Puerto Cabezas (Nicaragua). Challenging security conditions.

After a pause due to family reasons, here I am again describing one of most challenging field location evaluated in Nicaragua, Puerto Cabezas (including the attached area of Bilwi). This post mentions my navigation experience intended to assess security conditions of crew, staff and assets transported by boat.
In fact, the great majority of every day Organization's activities took place by boat (Rio Coco and Caribbean Sea). The article focuses as well about the importance of satellite phones as one of the most reliable - thus not totally secure - communication means.

Puerto Cabezas is a small port area located on the north east Atlantic / Caribbean coastline, at about 560 km northeast of Managua. There are approximately 27,000 inhabitants of Bilwi. In the municipality of Puerto Cabezas there are 51 Miskito (indigenous) communities which combine with Bilwi's population for a total of 51,000 inhabitants. The city is surrounded by several rivers and lagoons. The official languages of the region are Spanish, Miskitu, Sumo, and English. Spanish is predominately spoken however there is a very large segment of the population who speak Miskito. In all communities, Miskito is by far the predominant language. During the two days trip spent in the Puerto Cabezas area, one entire day has been dedicated to the river route along Coco River. This mission has been conducted to assess the condition of navigation and the quality of boats rented by the Organization. The itinerary travelled was Waspam – Sih Ba by boat (8 hour navigation time). In the above picture, Rio Coco and local communities.

Author visiting the Sih Ba Miskito community, reachable only by boat



The threat:
The main threat in the region is related to the moderate concentration of common criminals while the Mara (gangs) phenomenon is less evident in Puerto Cabezas than in the inner areas. The operations conducted by boat present a high risk due to the river conditions and the large quantity of obstacles and debris floating in the river.
The threat level in and around the Puerto Cabezas is assessed as follows:

Road Safety:
The conditions of the roads to reach the communities around the Puerto Cabezas town, up to Waspan (along Coco River) and in the inner region are very poor, not paved but kept in decent conditions. Due to the scarcity of vehicles, the risk of accidents by road travel is assessed as low.

Communications:
Communications in such complex geographical environment are essential. The four means of communications (MOSS compliant) that must be installed and functional are:

• VHF radio set
• HF radio set
• cellular phone (ideally with different SIM cards in order to maximize the use of the coverage)
• satellite phone

In this particular case a fifth communication means was deemed necessary in order to coordinate field work with local communities and improve the emergency respond. In fact, the great majority of the Miskito communities, assisted by the Organization, were using an HF “radio amateur” set which was working with different frequencies. In this case it would be useful to have a proper radio or, infringing the internal rules and agreement with government which assigned to the Organization dedicated frequencies (not recommended), change frequencies on the HF Codan radio apparatus supplied. Such measure can be considered as “preventive” since can be implemented in case of emergency to share security information gained on the ground.

SAT telephones:
There are several models of sat phones available with different features but some older models, even if technically better built, cannot be suitable for the complex environment like the one analyzed here.
In particular the sat phone evaluated in this office location was a Nera model. The Nera sat phone functions well in some circumstances (mainly as a static fixed point communicator). There are however several significant operational problems with its use in the field. It is of the type with a “laptop” type antenna which requires to be pointed directly at the satellite it is trying to communicate with. Any deviation from this line of contact will terminate the communications. This makes it difficult to use on the move. The system is not quick or easy to set up and would be difficult to use in an emergency. The system is not discreet and has caused problems in the past when used in front of naturally suspicious rebels or armed groups at checkpoints. In some cases the groups do not know what it is and this can lead to increased tension. I indeed recommend:
· the use of satellite phone system with a hand held satellite phone for the reasons outlined above. Iridium now has such a product available.
· Every field location should have at least a ready-to-use sat phone handy (SIM card must be placed properly, contract should not be expired, sat must be charged and charger (home/car adaptor) should be always carried with the phone.
· Phones must be transported in proper water-proof bags suitable for boat operations and emergencies.

In the next post I will write about security while operating boats. Puerto Cabezas (Nicaragua) along with Quidbo (Colombia) and Puerto Lempira (Honduras) are all locations which I assessed and currently use boats to carry out their daily duties. So that it is important to understand the security rules and the technical features of the vessels prior any navigation.

NERA Satellite phone with lap top style anntenna. Not recommended for at-risk environment.

Iridium 9555, very efficient sat phone and descreet desing.

Nicaragua, general security situation and (brief) threat analysis

I conducted the security risk assessment in Nicaragua in February 2008. I inspected the Country Office in Managua as well as all field offices and logistic facilities of a worldwide International Organization (Corinto, Puerto Cabezas, Ocotal, Matagalpa, Siuna). A one day boat trip along the Coco River (Waspam) has been conducted in order to verify the navigation security conditions of staff during implementation of field operations in the Northern areas of the country.
The picture shows (me next to) a gigantic Govt propaganda poster of President Daniel Ortega praising his Populist/Socialist political message in favour of the masses.
Nicaragua, as seen in its regional context, is one of the less dangerous countries compared with its neighbours El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. Police coverage is extremely sparse outside of major urban areas, particularly in Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast. Sporadic incidents of highway banditry happen frequently in remote rural areas of north and northwest Nicaragua. In order to reduce the threat of being involved in such criminal event it is recommendable to travel between 6.00 AM and 6.00 PM. Political demonstrations and strikes occur sporadically, are usually limited to urban areas, and occasionally become violent. In the Puerto Cabezas area recently a public protest against local government (Alcaldia) took place. Stones have been launched but the police was able to keep the protest under control.Regarding major organized criminal activities it should be noted that narcotics traffickers often use the Caribbean and Pacific coastal waters. The new luxury houses located in very isolated places show that there is an increment of drug traffic between Colombia and Mexico/US affecting those countries in between.Assaults and armed attacks have been registered in isolated areas, mainly along the route Managua – Puerto Cabezas where overcrowded buses are stopped and travellers robbed.
THREAT ANALYSIS
The greatest area of concern of the internal security is related with several illicit activities conducted by both common and organized criminality. Violent crime in Managua and other cities is increasing, and street crimes are frequent. Pick pocketing and occasional armed robberies occur on crowded buses, at bus stops and in open markets, particularly the large Mercado Oriental, and less frequently at the Huembes market. Gang activity is rising in Managua, though not at levels found in neighbouring Central American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, etc). Gang violence, including robbery, assault and stabbing, is most frequently encountered in poorer neighbourhoods, including the Ticabus area, but has occurred in the neighbourhoods surrounding major hotels, bus terminals and open-air markets.Street crime and petty theft are a common problem in Puerto Cabezas, along both the Nicaraguan Caribbean coast and route Managua – Puerto Cabezas. Lack of adequate police coverage has resulted in these areas being used by drug traffickers and other criminal elements. Taxi drivers and passengers have been victims of robbery, assault, sexual assault, and even murder. It is advisable, before taking a taxi, to be sure that the cab has a red license plate and that the number is clearly legible. The taxi must be properly labelled with the cooperative (company) name and logo. While riding in a vehicle, windows should be closed, car doors locked and valuables placed out of sight.Crimes of opportunity such as car theft, abduction and muggings are ever present. In essence, the high level of criminality has little or no authority and no recourse to Police action in the rural areas is a serious threat to all visitors to, and agencies in, Nicaragua. As mentioned above, almost in all towns (mainly in the centers) the legality and police enforcement have not been fully restored.
Force Majeure:
Hurricanes present a constant threat to Nicaragua during the rainy season which has seen a penetration within the Caribbean Coast in the Puerto Cabezas area. Nicaragua is subject to Earthquakes as well. The last quake in 1972 has partially destroyed Managua. Since the capital lies in the proximity of the S. Andrea fault the exposition at tremors and earthquakes is relevant.

In the next posts I will analyze some interesting aspects of the difficulties encountered by staff deployed in different field locations. Puerto Cabezas represents the most challenging field site for its exposure to hurricanes and its geographic complexity (located on the shores of Rio Coco, facing the Caribbean Sea).

Guatemala - Chapter 2. Overall threat, organized crime and natural disasters.

With this brief post I conclude my “Guatemala” security considerations. In the previous one I described how impunity and regular criminality affect dramatically security in the country. Here are some hints about the overall threats to the humanitarian organization I was in charge of, the organized crime and natural disasters (hurricanes and volcanoes).

The Threat:
There are currently no known specified threats against humanitarian staff and interests in Guatemala other than the general threats prevalent to all organizations and civilians in the country.
Crimes of opportunity such as car theft, abduction and muggings are ever present. In essence, the high level of criminality and little or no authority and no recourse to Police action in the rural areas is a serious threat to all visitors to, and agencies. As mentioned almost in all towns (mainly in the centers) the legality and police enforcement have not been fully restored.

Terrorist Action:
Currently there are no registered incidents of IED or VBED (Vehicle Borne Explosive Device) in Guatemala. However, the authorities have expressed concern and state that they have in the past monitored Muslim extremists travelling trough Guatemala. There are no officially identified terrorist groups by the Guatemalan Government, even though there are constant confrontation with groups such as the EXPAC (ex paramilitaries), which have in the past made their dissatisfaction known through violent means. Nonetheless the security system on site is constantly in touch with local authorities and the international community to ensure that there is an early warning system in place should the terrorist threat increase. However, the terrorist threat can be assessed as low in Guatemala.

Demonstration / political:
There is no obvious potential for politically motivated violence. The activities of the recent born International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), mentioned in my previous article, backed by UN could increase the risk that international organizations could be targeted by organized crime. So far, the current threat of violent demonstration is assessed as low.

Road Accident:
Road travel in Guatemala is hazardous. Road conditions outside of town range from are generally good. The risk of a fatal accident appears to be high. The traffic is heavy in Guatemala City and the drivers have almost no discipline and respect of road regulations. Defensive driving techniques are a must for all drivers. The hazard presented by road travel is assessed as high.

Organized Criminal Activity:
This is the area of major concern in Guatemala. The Maras (youth gangs – see post dated August 16th) are of particular concern, since they are both involved with major drug operations, people smuggling syndicates and regional Mara turf wars. Additionally, they routinely control zones throughout the Capital, running extortion rackets, which include extensive involvement in the countries public transit system. As a result, it is highly recommended not to ride public buses or enter certain zones of Guatemala City and use only approved taxi companies suitable for official or personal travel. Lastly, organized crime groups have also been linked to kidnappings and “express kidnapping”, which take place frequently in Guatemala. Risk level is high.

Natural disasters/Force Majeur:
Hurricanes present a constant threat to Guatemala during the rainy season which has seen in 2005 (Hurricane Stan) approximately 2000 death. Weak government response, limited resources and a limited infrastructure all aggravate this problem. Guatemala is a geologically active country and earthquakes are also a constant concern, as well as flooding and regular power outages throughout the country. Guatemala has also 22 volcanoes, 4 of which are considered active. Volcanic activity, such as that of Fuego Volcano near Antigua in January 2003, and again in January 2006, has on occasion forced evacuations of nearby villages; the January-February 2000 activity of Pacaya Volcano near Guatemala City also briefly closed Guatemala City's international airport. The threat posed by the effects of an earthquake is assessed as high.
Map of Major Volcanoes in Guatemala. Courtesy: intute.ac.uk

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
· Crime is the biggest single threat to International Organizations in Guatemala. Sensible precautions can drastically reduce the probability of personnel becoming victims. Those most at risk are expatriates especially those recently arrived in country. Road traffic accidents are a serious problem. Sound vehicle maintenance and good driving practices will reduce the probability of accidents.
· Staff working in Guatemala City should keep the lowest profile possible while moving from/to the Capital. In this regard, it is recommendable to use magnetic logos for cars only for official missions or when it is strictly necessary in the field. This would reduce the visibility of the operators and mission and mitigate the risk.
Picture on top: Guatemalan Maras members arrested by special police - Courtesy: Noorlarnet.uoi.no

Guatemala: affected by violent crime and impunity. Is this a never ending tunnel?

I am writing this post from the Dubai Airport lounge while I am waiting for my connection flight to New York. Just concluded a three months security mission in Sri Lanka where I was in charge of the security of staff, assets and operations of in international organization in the North of the country. I will write soon a post about the challenging security situation in the island. In the meantime, I believe it would be logic continue with the Latin American “chapter” i.e. my security experience in Centro/Latin America in order to give more uniformity to the structure of this blog.
I conducted my RSA in Guatemala in February 2008, visited Guatemala City and the field office located in Jocotan/Los Amates. In that period an interesting debate around the best method (if ever any) to reduce/eliminate the impunity was taking place. Such discussion, both intellectual and political, was stimulated by creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, its Spanish acronym). The United Nations in fact in December 2006 signed an agreement with the Guatemalan Government to set up an independent commission, to investigate illegal armed groups that have been operating in the Central American country with impunity and to help justice officials carry out criminal prosecutions against them. In February 2007, three Salvadoran parliamentarians and their driver were assassinated by senior members of the Guatemalan National Civilian Police, including the head of the organized crime unit. Four of those police officers were themselves subsequently killed while in a high security Guatemalan jail. The incident has demonstrated the extent to which illegal security organizations have infiltrated high levels of state institutions in Guatemala.
The Commission should be able to conduct its own investigations and also help local institutions, particularly the Office of the Public Prosecutor. According with the UN official press report “The Commission currently had about 20 ongoing investigations and had proceeded to criminal prosecution in four cases... One of those involved the massacre of 12 persons and related to the rivalry between organized groups; another case dealt with police corruption and concerned groups that kidnapped children”. Reality is that corruption and impunity are still dramatically affecting Guatemala and its neighbouring countries and the above Commission has noble intention but scarce power.

Author assessing flour mill security measures at Los Amates.

Violent criminal activity continues to be a problem in Guatemala, including murder, rape, and armed assaults against foreigners. The police force is inexperienced and under-funded, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and inefficient. Well-armed criminals know there is little chance they will be caught or punished. Traditionally, Guatemala experiences increases in crime before and during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons.
Large demonstrations occur throughout Guatemala, often with little or no notice, and can cause serious traffic disruptions. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent, and travellers should avoid areas where demonstrations are taking place. The use of roadblocks and/or blocking of public facilities, including the international airport, has increased and demonstrators may prevent tourists caught behind the blockades from leaving.

Poster relating human being trafficking with impunity.

In 2007 particularly virulent rumours of child stealing and of murder for organ harvesting have been reported in several different areas of Guatemala frequented by foreigners. During my visit in the country numerous Guatemalan citizens have been lynched for suspicion of child stealing, and three local women who allegedly facilitated foreign adoptions were attacked by a mob that accused them of kidnapping and killing a girl whose mutilated remains were found near Camotan, Chiquimula (near the Honduran border on the main road leading to the Copan Mayan ruins). In reaction to unconfirmed reports of babies being kidnapped in the El Golfete area of the Rio Dulce (near Livingston, Izabal), residents of small villages in the area remain mobilized and suspicious of all outsiders, including foreigners. I passed by there areas. Talking with the people I perceived an overall distress and a total lack of confidence in the Police and the institutions in general. In Sayaxche, Petén, child stealing rumours escalated into mob action against a Guatemalan couple believed to be involved in child stealing. Mobs have also targeted police, resulting in delayed or ineffective responses by law enforcement.
Due to uncontrolled drug and alien smuggling, the Guatemalan border with Mexico is a relatively high-risk area, in particular in the northern Petén Department. The most dangerous area in that region is on the north-western border in the area that includes the Sierra de Lacandon and Laguna del Tigre National Parks.
My concern was/is that the staff, above all the expatriates, could be targeted to send a clear message to the international community as such and to the UN to stop the investigations of the Commission against Impunity. No attacks have taken place so far but this remains a valid warning since general security situation has not changed. Violent crime, however, is a serious concern due to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and dysfunctional law enforcement and judicial systems.
The number of violent crimes officially reported has remained high in recent years. Incidents include, but are not limited to, assault, theft, armed robbery, carjacking, rape, kidnapping, and murder. Criminals often operate in groups of four or more and are confrontational and violent. Gangs are a growing concern in Guatemala City and rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well armed with sophisticated weaponry and they sometimes use massive amounts of force. Emboldened armed robbers have attacked vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Travel on rural roads always increases the risk of a criminal roadblock or ambush. Widespread narcotics and alien smuggling activities can make remote areas especially dangerous. However, violent criminal activity on the highways continues, and foreigners, among others, have been targeted. Many of the robbery attempts have occurred in daylight hours on main highways. Carjacking incidents and highway robberies are often violent. Private vehicles, taxis and shuttle buses have been attacked. Typically, the assailants steal money, passports, and luggage. In some cases, assailants have been wearing full or partial police uniforms and have used vehicles that resemble police vehicles, indicating that some elements of the police might be involved. Travel after dark anywhere in Guatemala is extremely dangerous.
In conclusion, I would define as the most pernicious threats the virulent violent organized crime and the institutional failure to bring perpetrators of crimes to justice creating thus a denial attitude of the victims' right to justice and redress.
In the next post about Guatemala I will outline the external threat analysis, the organized criminal activities and the natural disaster risk (contingency plans) posed mainly by tropical hurricanes and volcanoes (22 out of which 4 active).

Photo on top: Courtesy totheroots.files.wordpress.com

Maras: juvenile Central American gangs as outcome of poverty and deprivation. Impact on security.

When I visited El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua I had the chance to face up the phenomenon of Maras, juvenile gangs, that dramatically affects the security of these and other countries, including some areas of the United States.
There are entire territories which are under the Maras control, almost impenetrable to low enforcement agencies and regular citizens. When I conducted my RSA in Central America I discovered that to get into that zones, where permitted, a “war tall” (payment of a fee) was requested. It has been reported that those who refused to pay have been killed on site. Originally, the gang's main purpose was to protect Salvadoran immigrants from other, more established gangs of Los Angeles, who were predominantly comprised of Mexicans and African-Americans. For this reason, the gang initially allowed only Salvadorans to join, but later admitted other Central Americans as members. As I exposed in my previous post it might exist a potential collusion between the Maras and international terrorist groups. It should be noted that in 2005, Honduran Security Minister Oscar Alvarez and the President of El Salvador raised alarm by claiming that Al-Qaeda was meeting with one of the most powerful Mara, MS-13 better known as Salvatrucha and other Central American gangs to help them infiltrate the United States. FBI agents said that the U.S. intelligence community and governments of several Central American countries found there is no basis to believe that MS-13 is connected to Al-Qaeda or other Islamic radicals, although there have been security meetings at ministral level within the Central American governments. In the above picture Honduran Special Police stand over Mara Salvatrucha gang members after anti-gang operation in Tegucigalpa, Courtesy Reuters/Roberto Carlos).
During my RSA trip in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras the Maras were attacking the bus lines in order to bribe the line owners and bus drivers. Drivers and bus staff were assaulted and, in the worst case scenario killed. The most unfortunate event took place in San Pedro de Sula December 23 2004 when a gunmen opened fire on a overcrowded bus. 28 passengers died, six of those were children. In this case specifically the Mara wanted to send a clear message to the government in order to counterbalance the police successful raids anti gangs. MS-13 now has an estimated 25,000 members in Honduras, El Salvador and other Central American nations. I have been in Honduras in April 2009, just before the military coup and it seems to me that little has been done to resolve the gang security problem.To understand why maras are so popular in Central America we have to dig a little in the socio-cultural context of their members. Maras often represent the only possibility to survive in difficult, poor and violent environments. Children and adolescents living in poor deprived and literally abandoned neighborhoods see the Mara as the only possibility of achieving social recognition. To gain access to the gang an initiation ritual must be successfully completed by the aspirant mareros. They can be involved in selling and smuggling drugs, participate in fighting against opposite gangs or commit homicides. Killing is considered by Mara as “regular procedure”, it represents a success (eliminate enemies, counterparts, policemen and suspects) and a personal accomplishment for the killer.

All Central American governments have in a way or another structured and launched their own programme deemed necessary to violently respond to the Mara long arm. The programme have functioned partially since the governments wanted to reduce the imminent risk posed by the gangs but did not address at all the social-cultural-economic unease which is the base for such criminal illicit outcome. The failure to proper consider the context of unrest and poverty using an immediate armed reaction has shown that governments won the battle but not the war against maras. In other words such approach would suggest the recognition of a larger political failure in terms of lack of public assistance, proper education if any, health cares, etc.
If in the next future the governments of the gang-affected countries will not implement a wider holistic approach to their most vulnerable citizens, assisting and taking care of those less fortunate, the Maras will dramatically continue to increase their capability with an evident repercussion on the life of all citizens and on the security in general.

RSA in El Salvador - Security Threats

I conducted the RSA in El Salvador in February 2008. I visited the Capital City San Salvador and three field locations San Lorenzo, Ahuachapán, Tacuba. In Tacuba I went to see an orphanage of undernourished/abandoned children which received humanitarian support by the Organization I was working for. It was a very touching experience.
The insecurity remains at higher levels and has become one of the most felt problems by the population. The Press and TV News report frequently about crimes, assaults, rapes and other types of violations. The travelers must be aware about risks posed by criminality and should use private vehicles, avoiding (if possible) walking and taking public transportation. Frequently demonstration and protests arise, planned by workers organizations or citizens, due to the deficiency of resources like drinking water, unemployment, high delinquency levels, etc. Such demonstrations have blocked streets and highways in several parts of the country, which can directly or indirectly affect field missions (movement restrictions, etc). The high level of impunity is an element of tension that must be taken into serious consideration as well. The number of Salvadorian deported from the US is estimated in about 200 per month. The great majority of them have been arrested for criminal actions in the United States or because of their status of illegal immigrants. Some civil organizations and NGOs, have questioned the work of the Civil National Police (PNC Spanish acronym) which is deemed generally corrupted. According to a recent country evaluation prepared by UNDP El Salvador, the country has one of the higher crime rates in the region. In fact, it has been estimated that the number of fire guns circulating are about 500.000 out of which 300.000 are illegal, and 80 % of all homicides are committed with fire guns. The above report projects that about 80% of UN personnel or their relatives, families or near friends in El Salvador have directly or indirectly been affected by delinquency acts. Regarding the natural disasters, El Salvador might suffer during the winter time, floods and water-drainages. Furthermore one of the most important natural threats is the earthquakes (last ones in 2001, two quakes). In this regards the country is very vulnerable and only few the buildings can be consider properly “anti-seismic”.

Author visiting an orphanage in Tacuba in order to assess field operators security conditions.

El Salvador participates with his military contingents to the US lead coalition in the Iraq war. The US from their part has given the country a large number of working visas for the Salvadorian people. El Salvador has recently decided to participate to the ALBA, Venezuelan lead alliance (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas), as its Spanish initials indicate, which proposes an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in its Spanish initials), differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization.
The recently elected President of El Salvador, Carlos Mauricio Funes as the candidate of the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) took office on 1 June 2009. He is the first FMLN party leader not to have fought in the civil war. His presidential campaign was highlighted by statements endorsing moderate political policies. He has promised to increase taxes on the rich to pay for programs such as health care in rural areas and crime prevention.
CRIME: The criminal threat in El Salvador is critical. Random and organized violent crime is endemic throughout El Salvador. Political or economic issues in the country may give rise to demonstrations, sit-ins or protests at any time or place, but these activities are most frequent in the capital or on its main access roads. Many Salvadorans are armed, and shootouts are not uncommon. Armed holdups of vehicles traveling on El Salvador's roads appear to be increasing, and several incidents involving foreigners have been reported. The homicide rate in the country increased 25 percent from 2004 to 2005, and El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Both violent and petty crimes are prevalent throughout El Salvador. Armed assaults and carjacking take place both in San Salvador and in the interior of the country, but are especially frequent on roads outside the capital where police patrols are scarce. Criminals have been known to follow cars leaving the international airport to private residences or secluded stretches of road where they carry out assaults and robberies. Armed robbers are known to shoot if the vehicle does not come to a stop. Criminals often become violent quickly, especially when victims fail to cooperate immediately in surrendering valuables. Frequently, victims who argue with assailants or refuse to give up their valuables are shot. Kidnapping for ransom continues to occur, but have decreased in frequency since 2001.
The “Mara” phenomenon:
On various occasions the media has linked some local “Maras” (local gangs) with Al-Qaeda activities or structures.
El Salvador has both Arab and Jewish communities, not large in terms of adherents but powerful, representative and influential. Their members are important merchants and landowners. I will write an article about Maras soon in order to analyze the risks posed by such criminal gangs to security.
Terrorist Action:
Despite the image El Salvador projects outside its borders, as Central American country, there are some factors that indicate that a terrorist action risk cannot be fully excluded. The level of crime is well known. Less, probably, the international implications related with the participation of El Salvador at the military coalition lead by the United States in Iraq since 2003. The military Salvadoran contingent is composed of approx. 380 Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada) members, who are replaced every 6 months. The mentioned Salvadoran military contingent in 4 years of participation at the Iraq campaign has had a total of 6 deaths and about 20 wounded many of them related to military actions. In 2004, El Salvador would have received a direct threat by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization but no terrorist related incidents have took place so far. As of August 2009, all non-U.S. coalition members had withdrawn from Iraq.

San Lorenzo Church, destroyed by a recent earthquacke.

Cucuta (Colombia) – Cross border influence from Venezuela. Security considerations.

I decided to write this article about Cucuta, Colombian bordering town with Venezuela, following a declaration of the Colombian government which few days ago claimed it found in a raid on a FARC guerrilla camp three AT-4 rocket launchers with serial numbers that connect them to the Venezuelan army. The manufacturer of the weapons, Swedish company Saab Bofors Dynamics, confirmed via the Swedish Foreign Ministry that the serial numbers on the arms matched a sale it made to Venezuela in the 1980s.Despite the fact that both sides are using such events to fuel their propaganda, I would like analyze here how these two neighbors are “unofficially” connected the and how such relation affects areas like Cucuta.
I visited Cucuta during my long RSA tour in Colombia since there was based a field office which were conducting humanitarian operations in the surrounding areas of Norte de Santander, part of Magdalena region, Catatumbo, part of Boyacá region.
Cucuta is particularly “affected” by the vicinity with Venezuela and such geographic proximity influences the life and the entire economy of the town. The most evident phenomenon is the smuggling of gasoline from Venezuela. At every corner “Pimpineros” (gas smugglers) sell their product without any fear of being caught by the police. There are no regular gas stations in town. Besides, there are several cars with Venezuelan plate owned by Colombians. Vehicles are cheaper in Venezuela due to lower taxes applied on cars.
Colombian armed groups cross the border with Venezuela in order to recover and relax, the borders appear to be porous in different unsurveilled points. Other border-related phenomena are prostitution and smuggling of precious metals and other materials.
Today, Cucuta has become one of the most violent cities in Colombia. Collective violence and organized crime left more than 1,300 people dead yearly (an average of 3.5 people per day). Cucuta’s official homicide rate is calculated at 128 per 100,000 people, nearly as high as that of Medellin, Colombia’s most violent city (184/100,000 people). The police estimate that approx 80% of homicides in Cucuta are linked to the violent conflict and another 20% to common crime. The trend has been followed in San Cristóbal, the Venezuelan border city just forty minutes from Cucuta. Numerous reasons contribute to the sharp increase in violence. First, violence has been on the rise since the early 1990s, when coca cultivation in the northern region of La Gabarra was introduced; subsequently, cultivation, production and illicit trade rose sharply. Second, as the capital of the Norte de Santander department and a border city, Cucuta has developed dynamics in which drug trafficking, poverty, licit and illicit trans-border trade activities, organized crime and common crime are thriving. Third, the escalation of war in the Catatumbo is having an impact on Cucuta. Catatumbo, located between the Colombia’s Andes mountains and the border with Venezuela, is considered one of the most dangerous areas in Colombia. There are extensive illicit coca cultivations and large logistic facilities have been established there by guerrilla groups. FARC and ELN are sharing territory and fighting to control it. This situation forced a large part of the population to leave the area and relocate to Venezuela. Interstate talks are in progress. The aim is to try to solve the dramatic condition of displaced people (IDPs). The Catatumbo area is often impossible to reach due to the high risk posed by guerrilla fighters. Each sign or indication of anything/anyone related to the United States can create an aggressive public reaction against visitors and operations due to the psychological association USA - evil State made by guerrilla activists. Such behavior has not been noted in other areas of Colombia.
Major guerrilla groups are present in the area as well as paramilitaries (former “Autodefensa”) who apparently should have taken the legal opportunity through a government programme to leave the armed groups they use to belong to. The majority of them have instead reorganized themselves acquiring the name of Black Eagle (Aguila Negra). Aguila Negra started a real mafia system which forces commercial activities and private company to pay a price in exchange of security.
To reach such illicit/violent stage they previously eliminated most of local criminals obtaining “de facto” the title of “protectors of security”. Police is not capable to eliminate/reduce this
trend.

Coca transformation laboratory in Catatumbo. Courtesy Radio Santa Fe

The paramilitaries are seeking to consolidate the entire region, including Cucuta. Conversely, urban centers such as Cucuta constitute safe havens for the guerrilla forces, in which they can further develop counterattacks and mobilize combatants. Urban militias (FARC, ELN and EPL) have a strong presence in poor shanties at the city’s periphery. At the same time, other paramilitary groups (Cordoba, Uraba, Cesar blocs) frequently patrol poor urban barrios and engage in social cleansing. There is a clear trend by the guerrilla forces to shift from rural to urban warfare, a new strategy which seeks to undermine Uribe’s security measures. Several oil pumping stations owned by state and private companies are located in this area. The Army is defending State owned facilities while private companies have to pay a price to guerrilla to secure both workers and installations. The pipeline transports oil from this region to the harbors located along the Caribbean Coast.
THE THREAT:
The main threats in the region are related to the high concentration of armed actors and are that of being caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups, being kidnapped and car accidents.
Communication is vital here. Recommended HF, VHF radios, cellular and satellite phones
Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is medium for the Cucuta town and high for the rural areas of the region. The Catatumbo remain an almost inaccessible region (very high risk). The local communities try to deal with terrorists having sometimes the possibility to act as mediators and negotiators, facilitating the dialogue among the parts.
Road Safety:
The conditions of the roads in Cucuta town are good but worsen where IDPs are settled. A high number of motorbikes circulate in town on a daily basis, motorcyclists usually do not respect traffic regulations. The risk an accident by road travel is assessed as high.
Medical Emergency:
Medical facilities in town are good, but the rural areas suffer of lack of medical infrastructures. The risk of not receiving adequate medical attention in Cucuta is assessed as low. Risk is assessed as medium in rural areas. It is fundamental arrange in advance a Medical Evacuation air operation system (MEDEVAC) in order to evacuate eventual severe injured staff.