mission which would have been organized from scratch.
The Organization, in fact, closed the local office few years prior the beginning of the conflict. A huge logistic/humanitarian assistance operation was arranged virtually round the clock.
I accepted the challenge, got an entry vista at the Syrian Embassy the following day and flow to Damascus where I spent three days since Lebanon had all land access points closed. Finally, the only open way in to Lebanon was through the northern town Al Aarida, bordering with Syria.
As soon as I arrived in Beirut I joined other security professionals coming from the US, New Zealand, Australia, etc. We started a new security office within the Organization structuring operations according with humanitarian relief activities intended to transport/distribute food to the populations affected by the conflict. The task was successful nevertheless not risk free.
Particularly, I assessed the security conditions at micro and macro level. After strategizing with the team about best security options to adopt according with the evolution of the conflict, I went on the ground assessing security of public infrastructures (roads, bridges, logistic activities, assets, etc) double-checking and crossing security info.
Furthermore, I organized and provided security to convoys from the Beirut port to southern Lebanon and Beeka Valley locations still under armed Hezbollah control. Both parts involved in the armed conflict were looking at us with skepticism because the Organization was providing humanitarian assistance to the population trapped in the war and when one is “neutral” is treated with suspicion.
The most challenging operation, by the way, it has been the one carried out during a technical communication operation. I was escorting a group of ICT engineers to the top of a mountain facing the Beeka valley while harsh wide battle was taking place. We had been granted by Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) access to the area while an intense IDF artillery fire was hammering from the bottom the mountain where we were operating. Yes we had a clearly marked (armored) vehicle and security clearance but nervousness among staff was perceived.
The artillery fire was closed but the engineers succeeded to replace the repeater rapidly and we abandoned the site using an alternative route.
Beirut represents to me a milestone as security professional. I had the chance to apply some lessons previously learned during my military career. The international environment created among us and our team spirit helped to face up the rapid evolution of events as well as the escalation of the conflict.
The war continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect on August 14, 2006. Hezbollah was responsible for thousands of Katyusha rocket attacks against Israeli civilian towns and cities in northern Israel, which Hezbollah claimed were in retaliation for Israel's killing of civilians and targeting Lebanese infrastructure. In the fighting 1,200 Lebanese and 158 Israelis were killed. Of the dead almost 1,000 Lebanese and 41 Israelis were civilians.

Reached the peace, I concluded my mission and left to South America to conduct other RSAs. I love Lebanon, its people and the magic atmosphere!

Hezbollah bunkers in the proximity of the Litani River.

Visiting a community in the surroundings of Baalbek.

Just after a shelling.

CopyRouter: an ethical efficient security tool or a personal privacy violation structure?

2008-10-23T11:06:00.000-07:00

Recently an Australian company, Brilliant Digital Entertainment Ltd., has marketed in the US a new controversial deep packet inspection technology called CopyRouter, which allows ISPs to check every file passing through their network. In fact, this technology can inspect "every image, every movie, every document attached to an email or found in a Web search, to see if it matches a list of illegal images from a law enforcement agency. This tool has stimulated a world wide open discussion about the ethical use of personal information when the company caught the attention of New York's attorney general, who has been pressing Internet companies to block child porn. He encouraged a technical discussion among larger IT companies with the aiming at strategies/tools to ways to fight child porn.
Now, since internet has always been an “open space” which, at least in general, should be a neutral instrument, objections have been raised by various privacy advocates urging that monitoring all ISP traffic would be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
I would ask comments about this system and the potential use that can be done.
Thanks!

Eyes on the Future - Rochester NY - Oct. 10th 2008 - Gov. David Paterson

2008-10-12T20:04:00.000-07:00

The NY governor delivered his speech at the Eyes on the Future summit, hosted by Greater Rochester Enterprise and the Small Business Council of Rochester, at St. John Fisher College in Pittsford. Paterson's messages essentially were: Don't expect a bailout from Albany (he's been saying for months) and New York has to "say no for a change."
Interesting was the remark related to the connection between the Wall Street mechanisms and the amount of money NY State makes through it (through the Wall Street physical presence in the State). This means that in this period of crisis NYS has been more affected then other States.
My questions: good intentions and great speech, but will he be able to deal with the nation wide financial crisis and how consistent is the incentive programme for small/middle size business in Upstate NY? I wait for your comments.

Security Procedures for Social Networks

2008-10-03T09:39:00.000-07:00

Internet opens up a world of possibilities for us and our children. It's a great place to learn, play, share and grow. However there are people who could represent a potential threat to us and our communities.
That’s why security must be a priority.
We need to know how to protect our family from cyber attacks and be prepared to do it. Education and communication are our first defense against online offender.

There are dozens of security manuals on line which could be suitable to give us basic knowledge about how face up correctly these issues.

From the service provider side (social networks, web sites, on line service environments, etc.) you would like to be protected through a range of security tools, like:
last generation hi tech filters to filter communications through the site. The filters are usually used to provide electronic shields against offenders and wrongdoers. We can call it "Passive Security".
Service provider staff to monitor activities, contents and chat, receive and analyze reports of misconduct and provide personalized player support. This aspect of security can be called "Active".
Both active and passive security are extremely important because the combination of the electronic and human factor is the winning formula in order to reduce the cyberattacks.

How to improve our security on line then?
Promoting security awareness through parents to review the safety precautions with their children. Security can be largely improved with family cooperation. Internet is a great communication tool but potentially unsafe too if not correctly handled. I encourage indeed parents to review the following safety measures with their children:
Never give out personal information, such as your real name, age, location, phone number or school.
Never share your password with anyone except your parents. Someone else might use your password and pretend to be you, give out your personal information or do something that may get you into trouble.
Tell your parents if someone says or does something on the Internet that makes you uncomfortable, or if someone asks you for personal information.
Choose a user name that does not reflect your real identity. Avoid names that are in any way suggestive, even if they seem innocent to you.
Avoid chat rooms that are not monitored by moderators.

These suggestions come from years of experience and good practice. I am trying to refine the security procedures for social network and I have been hired recently to do that. My desire is sharing these recommendations in order to have a cleaner and safer Internet!