Quibdó (Colombia): security challenges posed by guerrilla in a complex geographic environment.

I visited Quibdó during my last RSA mission in Colombia in 2007. The town of Quibdó is the district capital of Chocó in the north west of Colombia. The region has some of the worst national indicators in terms of poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, maternal and child health. The regional capital, Quibdó, shelters more displaced persons per capita – tens of thousands of them – than any other population centre in Colombia.
Along the banks of the nearby Atrato, San Juan and Baudó rivers, hundreds of thousands of mainly Afro-Colombians and indigenous civilians are trapped in the web of war. The armed gangs who control the waterways do not allow them to fish, hunt or gather wood. The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its proximity to, and border with Panama and the Pacific coastline. The area is heavily used for the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and other contraband items. The terrain is very harsh with mountains and thick jungle in abundance. The road infrastructure consists of only two access routes into the region from the east. The main form of transportation is by the complex river network. Visitors to the region are advised to only travel on essential business and by air only.
The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There has been an escalation in these clashes over the last two years as a result of Colombian military pressure in the region. Whilst the town of Quibdó itself is under government control, all other parts of the district are considered extremely dangerous as various armed groups struggle for control in the region.
Whilst there are no formal agreements in place and delivery missions are frequently stopped at illegal checkpoints (often our boat was stopped during navigation in the river), there have been very few incidents of antagonism, violence against staff or theft. It should be borne in mind that, as the military continue to increase the pressure on these groups both in action and logistically, the area can face up an escalation of violence.
Supplies cargos have been stopped by illegal military actors as well as government armed forces apparently to avoid that the shipment could end in the hands of guerrilla.
The phenomenon of displacement of people in this area is massive. Huge areas of wooden and cellophane made houses surround Quibdó’ town. Colombian displaced people have crossed the border to Panama looking for a better future.
The two most important ethnic communities in the area are the Afro-Colombian and the autochthonous indigenous populations. Both of them are conducting a “Pacific Resistance” to guerrilla which forces them to leave their native locations. They passively resist until illegal armed groups start taking actions, killing people. They are forced to share their space with terrorists. Both communities have a territory legally recognized by the State of Colombia.
THE THREAT
The main external threat in Chocó district remains that of domestic terrorist activity. The major internal risk to personnel is river travel and its associated hazards.
The risk of domestic terrorist actions is assessed as high (there may be cross over in this threat area to organized crime).
There is an identified threat to international staff working in the Chocó’ region. This is primarily due to the threat of kidnapping, as westerners are generally seen as a more valuable target than local nationals. The presence of international staff can significantly alter the security profile of an operation.
ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in Chocó in particular. Affluent nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnappings. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Chocó district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers. The armed groups are under continuous pressure from both the military and each other and resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential threat to operations. Very few outsiders visit the region and seldom venture out of Quibdó. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high. Two Army Brigades specialized in antiterrorism and counter-guerrilla are settled in town and have recently attacked guerrilla troops in the area of S. Juan (rural area).
MEDICAL EMERGENCY:
Medical facilities are rudimentary. There is a hospital in Quibdó which offers basic emergency services on a pre payment basis. There are no medical facilities outside of the main towns and very poor means of evacuation from mission areas. The risk of not receiving adequate medical attention at the Quibdó in is assessed as high.

RIVER TRAVELS:

Travel is dangerous. At least 600 people have been killed in the last few years according to the main Afro-Colombian Association, ACIA.
The requirement to travel by river presents some unique risks to the Quibdó operation. There are many diseases present in and around the river areas, including tuberculosis, pulmonary pathologies, diarrhea and yellow fever. A large amount of debris floating on and submerged in the river water can put at risk navigation and is often very difficult to see. This includes dead trees and sunken boats and creates a major hazard to river traffic. The risk of injury or severe illness as a result of river travel is assessed to be high.
I would call the Quibdó Region the hidden treasure in Colombia for its natural beauty and it geographical structure.

Cartagena (Colombia) – RSA surrounded by a beautiful colonial atmosphere.

Cartagena is a beautiful colonial town. I visited it in 2007 while carrying out my RSA mission in Colombia. Probably the nicest colonial urban area in the Caribbean. It lies along the Caribbean shores in the North of Colombia in a strategic area used by the Spaniards in the XV-XVII centuries to ship to Europe gold and precious material coming form the New World. Despite its nice appearance and its touristic vocation several are the threats to consider while preparing the Risk Assessment related mainly to its surrounding districts (organized crime, drug cartels wars, kidnapping, extortion, etc). There are different security phases for the centre and the periphery. Cartagena centre enjoys a lower secutiy phase (1 in a scale of 5). The town is well guarded and surveilled by regular and tourist police who protects tourists and the related income generated by tourism, while the situation worsens in the suburbs (phase 2). Those areas are affected by poverty and violence. Large camps of displaced people (IDPs) who were forced by guerrilla to leave their villages in the Colombian inner areas have been established here. Same threats affect the bordering districts of Sucre, Atlántico, Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Cesar. The whole area is of strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North and in particular to the ports of the Caribbean coast which are a main transit route for both legal and illegal trade.
The town of Cartagena is a very popular holiday destination for many Colombians with an historic old colonial town (Ciudad Murallada) coupled with beaches and high rise accommodation. On the other hand, the city has some desperately poor areas. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces and the pattern of the conflict follows a similar trend to the rest of the country with the main armed groups struggling for control of territory within Cartagena and control of the strategic routes, fertile drug-crop land and mineral resources in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of people within these districts, as local farmers try to flee the contested areas. As said, the town itself is secure due to high concentration of police and military troops which are trying to preserve intact the flux of tourists. Tourism is the engine of the economy in Cartagena.
There is a huge economic difference between down-town Cartagena and the surroundings (very poor and extended areas). This difference causes social tensions and violence. Internationals visiting the region must be aware about the risk of kidnappings, for both political reasons and extortion. The best mitigating measure is the adoption of a low profile and low visibility while visiting the country. Accidental shooting is another element to consider while analyzing the risk. Although there are undoubtedly many illegal weapons in the region, the risk of accidental shooting in the region can be assessed as medium, low in Cartagena.
Organized Criminal Activity:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in the Northern region. Nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnapping. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Cartagena district, mainly in Cordoba and Monte de Maria areas, including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers, as the government forces are capable of controlling only parts of the area and only the main routes in particular.
Road Travel:
Road travel within Cartagena is normal for a large urban city. There is risk of crime, particularly at night. The road conditions within the town are good. In the rural areas, the road conditions are generally poor on main transit routes. In the project areas many of the local roads are not surfaced and in some instances operations are cancelled when weather conditions render parts of the routes too dangerous to travel. There is high risk of criminal/armed group activity in the rural areas. My recommendation is to travel only in areas with low/acceptable risk. Never take the initiative to adventure in unknown places. Travel always in group. Last but not least bring always your cell phone with you and be sure that police number is promptly available.





This map highlights (red) the high concentration of IDPs in the North of Colombia - OCHA Courtesy

RSAs in Cali – Medellin (Colombia). Security challenges.

Why compare two different Colombian cities, with different back grounds, different developments and history? It has been deemed interesting put side by side the security contexts of Cali and Medellin for two reasons: both have similar factors threatening stability and security, and secondly I wanted to understand which kind of security measures were adopted in two diverse environments with similar characteristics. In other words, taking into account the slight difference between the two situations, which was the most successful security model adopted?
I conducted my RSA in Cali and Medellin between January and February 2007 and at the first glance both towns appeared very interesting, the people friendly and the quality and quantity of commercial activities amazing.
CALI (Valle del Cauca District): In the area several armed actors (FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, recent armed entities like Aguila Negra, local criminal gangs, etc) are conducting their operations. The town is strategic to control the illicit cultivation of coca as well as for the routes towards the sea to export the final product. The government identified an area in the region (among locations Florida, Palira, Pradera) to facilitate the exchange of rebel prisoners with kidnapped people by guerrilla, trough the programme “Humanitarian Agreement”. The operation so far has not produced the expected results and the programme is currently suspended. In March 2009, the FARC wanted to exchange 22 captured members of the security forces for 500 guerrillas currently held in Colombian and U.S. prisons. The Colombian Government rejected such an exchange and demanded the FARC to unilaterally release their hostages. The FARC is suspected to also hold hundreds of civilians hostage for extortion. They are not part of the proposed exchange.
The centre of the town of Cali is well protected by police but in the surroundings illegal armed groups are almost free to circulate and conduct their business. The main threat in the region is related to the high concentration of armed actors. This factor can endanger travelers who can be caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups. Wrong place and wrong moment.
The town of Cali has been divided in areas controlled by (at least) 20 different criminal gangs. Most of them have direct contact with organized guerrilla armed groups.
The actual government has improved greatly the security of Colombian urban areas, included Cali, leaving peripheries with little order and security. It is recommended to be properly informed about the security situation prior any movement in town since the situation is very volatile. The phenomenon of kidnapping is still high. Kidnappings take place for two main reasons: a “political” one, to put pressure on politician to obtain favors or exchange of “prisoners” or as an extortion to finance illicit activities. Often kidnapped people are sold by local criminal gangs to organized armed guerrilla groups. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high.

Author at Medellin Botero's Park

MEDELLIN (Antioquia District). The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North West. The town of Medellin is surrounded by hills and the region in general is rugged. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There are two distinct areas of conflict: the urban city of Medellin and rural areas in the surrounding district. The main armed groups are primarily struggling for control of territory and control of the strategic routes, mineral resources and infrastructure projects (e.g. hydro) in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas around the district. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of peoples (IDPs). The level of local criminality is high too. Several gangs control urban territory (with limitations in the city center “Poblado”) which are interconnected with guerrilla.
Within the district, local farmers try to flee the contested areas. Many are the illegal armed groups operating in the Antioquia district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban center. The armed groups are under continuous pressure both from the military and from rival gangs. Resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential increase of tension among populations.
Risk mitigation measures recommended for both locations:
Here a check list of recommended security measures for field offices deemed necessary to reduce the risk posed by both drug cartels activities and common criminality:
· Guards: well trained and equipped, ideally armed.
· Alarm: movement/vibration sensors should be installed throughout the office location, including parking lot, fence, etc.
· Video recording surveillance system: active on a 24/7 basis.
· Fence: ideally a proper (wall/barbed wire) high fence should protect premises. On top a signaled electric fence should be mounted.
· Dogs: If possible trained watchdogs can be used to improve security mainly during night hours. Dogs must be trained and properly managed.
· Minimal visibility: the visibility of the office and official vehicles should be minimal. Anonymity will help prevent assaults. Neither office nor vehicles should have external signs and indication about business conducted there.
· Blast Resistant Film (BRF): it is recommended that windows of the office to be treated with BRF.
· Snipers: as an extreme measure one or two member of the guard force can be positioned on top of the roof in strategic position in order to better surveil the activity in the roads in the close proximity of the building. This activity can be organized on a special occasion basis (when a special security threath occurs – political unrest and protests, violent events, criminal activities, etc) or on a regular basis.
· Vehicles: should be armored, equipped with bullet proof vests, helmets, radio communication systems (HF, VHF, cellular, sat phone), GPS tracking system, first aid kit, fire extinguisher, etc.

Pasto – Colombia: RSA between natural disaster threat (Volcano Galeras) and drug cartels war

I conducted a Risk Security Assessment in Pasto in February 2007 and it was one of the most challenging.
Pasto is a nice town in the south of Colombia, not far from the border with Ecuador. Pasto is the major town in the green Nariño region, home of allegedly the best coffee quality produced in the country. The green hills and the perfect microclimate make this region ideal to grow a rich full bodied coffee. In the nearby of the town lies the active volcano Galeras. Seismic activities at a low level have continued at Galeras, with small explosions occasionally dusting nearby villages and towns with ash. The volcano has continued to be well studied, and predictions of eruptions at the volcano have improved. One phenomenon, which seems to be a reliable precursor to eruptive activity, is a low-frequency seismic event known as a tornillo event. These have occurred before about four-fifths of the explosions at Galeras, and the number of tornillo events recorded before an eruption is also correlated with the size of the ensuing eruption. Recently, on February 14, 2009, the volcano erupted and some 8,000 residents were evacuated, and there were no immediate reports of injuries or serious property damage. As in 2005, the city of Pasto was blanketed by a layer of ash after the volcanic explosion (due to the direction of the wind). The local authorities ordered two water treatment plants near Galeras to shut down. On March 13, 2009, Galeras erupted twice. Ash fell on Pasto and some other towns near the volcano, where an evacuation was ordered but reportedly ignored. No injuries or damage were reported.
When I visited the location in 2007, in my RSA report within the natural disaster chapter I described the risk posed by the proximity of downtown office and operations to the volcano. In fact it erupted before my visit and well trained staff were able to evacuate from building precisely and smoothly.
I revised the special “Volcano Galeras” contingency plans and provided recommendation about the conduction of regular practical evacuation exercises in order to mitigate the risk. The next post on this blog is going to be a technical one about Natural Disasters Contingency Plans.
Still the threat is there and in these circumstances timing is essential, regardless the fact that the last eruption took place at one flank of the volcano not involving directly the city.
“Expect the unexpected” is the baseline of every successful RSA.
Regarding the guerrilla factor, it must be said that the area is very strategic for guerrillas and generally speaking for all armed actors. In fact the routes leading from Pasto to the Pacific Ocean are precious for criminal organizations because represent the direct access to the sea and to the departure places to export drugs to Central America or USA.
One of the most famous ports used by drug traffickers is Buenaventura, located miles from the western cordillera of the Andes mountain range and the major city of Cali, the department's capital. Buenaventura has had a notorious history plagued by drug trafficking, violence, and the presence of guerrilla and paramilitary groups. In the last two years, the amount of reported homicides has doubled. The murder rate that is 24 times that of New York City, making it a crime rate of 175.2. To counter the violence, the Colombian government has set up a marine Special Forces unit in the worst area of the city. During my visit drug cartels were having an armed confrontation in the city streets.
From Buenaventura drug is loaded on “Go Fast” boats which in hours can reach the Mexican shores transporting up to 5 tons of drug. Usually these boats are refueled during the night by fishing boats. Once mission is accomplished the Go Fasts (worth more than $100.000) are abandoned and the crew can return back Colombia via flight.

Buenaventura is also famous for the handmade submarines which have been created to skip the radar/sonar signals. Those “narco submarine” (also called narco sub, drug sub, Big Foot submarine and Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS)) are home-made marine vessels built by drug traffickers to smuggle their goods. They are used by Colombian drug cartel members to export cocaine from Colombia to the United States. They are typically made of fiberglass, powered by a 300/350 hp diesel engine and manned by a crew of four. With enough cargo space to carry two to ten tons of cocaine, they also carry large fuel tanks, giving them a range of 2,000 miles (3,200 Km). Because much of its structure is fiberglass and it travels nearly below the sea surface, the vessel is virtually impossible to detect via sonar or radar. Narco submarines also have an upper lead shielding to minimize their 'heat signature' and evade infrared sensors. The newer models have piping along the bottom to allow the water to cool the exhaust as the ship moves, making it even less susceptible to infrared detection. About a third of the 600 tons of cocaine coming out of Colombia each year leaves via the Pacific coast and a significant amount is being carried in semi-submersibles. In late January 2009, a Sri Lankan Army task force found three semi-subs being built by Tamil rebels in the jungles of Mullaitivu. With this discovery, the LTTE became the first armed organization to develop underwater weapons. I will write an interesting article about my SRA in the post conflict Sri Lanka soon.
The Nariño region is thus located between the inner Putumayo region and the sea. Putumayo is covered by heavy Amazonic forest in which is cultivated and elaborated a large quantity of cocaine. Besides it serves as safe haven for guerrilla and paramilitaries. The region is difficult to control by government forces. The area is well known for a massive deployment of anti personnel mines used by guerrilla to protect their coca cultivation areas and presence of transformation labs. Pasto can be considered a middle risk site for the reasons exposed above.
Pasto represented a security challenge for two main reasons above exposed: natural disaster threat and presence of guerrilla and drug cartels. As said, the next article will explain how to make a successful assessment of threats posed by natural “force majeure”. Regarding the guerrilla factor, the argument will be divided in different chapters and exposed in future posts.

This semi-summersible is 20 mts long and 5 mts wide.It can transport up to 10 tons of cocaine (street value $700m) - Courtesy darkgovernment.

Road assessment: a building just destroyed during drug cartels war on the route Pasto - Buenaventura

RSA in Colombia - Bogota'

I have decided to write few articles about the Risk Security Assessment I conducted in Colombia in January – February 2007 for two reasons: first of all, I visited eleven towns in the country so it would be too reductive summarize such an interesting mission in few lines, secondly the general security context is very complex and deserves a fairly deep explanation.
My task was to conduct an evaluation of the risk both at Bogota country office and at each field office location level, performing RSA and thus providing recommendations about how to improve security measures according with the MOSS (Minimum Operating Standard Security).
For obvious confidential reasons I cannot provide details of such mission, besides it would be very boring for readers. Far more interesting is reading these posts as considerations made by a traveler who knows about security.
Let’s start then describing the general security context in Colombia.
Everybody knows that Marxist guerrilla groups began their insurgency in the early 1960s. An estimated 10,000 rebels remain active in various areas. The largest is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), followed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and a splinter group of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). The former right-wing paramilitary groups number an estimated 5,000 to 7,000, were accused of widespread human rights abuses. Few years ago the Colombian government came out with a plan intended to offer to criminal groups an interesting package to stimulate them to leave their illegal activities through a special rehabilitation program (providing jobs, offering salaries etc). The program did not work as expected. In fact, some of them came back to their illicit activities adopting the name of Black Eagles (Aguila Negra), others took apparently advantage of the government offer, but started in parallel then their own local criminal gang, only few returned to legality. Both former paramilitaries and guerrillas rely on the cocaine business to finance their operations.
Colombia is widely regarded as one of the main drug producing countries of the world and a major distribution route. Drug money is used for political and criminal assassinations and for political acceptability, and clashes between guerrilla groups and the army, police and drug gangs, are almost daily occurrences within Colombia. Travel to areas reported to grow and process drugs represents a high risk to personal safety.
Illegal armed groups are accused of deliberately displacing civilians, often to benefit wealthy patrons.
These Internal Displaced People are assisted by the international community through International Organizations, NGOs, etc.
Statistically Colombia is quoted as the country with the highest rate of violent deaths in the world. These are committed every 20 minutes bringing the total to 45,000 per year of which 97% remain unsolved. 61% of all kidnappings, are also carried out in Colombia.
This was the context in which I conducted my RSA.











Ecuadorean soldiers carried away the bodies of Colombian guerrillas killed by the Colombian military during a raid of a rebel camp in Ecuador. The raid set off a diplomatic crisis. Courtesy NY Times.

Bogota’ was for me a real surprise. A very nice town modern and developed. The main threat in Bogotá area remains that of local crime (robbery, credit card cloning etc). The security in general has improved lately thanks to an agreement promoted by the Government, between the Armed Forces, Police and private security companies. Such document promote a better cooperation of the security forces on the ground, giving to thousand private security operators same prerogative as police only when an emergency takes place. In practical terms the number of security “eyes” on the Bogota’ streets tripled. The number of attempted kidnappings and crime related events and dramatically reduced.

Two suburbs of the town are considered “critical” from a crime stand point: Soacha and Ciudad Bolivar. In these two areas is high the presence of IDPs who left their homes located probably in rural areas, forced by guerrilla to leave. They relocated in very precarious conditions in the nearby of large cities, including Bogota.
Just a couple of practical suggestions for those travelling in town, besides the basic security precautions that anybody must adopt when out of home country. When catching a taxi be sure that it belongs to a known “certified” company. Furthermore, as soon as the taxi arrives, pretend to make a call (fake) to somebody saying loudly to wait for you, and that you are arriving with the taxi plated (mention the plate). You could even ask ID card to the driver, if he refuses call another (certified) taxi.
Don’t take the risk to travel between cities in Colombia by car. The car could be attacked in isolated areas. Better fly, flight tickets are generally cheap and the service on board of the Avianca, the national flight company, is very good.
Enjoy Bogota’ its people, its pure Latin brilliant night life, its food and tradition.