PERU: General security situation, considerations from my Risk Security Assessment

I visited Peru in February and March 2007 while conducting a Risk Security Assessment mission. The materials used to prepare this blog post have been updated and carefully reviewed in order to provide an idea about the actual security context in Peru.

SITUATION:

Peru is suffering from an increase in crime from simple muggings through to violent kidnapping; mostly confined to urban areas and within the poorer districts during the day but widespread after dark. The current government is slowly becoming increasingly popular, despite of the economic situation declining and local crime rising. Regarding the terrorism groups who used to frighten Peru, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru, both have been almost successfully fought in the Eighties and right now some old militants are trying to reorganize themselves. Those trends are channeling themselves towards the big drug traffic ants as the military-like expertise they can offer is very useful to protect illegal cocaine laboratories and the transportation of the final product. It has to be borne in mind that Peru is the second largest coca producer in South America, after Colombia. Urban driving conditions are appalling and at present they are assessed of being probably the greatest threat to staff in Peru. One of the most common security challenges to personal security is related to the use of taxis. There are almost no road regulations and police is literally not “visible” on the streets. Often illegal taxi drivers put on their car a Taxi sign. It has been reported that a massive quantity of false circulation documents as well as driving permits are fake and easy to obtain, since there is a flourishing market for false documents in Lima.
Furthermore, driving schools often “sell” driving license without performing any practical exams or oral/written tests.
Kidnapping can be considered a high risk factor in Peru, above all for foreigners travelling in Peru.
Often the victim is forced to withdraw money from ATM machines, usually before and after midnight so that the cash amount is double as it refers to two days. The phenomenon is popularly called Millionaire Walking (Paseo Milionario). It is recommended to use secure taxi company before arriving in country. Local staff is required to attend to a specialized security awareness training in addition to the basic security training. This is primarily due to deal with the threat of kidnapping and being involved in a car accident in very remote areas with no communication and close medical facilities.

SECURITY SITUATION - THREAT ANALYSIS
President Alan Garcia is at his second mandate as president of Peru. People are slowly but steadily increasing their support of his administration since he is giving clear signs that he wants to do something concrete to help the poor conditions of his country. For example, he is the author of a law which will ask the major mine companies to pay a “volunteer contribute” (several million of dollars) to organizations involved in fighting hunger in Peru since the State program organizations waist up to 40% of the available resources. If those political actions will help Peru to improve or if this will be a barely cosmetic political move it is not clear.
There are still concerns over renewed insurgency activity from the Shining Path (SL) guerrilla group having them join the drug traffickers with their support in security.

Peru is the second largest producer of cocaine in South America after Colombia. Here coca plantations are not illegal, but coca farmers must accept to sell part of the production to a State owned company. The quantity to be sold is minimal so that the great majority of it is then illegally purchased by drug dealers. The system does not help the fight against drug smugglers as the cultivations are not illegal and it is very difficult to define the line between legality and illegality.
The areas of biggest concern are, however, the common criminality and road accidents. Common criminality is widespread in the country with a peak level in the periphery of Lima. Law enforcement agents are not visible, and according to the official data, are not doing enough to fight this phenomenon. The second area of concern is related to car traffic and accidents. As said, there is a high risk of becoming a victim of a car accident, since there is little order and respect of road regulations. In Peru public transportation managed by government or local authorities does not exist, but it has been left to private companies and individuals. There is little control on authorizations and documents so that virtually anybody who owns a car or a minibus can be a taxi or public bus driver. Furthermore, a long time passes between vehicle technical inspections increasing the risk of mechanical breakdowns and incidents due to the lack of maintenance. The parliament has recently approved a law which forbids the importation of used cars older than five years. The high taxes to buy a new vehicle (50% of the price) have created a stagnant situation which do not facilitate the replacement of older models.

Author posing with a local community involved in an agriculture based project in the Handahuaylas area.

Peru has a working relationship with Brazil, although this has been strained by US aid packages to Lima. However, Peru is a member of MERCOSOR trade region, which is dominated by Brazil, bringing the countries closer together. Bolivia is a close partner, largely due to mutual concerns over Chile. Whilst Peru and Chile have been historic rivals, the current relationship is reasonably amicable, although the dispute over maritime borders is still alive. The two countries are working together on border security and anti-terrorist operations. Border disputes with Ecuador remain a source of tension, although outright combat seems unlikely.

The once special relationship with Japan has been strained, following the flight of Garcia predecessor, Alberto Fujimori, to Japan in 2000 and the associated international pressure on Japan to extradite him for murder. Fujimori undergone a trial, has been accused of several imputations and is now in prison. His daughter Keiko, actual Peruvian politician, is planning to run for President of Peru in 2011. How this element could change the feeling of the Peruvians about a possible return of the former President remains to be seen.
Peru’s relationship with the US has had a rocky past but is now close, particularly with large US funding for narcotics and security operations. However, many in Peru are critical of the US for failing to address fundamental trade and social problems within the country through their funding packages. There appears to be some credible information that international terrorists are present in the country but it is not known to which organization they belong; their activities seem to be linked with drugs, financing and false documentation.
The wave of internal terrorism, which Peru suffered in the 1980s and 1990s, has largely passed, but it has not completely disappeared. Remnants of the Shining Path (SP) movement (estimated at around 300 fighters and an unknown number of political activists) are still active in the Apurimac, Ene and Lower Huallaga Valleys. SP was responsible for the US embassy bombing in 2002. A group of terrorists also abducted gas pipeline workers near Toccate in the Ayacucho Department on 9th June 2003. In addition, the Garcia government, despite of his increasing popularity, remains disliked on basic reforms, which gives the potential for protests and strikes if the economic and social situation worsens. There have been recent protests by coca farmers over crop eradication by US-funded anti-narcotics operations and there are signs that the farmers are becoming increasingly militant in their opposition to the government’s support for US actions. In fact the project of restructuring coca plantations with other cultivations has given low results in terms of production and prices. The United Nations are also seen as a threat by the coca farmers and the SP who have an interest in coca production being the major security provider.

Off road trip on the Andean Mountains to Huancavelica.

RSA in El Salvador - Security Threats

I conducted the RSA in El Salvador in February 2008. I visited the Capital City San Salvador and three field locations San Lorenzo, Ahuachapán, Tacuba. In Tacuba I went to see an orphanage of undernourished/abandoned children which received humanitarian support by the Organization I was working for. It was a very touching experience.
The insecurity remains at higher levels and has become one of the most felt problems by the population. The Press and TV News report frequently about crimes, assaults, rapes and other types of violations. The travelers must be aware about risks posed by criminality and should use private vehicles, avoiding (if possible) walking and taking public transportation. Frequently demonstration and protests arise, planned by workers organizations or citizens, due to the deficiency of resources like drinking water, unemployment, high delinquency levels, etc. Such demonstrations have blocked streets and highways in several parts of the country, which can directly or indirectly affect field missions (movement restrictions, etc). The high level of impunity is an element of tension that must be taken into serious consideration as well. The number of Salvadorian deported from the US is estimated in about 200 per month. The great majority of them have been arrested for criminal actions in the United States or because of their status of illegal immigrants. Some civil organizations and NGOs, have questioned the work of the Civil National Police (PNC Spanish acronym) which is deemed generally corrupted. According to a recent country evaluation prepared by UNDP El Salvador, the country has one of the higher crime rates in the region. In fact, it has been estimated that the number of fire guns circulating are about 500.000 out of which 300.000 are illegal, and 80 % of all homicides are committed with fire guns. The above report projects that about 80% of UN personnel or their relatives, families or near friends in El Salvador have directly or indirectly been affected by delinquency acts. Regarding the natural disasters, El Salvador might suffer during the winter time, floods and water-drainages. Furthermore one of the most important natural threats is the earthquakes (last ones in 2001, two quakes). In this regards the country is very vulnerable and only few the buildings can be consider properly “anti-seismic”.

Author visiting an orphanage in Tacuba in order to assess field operators security conditions.

El Salvador participates with his military contingents to the US lead coalition in the Iraq war. The US from their part has given the country a large number of working visas for the Salvadorian people. El Salvador has recently decided to participate to the ALBA, Venezuelan lead alliance (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas), as its Spanish initials indicate, which proposes an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in its Spanish initials), differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization.
The recently elected President of El Salvador, Carlos Mauricio Funes as the candidate of the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) took office on 1 June 2009. He is the first FMLN party leader not to have fought in the civil war. His presidential campaign was highlighted by statements endorsing moderate political policies. He has promised to increase taxes on the rich to pay for programs such as health care in rural areas and crime prevention.
CRIME: The criminal threat in El Salvador is critical. Random and organized violent crime is endemic throughout El Salvador. Political or economic issues in the country may give rise to demonstrations, sit-ins or protests at any time or place, but these activities are most frequent in the capital or on its main access roads. Many Salvadorans are armed, and shootouts are not uncommon. Armed holdups of vehicles traveling on El Salvador's roads appear to be increasing, and several incidents involving foreigners have been reported. The homicide rate in the country increased 25 percent from 2004 to 2005, and El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Both violent and petty crimes are prevalent throughout El Salvador. Armed assaults and carjacking take place both in San Salvador and in the interior of the country, but are especially frequent on roads outside the capital where police patrols are scarce. Criminals have been known to follow cars leaving the international airport to private residences or secluded stretches of road where they carry out assaults and robberies. Armed robbers are known to shoot if the vehicle does not come to a stop. Criminals often become violent quickly, especially when victims fail to cooperate immediately in surrendering valuables. Frequently, victims who argue with assailants or refuse to give up their valuables are shot. Kidnapping for ransom continues to occur, but have decreased in frequency since 2001.
The “Mara” phenomenon:
On various occasions the media has linked some local “Maras” (local gangs) with Al-Qaeda activities or structures.
El Salvador has both Arab and Jewish communities, not large in terms of adherents but powerful, representative and influential. Their members are important merchants and landowners. I will write an article about Maras soon in order to analyze the risks posed by such criminal gangs to security.
Terrorist Action:
Despite the image El Salvador projects outside its borders, as Central American country, there are some factors that indicate that a terrorist action risk cannot be fully excluded. The level of crime is well known. Less, probably, the international implications related with the participation of El Salvador at the military coalition lead by the United States in Iraq since 2003. The military Salvadoran contingent is composed of approx. 380 Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada) members, who are replaced every 6 months. The mentioned Salvadoran military contingent in 4 years of participation at the Iraq campaign has had a total of 6 deaths and about 20 wounded many of them related to military actions. In 2004, El Salvador would have received a direct threat by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization but no terrorist related incidents have took place so far. As of August 2009, all non-U.S. coalition members had withdrawn from Iraq.

San Lorenzo Church, destroyed by a recent earthquacke.

Cartagena (Colombia) – RSA surrounded by a beautiful colonial atmosphere.

Cartagena is a beautiful colonial town. I visited it in 2007 while carrying out my RSA mission in Colombia. Probably the nicest colonial urban area in the Caribbean. It lies along the Caribbean shores in the North of Colombia in a strategic area used by the Spaniards in the XV-XVII centuries to ship to Europe gold and precious material coming form the New World. Despite its nice appearance and its touristic vocation several are the threats to consider while preparing the Risk Assessment related mainly to its surrounding districts (organized crime, drug cartels wars, kidnapping, extortion, etc). There are different security phases for the centre and the periphery. Cartagena centre enjoys a lower secutiy phase (1 in a scale of 5). The town is well guarded and surveilled by regular and tourist police who protects tourists and the related income generated by tourism, while the situation worsens in the suburbs (phase 2). Those areas are affected by poverty and violence. Large camps of displaced people (IDPs) who were forced by guerrilla to leave their villages in the Colombian inner areas have been established here. Same threats affect the bordering districts of Sucre, Atlántico, Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Cesar. The whole area is of strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North and in particular to the ports of the Caribbean coast which are a main transit route for both legal and illegal trade.
The town of Cartagena is a very popular holiday destination for many Colombians with an historic old colonial town (Ciudad Murallada) coupled with beaches and high rise accommodation. On the other hand, the city has some desperately poor areas. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces and the pattern of the conflict follows a similar trend to the rest of the country with the main armed groups struggling for control of territory within Cartagena and control of the strategic routes, fertile drug-crop land and mineral resources in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of people within these districts, as local farmers try to flee the contested areas. As said, the town itself is secure due to high concentration of police and military troops which are trying to preserve intact the flux of tourists. Tourism is the engine of the economy in Cartagena.
There is a huge economic difference between down-town Cartagena and the surroundings (very poor and extended areas). This difference causes social tensions and violence. Internationals visiting the region must be aware about the risk of kidnappings, for both political reasons and extortion. The best mitigating measure is the adoption of a low profile and low visibility while visiting the country. Accidental shooting is another element to consider while analyzing the risk. Although there are undoubtedly many illegal weapons in the region, the risk of accidental shooting in the region can be assessed as medium, low in Cartagena.
Organized Criminal Activity:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in the Northern region. Nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnapping. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Cartagena district, mainly in Cordoba and Monte de Maria areas, including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers, as the government forces are capable of controlling only parts of the area and only the main routes in particular.
Road Travel:
Road travel within Cartagena is normal for a large urban city. There is risk of crime, particularly at night. The road conditions within the town are good. In the rural areas, the road conditions are generally poor on main transit routes. In the project areas many of the local roads are not surfaced and in some instances operations are cancelled when weather conditions render parts of the routes too dangerous to travel. There is high risk of criminal/armed group activity in the rural areas. My recommendation is to travel only in areas with low/acceptable risk. Never take the initiative to adventure in unknown places. Travel always in group. Last but not least bring always your cell phone with you and be sure that police number is promptly available.





This map highlights (red) the high concentration of IDPs in the North of Colombia - OCHA Courtesy

RSAs in Cali – Medellin (Colombia). Security challenges.

Why compare two different Colombian cities, with different back grounds, different developments and history? It has been deemed interesting put side by side the security contexts of Cali and Medellin for two reasons: both have similar factors threatening stability and security, and secondly I wanted to understand which kind of security measures were adopted in two diverse environments with similar characteristics. In other words, taking into account the slight difference between the two situations, which was the most successful security model adopted?
I conducted my RSA in Cali and Medellin between January and February 2007 and at the first glance both towns appeared very interesting, the people friendly and the quality and quantity of commercial activities amazing.
CALI (Valle del Cauca District): In the area several armed actors (FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, recent armed entities like Aguila Negra, local criminal gangs, etc) are conducting their operations. The town is strategic to control the illicit cultivation of coca as well as for the routes towards the sea to export the final product. The government identified an area in the region (among locations Florida, Palira, Pradera) to facilitate the exchange of rebel prisoners with kidnapped people by guerrilla, trough the programme “Humanitarian Agreement”. The operation so far has not produced the expected results and the programme is currently suspended. In March 2009, the FARC wanted to exchange 22 captured members of the security forces for 500 guerrillas currently held in Colombian and U.S. prisons. The Colombian Government rejected such an exchange and demanded the FARC to unilaterally release their hostages. The FARC is suspected to also hold hundreds of civilians hostage for extortion. They are not part of the proposed exchange.
The centre of the town of Cali is well protected by police but in the surroundings illegal armed groups are almost free to circulate and conduct their business. The main threat in the region is related to the high concentration of armed actors. This factor can endanger travelers who can be caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups. Wrong place and wrong moment.
The town of Cali has been divided in areas controlled by (at least) 20 different criminal gangs. Most of them have direct contact with organized guerrilla armed groups.
The actual government has improved greatly the security of Colombian urban areas, included Cali, leaving peripheries with little order and security. It is recommended to be properly informed about the security situation prior any movement in town since the situation is very volatile. The phenomenon of kidnapping is still high. Kidnappings take place for two main reasons: a “political” one, to put pressure on politician to obtain favors or exchange of “prisoners” or as an extortion to finance illicit activities. Often kidnapped people are sold by local criminal gangs to organized armed guerrilla groups. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high.

Author at Medellin Botero's Park

MEDELLIN (Antioquia District). The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North West. The town of Medellin is surrounded by hills and the region in general is rugged. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There are two distinct areas of conflict: the urban city of Medellin and rural areas in the surrounding district. The main armed groups are primarily struggling for control of territory and control of the strategic routes, mineral resources and infrastructure projects (e.g. hydro) in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas around the district. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of peoples (IDPs). The level of local criminality is high too. Several gangs control urban territory (with limitations in the city center “Poblado”) which are interconnected with guerrilla.
Within the district, local farmers try to flee the contested areas. Many are the illegal armed groups operating in the Antioquia district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban center. The armed groups are under continuous pressure both from the military and from rival gangs. Resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential increase of tension among populations.
Risk mitigation measures recommended for both locations:
Here a check list of recommended security measures for field offices deemed necessary to reduce the risk posed by both drug cartels activities and common criminality:
· Guards: well trained and equipped, ideally armed.
· Alarm: movement/vibration sensors should be installed throughout the office location, including parking lot, fence, etc.
· Video recording surveillance system: active on a 24/7 basis.
· Fence: ideally a proper (wall/barbed wire) high fence should protect premises. On top a signaled electric fence should be mounted.
· Dogs: If possible trained watchdogs can be used to improve security mainly during night hours. Dogs must be trained and properly managed.
· Minimal visibility: the visibility of the office and official vehicles should be minimal. Anonymity will help prevent assaults. Neither office nor vehicles should have external signs and indication about business conducted there.
· Blast Resistant Film (BRF): it is recommended that windows of the office to be treated with BRF.
· Snipers: as an extreme measure one or two member of the guard force can be positioned on top of the roof in strategic position in order to better surveil the activity in the roads in the close proximity of the building. This activity can be organized on a special occasion basis (when a special security threath occurs – political unrest and protests, violent events, criminal activities, etc) or on a regular basis.
· Vehicles: should be armored, equipped with bullet proof vests, helmets, radio communication systems (HF, VHF, cellular, sat phone), GPS tracking system, first aid kit, fire extinguisher, etc.

Natural Disaster Contingency Plan for Volcanic Eruption - Considerations

This article wants to present the practical features of a Natural Disaster Contingency Plan focused on threat posed by a volcano. A contingency plan is an anticipatory emergency plan to be followed in an expected or eventual disaster, based on Risk Security Assessment, availability of human and material resources, community preparedness, local and international response capability, etc.
It worth remind that since 1980, volcanic activity worldwide has killed more than 29000 people and displaced more than one
million others.
Here I would like to show some aspects of a Contingency Plan prepared to deal the potential eruption and the collateral effects of a volcano (I reviewed/updated such plan when conducted my RSA in the Colombian city of Pasto, located steps away from the active Volcano Galeras - see previous article).
The guidelines here exposed can be considered as baseline for a successful natural disaster contingency plan, as part of a national security plan created to mitigate risks to staff, assets, operations in a given specific field location. The company/organization national security plan should be interfaced with a broader governmental/civil defense plan.
The security officer on the field is usually tasked to liaise with central authorities and make sure that the local contingency plan reflects major evacuation strategies and procedures to be interrelated and implemented at national level as well.
The contingency plan usually takes into consideration three phases of the emergency: the alerting phase, the reacting phase and the protection phase.
The most delicate one is the first phase of the plan. It is absolutely important to pay particular attention to the preparation phase, i.e. to the mechanism that must be put in place before the eruption occurs. Since it is very difficult to predict when a natural disaster will take place or how severe it will be, the only aspect that can be controlled is preparation for a disaster and the respose methodology during and after the disaster. Here a brief check list of items which must be prepared prior any natural disaster emergency.
1. Keep emergency items ready at all times and in one place which is easy to reach and known to the whole staff, i.e.:
· Food: keep a stock which requires little cooking and no refrigeration (electric power may be interrupted);
· Emergency cooking equipment: a small portable gas camping stove is perfect, with spare gas cylinders;
· First-aid kit;
· Blankets;
· Emergency spare clothing;
· Lights, flashlights, pocket torch in working order;
· Portable radio with spare batteries, etc.
2. Take safety measures with respect to valuables (savings, passbook, securities, cash, precious metals, wills, including electronic assets such portable hard drivers, laptops, etc). Particular attention must be paid to info backups. Data backup must take place on a daily basis and hard copies of backups should be stored in a special certified anti natural disaster/fire caveau or safe room away from office location. Banks or specialized companies usually offer such service.
3. In case you are at your residence during the event, know how and where to turn off your electricity, gas, water and central heating oil.
4. Practical evacuation exercises must be organized and conducted in order to improve the staff readiness. Such evacuation plan must indicate a concentration point where staff have to go after the evacuation and establishes clear and effective communication measures. If the disaster takes place after business hours each staff’s family has to make advance arrangements to get in touch with all family members.
5. A shelter can be located in the concentration point in the vicinity of the office building and escape routes must be clearly marked.
6. The main concept behind the natural disaster contingency plan is that unless one is not qualified to give valuable emergency assistance or have been allocated some specific task in connection with the disaster, keep away from disaster areas if you are not already involved. Your presence will only hamper rescue, first-aid or relief work. This is no time for sight-seeing.
7. It is vital to follow the instruction contained in the plan and do not worry public officials with any matters that are not urgent. Your other problems will be dealt with later.
If the natural phenomenon includes an earthquake a different contingency plan apply, which includes features of the classic earthquake contingency plan and the one above. The plan must be carefully prepared by a security professional and staff have to be aware of it and trained on its content.
I will write soon about other specific natural disaster contingency plans which will consider separately the following natural events: earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, tropical storms (hurricanes, typhoons and cyclones) with a focus on hurricanes. I conducted RSAs in several Central American/Caribbean countries where the most important threat is posed on a regular basis by hurricanes.
The Natural Disaster Contingency Plan for Volcanic Eruption identifies as well the responsibilities of the respective stakeholders in managing volcanic risk and emergencies.
The second phase, the reactive phase, commences on the completion of the alerting phase activities. During this time all the security procedures must be implemented with special care to the evacuation course of action. The modus operandi related to the evacuation is peculiar of each single location and should follow an accurate previous RSA.
Once reached the concentration point/equipped shelter the third phase takes place. The protection phase can be considered an active/dynamic moment of the plan. At this stage the communication system is working between staff and the identified actors (described in the plan). The internal security structure at national level (if available) or contracted security services can, at this point, provide precise information about a further relocation of staff and assets in a safe area. Such transfer operation can take place via air (normally through helicopters), land or sea (if the location is on sea shores or island).
After the completion of the relocation a second plan has to be implemented: the recovery plan.
I hope this article will be able to give a general understanding of what a contingency plan is and what are the concepts behind it. The scope is once again the protection of staff and valuable assets, regardless the complicated and dangerous environment in which we are operating.

In the chart: the volcano alert levels. Courtesy civildefence.gov.nz

Pasto – Colombia: RSA between natural disaster threat (Volcano Galeras) and drug cartels war

I conducted a Risk Security Assessment in Pasto in February 2007 and it was one of the most challenging.
Pasto is a nice town in the south of Colombia, not far from the border with Ecuador. Pasto is the major town in the green Nariño region, home of allegedly the best coffee quality produced in the country. The green hills and the perfect microclimate make this region ideal to grow a rich full bodied coffee. In the nearby of the town lies the active volcano Galeras. Seismic activities at a low level have continued at Galeras, with small explosions occasionally dusting nearby villages and towns with ash. The volcano has continued to be well studied, and predictions of eruptions at the volcano have improved. One phenomenon, which seems to be a reliable precursor to eruptive activity, is a low-frequency seismic event known as a tornillo event. These have occurred before about four-fifths of the explosions at Galeras, and the number of tornillo events recorded before an eruption is also correlated with the size of the ensuing eruption. Recently, on February 14, 2009, the volcano erupted and some 8,000 residents were evacuated, and there were no immediate reports of injuries or serious property damage. As in 2005, the city of Pasto was blanketed by a layer of ash after the volcanic explosion (due to the direction of the wind). The local authorities ordered two water treatment plants near Galeras to shut down. On March 13, 2009, Galeras erupted twice. Ash fell on Pasto and some other towns near the volcano, where an evacuation was ordered but reportedly ignored. No injuries or damage were reported.
When I visited the location in 2007, in my RSA report within the natural disaster chapter I described the risk posed by the proximity of downtown office and operations to the volcano. In fact it erupted before my visit and well trained staff were able to evacuate from building precisely and smoothly.
I revised the special “Volcano Galeras” contingency plans and provided recommendation about the conduction of regular practical evacuation exercises in order to mitigate the risk. The next post on this blog is going to be a technical one about Natural Disasters Contingency Plans.
Still the threat is there and in these circumstances timing is essential, regardless the fact that the last eruption took place at one flank of the volcano not involving directly the city.
“Expect the unexpected” is the baseline of every successful RSA.
Regarding the guerrilla factor, it must be said that the area is very strategic for guerrillas and generally speaking for all armed actors. In fact the routes leading from Pasto to the Pacific Ocean are precious for criminal organizations because represent the direct access to the sea and to the departure places to export drugs to Central America or USA.
One of the most famous ports used by drug traffickers is Buenaventura, located miles from the western cordillera of the Andes mountain range and the major city of Cali, the department's capital. Buenaventura has had a notorious history plagued by drug trafficking, violence, and the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In the last two years, the amount of reported homicides has doubled. The murder rate that is 24 times that of New York City, making it a crime rate of 175.2. To counter the violence, the Colombian government has set up a marine Special Forces unit in the worst area of the city. During my visit drug cartels were having an armed confrontation in the city streets.
From Buenaventura drug is loaded on “Go Fast” boats which in hours can reach the Mexican shores transporting up to 5 tons of drug. Usually these boats are refueled during the night by fishing boats. Once mission is accomplished the Go Fasts (worth more than $100.000) are abandoned and the crew can return back Colombia via flight.

Buenaventura is also famous for the handmade submarines which have been created to skip the radar/sonar signals. Those “narco submarine” (also called narco sub, drug sub, Big Foot submarine and Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS)) are home-made marine vessels built by drug traffickers to smuggle their goods. They are used by Colombian drug cartel members to export cocaine from Colombia to the United States. They are typically made of fiberglass, powered by a 300/350 hp diesel engine and manned by a crew of four. With enough cargo space to carry two to ten tons of cocaine, they also carry large fuel tanks, giving them a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 Km). Because much of its structure is fiberglass and it travels nearly below the sea surface, the vessel is virtually impossible to detect via sonar or radar. Narco submarines also have an upper lead shielding to minimize their 'heat signature' and evade infrared sensors. The newer models have piping along the bottom to allow the water to cool the exhaust as the ship moves, making it even less susceptible to infrared detection. About a third of the 600 tons of cocaine coming out of Colombia each year leaves via the Pacific coast and a significant amount is being carried in semi-submersibles. In late January 2009, a Sri Lankan Army task force found three semi-subs being built by Tamil rebels in the jungles of Mullaitivu. With this discovery, the LTTE became the first armed organization to develop underwater weapons. I will write an interesting article about my SRA in the post conflict Sri Lanka soon.
The Nariño region is thus located between the inner Putumayo region and the sea. Putumayo is covered by heavy Amazonic forest in which is cultivated and elaborated a large quantity of cocaine. Besides it serves as safe haven for guerrilla and paramilitaries. The region is difficult to control by government forces. The area is well known for a massive deployment of anti personnel mines used by guerrilla to protect their coca cultivation areas and presence of transformation labs. Pasto can be considered a middle risk site for the reasons exposed above.
Pasto represented a security challenge for two main reasons above exposed: natural disaster threat and presence of guerrilla and drug cartels. As said, the next article will explain how to make a successful assessment of threats posed by natural “force majeure”. Regarding the guerrilla factor, the argument will be divided in different chapters and exposed in future posts.

This semi-summersible is 20 mts long and 5 mts wide.It can transport up to 10 tons of cocaine (street value $700m) - Courtesy darkgovernment.

Road assessment: a building just destroyed during drug cartels war on the route Pasto - Buenaventura

RSA in Colombia - Bogota'

I have decided to write few articles about the Risk Security Assessment I conducted in Colombia in January – February 2007 for two reasons: first of all, I visited eleven towns in the country so it would be too reductive summarize such an interesting mission in few lines, secondly the general security context is very complex and deserves a fairly deep explanation.
My task was to conduct an evaluation of the risk both at Bogota country office and at each field office location level, performing RSA and thus providing recommendations about how to improve security measures according with the MOSS (Minimum Operating Standard Security).
For obvious confidential reasons I cannot provide details of such mission, besides it would be very boring for readers. Far more interesting is reading these posts as considerations made by a traveler who knows about security.
Let’s start then describing the general security context in Colombia.
Everybody knows that Marxist guerrilla groups began their insurgency in the early 1960s. An estimated 10,000 rebels remain active in various areas. The largest is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), followed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and a splinter group of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). The former right-wing paramilitary groups number an estimated 5,000 to 7,000, were accused of widespread human rights abuses. Few years ago the Colombian government came out with a plan intended to offer to criminal groups an interesting package to stimulate them to leave their illegal activities through a special rehabilitation program (providing jobs, offering salaries etc). The program did not work as expected. In fact, some of them came back to their illicit activities adopting the name of Black Eagles (Aguila Negra), others took apparently advantage of the government offer, but started in parallel then their own local criminal gang, only few returned to legality. Both former paramilitaries and guerrillas rely on the cocaine business to finance their operations.
Colombia is widely regarded as one of the main drug producing countries of the world and a major distribution route. Drug money is used for political and criminal assassinations and for political acceptability, and clashes between guerrilla groups and the army, police and drug gangs, are almost daily occurrences within Colombia. Travel to areas reported to grow and process drugs represents a high risk to personal safety.
Illegal armed groups are accused of deliberately displacing civilians, often to benefit wealthy patrons.
These Internal Displaced People are assisted by the international community through International Organizations, NGOs, etc.
Statistically Colombia is quoted as the country with the highest rate of violent deaths in the world. These are committed every 20 minutes bringing the total to 45,000 per year of which 97% remain unsolved. 61% of all kidnappings, are also carried out in Colombia.
This was the context in which I conducted my RSA.











Ecuadorean soldiers carried away the bodies of Colombian guerrillas killed by the Colombian military during a raid of a rebel camp in Ecuador. The raid set off a diplomatic crisis. Courtesy NY Times.

Bogota’ was for me a real surprise. A very nice town modern and developed. The main threat in Bogotá area remains that of local crime (robbery, credit card cloning etc). The security in general has improved lately thanks to an agreement promoted by the Government, between the Armed Forces, Police and private security companies. Such document promote a better cooperation of the security forces on the ground, giving to thousand private security operators same prerogative as police only when an emergency takes place. In practical terms the number of security “eyes” on the Bogota’ streets tripled. The number of attempted kidnappings and crime related events and dramatically reduced.

Two suburbs of the town are considered “critical” from a crime stand point: Soacha and Ciudad Bolivar. In these two areas is high the presence of IDPs who left their homes located probably in rural areas, forced by guerrilla to leave. They relocated in very precarious conditions in the nearby of large cities, including Bogota.
Just a couple of practical suggestions for those travelling in town, besides the basic security precautions that anybody must adopt when out of home country. When catching a taxi be sure that it belongs to a known “certified” company. Furthermore, as soon as the taxi arrives, pretend to make a call (fake) to somebody saying loudly to wait for you, and that you are arriving with the taxi plated (mention the plate). You could even ask ID card to the driver, if he refuses call another (certified) taxi.
Don’t take the risk to travel between cities in Colombia by car. The car could be attacked in isolated areas. Better fly, flight tickets are generally cheap and the service on board of the Avianca, the national flight company, is very good.
Enjoy Bogota’ its people, its pure Latin brilliant night life, its food and tradition.