Cartagena (Colombia) – RSA surrounded by a beautiful colonial atmosphere.

Cartagena is a beautiful colonial town. I visited it in 2007 while carrying out my RSA mission in Colombia. Probably the nicest colonial urban area in the Caribbean. It lies along the Caribbean shores in the North of Colombia in a strategic area used by the Spaniards in the XV-XVII centuries to ship to Europe gold and precious material coming form the New World. Despite its nice appearance and its touristic vocation several are the threats to consider while preparing the Risk Assessment related mainly to its surrounding districts (organized crime, drug cartels wars, kidnapping, extortion, etc). There are different security phases for the centre and the periphery. Cartagena centre enjoys a lower secutiy phase (1 in a scale of 5). The town is well guarded and surveilled by regular and tourist police who protects tourists and the related income generated by tourism, while the situation worsens in the suburbs (phase 2). Those areas are affected by poverty and violence. Large camps of displaced people (IDPs) who were forced by guerrilla to leave their villages in the Colombian inner areas have been established here. Same threats affect the bordering districts of Sucre, Atlántico, Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Cesar. The whole area is of strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North and in particular to the ports of the Caribbean coast which are a main transit route for both legal and illegal trade.
The town of Cartagena is a very popular holiday destination for many Colombians with an historic old colonial town (Ciudad Murallada) coupled with beaches and high rise accommodation. On the other hand, the city has some desperately poor areas. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces and the pattern of the conflict follows a similar trend to the rest of the country with the main armed groups struggling for control of territory within Cartagena and control of the strategic routes, fertile drug-crop land and mineral resources in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of people within these districts, as local farmers try to flee the contested areas. As said, the town itself is secure due to high concentration of police and military troops which are trying to preserve intact the flux of tourists. Tourism is the engine of the economy in Cartagena.
There is a huge economic difference between down-town Cartagena and the surroundings (very poor and extended areas). This difference causes social tensions and violence. Internationals visiting the region must be aware about the risk of kidnappings, for both political reasons and extortion. The best mitigating measure is the adoption of a low profile and low visibility while visiting the country. Accidental shooting is another element to consider while analyzing the risk. Although there are undoubtedly many illegal weapons in the region, the risk of accidental shooting in the region can be assessed as medium, low in Cartagena.
Organized Criminal Activity:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in the Northern region. Nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnapping. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Cartagena district, mainly in Cordoba and Monte de Maria areas, including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers, as the government forces are capable of controlling only parts of the area and only the main routes in particular.
Road Travel:
Road travel within Cartagena is normal for a large urban city. There is risk of crime, particularly at night. The road conditions within the town are good. In the rural areas, the road conditions are generally poor on main transit routes. In the project areas many of the local roads are not surfaced and in some instances operations are cancelled when weather conditions render parts of the routes too dangerous to travel. There is high risk of criminal/armed group activity in the rural areas. My recommendation is to travel only in areas with low/acceptable risk. Never take the initiative to adventure in unknown places. Travel always in group. Last but not least bring always your cell phone with you and be sure that police number is promptly available.





This map highlights (red) the high concentration of IDPs in the North of Colombia - OCHA Courtesy

RSAs in Cali – Medellin (Colombia). Security challenges.

Why compare two different Colombian cities, with different back grounds, different developments and history? It has been deemed interesting put side by side the security contexts of Cali and Medellin for two reasons: both have similar factors threatening stability and security, and secondly I wanted to understand which kind of security measures were adopted in two diverse environments with similar characteristics. In other words, taking into account the slight difference between the two situations, which was the most successful security model adopted?
I conducted my RSA in Cali and Medellin between January and February 2007 and at the first glance both towns appeared very interesting, the people friendly and the quality and quantity of commercial activities amazing.
CALI (Valle del Cauca District): In the area several armed actors (FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, recent armed entities like Aguila Negra, local criminal gangs, etc) are conducting their operations. The town is strategic to control the illicit cultivation of coca as well as for the routes towards the sea to export the final product. The government identified an area in the region (among locations Florida, Palira, Pradera) to facilitate the exchange of rebel prisoners with kidnapped people by guerrilla, trough the programme “Humanitarian Agreement”. The operation so far has not produced the expected results and the programme is currently suspended. In March 2009, the FARC wanted to exchange 22 captured members of the security forces for 500 guerrillas currently held in Colombian and U.S. prisons. The Colombian Government rejected such an exchange and demanded the FARC to unilaterally release their hostages. The FARC is suspected to also hold hundreds of civilians hostage for extortion. They are not part of the proposed exchange.
The centre of the town of Cali is well protected by police but in the surroundings illegal armed groups are almost free to circulate and conduct their business. The main threat in the region is related to the high concentration of armed actors. This factor can endanger travelers who can be caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups. Wrong place and wrong moment.
The town of Cali has been divided in areas controlled by (at least) 20 different criminal gangs. Most of them have direct contact with organized guerrilla armed groups.
The actual government has improved greatly the security of Colombian urban areas, included Cali, leaving peripheries with little order and security. It is recommended to be properly informed about the security situation prior any movement in town since the situation is very volatile. The phenomenon of kidnapping is still high. Kidnappings take place for two main reasons: a “political” one, to put pressure on politician to obtain favors or exchange of “prisoners” or as an extortion to finance illicit activities. Often kidnapped people are sold by local criminal gangs to organized armed guerrilla groups. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high.

Author at Medellin Botero's Park

MEDELLIN (Antioquia District). The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North West. The town of Medellin is surrounded by hills and the region in general is rugged. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There are two distinct areas of conflict: the urban city of Medellin and rural areas in the surrounding district. The main armed groups are primarily struggling for control of territory and control of the strategic routes, mineral resources and infrastructure projects (e.g. hydro) in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas around the district. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of peoples (IDPs). The level of local criminality is high too. Several gangs control urban territory (with limitations in the city center “Poblado”) which are interconnected with guerrilla.
Within the district, local farmers try to flee the contested areas. Many are the illegal armed groups operating in the Antioquia district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban center. The armed groups are under continuous pressure both from the military and from rival gangs. Resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential increase of tension among populations.
Risk mitigation measures recommended for both locations:
Here a check list of recommended security measures for field offices deemed necessary to reduce the risk posed by both drug cartels activities and common criminality:
· Guards: well trained and equipped, ideally armed.
· Alarm: movement/vibration sensors should be installed throughout the office location, including parking lot, fence, etc.
· Video recording surveillance system: active on a 24/7 basis.
· Fence: ideally a proper (wall/barbed wire) high fence should protect premises. On top a signaled electric fence should be mounted.
· Dogs: If possible trained watchdogs can be used to improve security mainly during night hours. Dogs must be trained and properly managed.
· Minimal visibility: the visibility of the office and official vehicles should be minimal. Anonymity will help prevent assaults. Neither office nor vehicles should have external signs and indication about business conducted there.
· Blast Resistant Film (BRF): it is recommended that windows of the office to be treated with BRF.
· Snipers: as an extreme measure one or two member of the guard force can be positioned on top of the roof in strategic position in order to better surveil the activity in the roads in the close proximity of the building. This activity can be organized on a special occasion basis (when a special security threath occurs – political unrest and protests, violent events, criminal activities, etc) or on a regular basis.
· Vehicles: should be armored, equipped with bullet proof vests, helmets, radio communication systems (HF, VHF, cellular, sat phone), GPS tracking system, first aid kit, fire extinguisher, etc.

RSA in Colombia - Bogota'

I have decided to write few articles about the Risk Security Assessment I conducted in Colombia in January – February 2007 for two reasons: first of all, I visited eleven towns in the country so it would be too reductive summarize such an interesting mission in few lines, secondly the general security context is very complex and deserves a fairly deep explanation.
My task was to conduct an evaluation of the risk both at Bogota country office and at each field office location level, performing RSA and thus providing recommendations about how to improve security measures according with the MOSS (Minimum Operating Standard Security).
For obvious confidential reasons I cannot provide details of such mission, besides it would be very boring for readers. Far more interesting is reading these posts as considerations made by a traveler who knows about security.
Let’s start then describing the general security context in Colombia.
Everybody knows that Marxist guerrilla groups began their insurgency in the early 1960s. An estimated 10,000 rebels remain active in various areas. The largest is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), followed by the National Liberation Army (ELN) and a splinter group of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). The former right-wing paramilitary groups number an estimated 5,000 to 7,000, were accused of widespread human rights abuses. Few years ago the Colombian government came out with a plan intended to offer to criminal groups an interesting package to stimulate them to leave their illegal activities through a special rehabilitation program (providing jobs, offering salaries etc). The program did not work as expected. In fact, some of them came back to their illicit activities adopting the name of Black Eagles (Aguila Negra), others took apparently advantage of the government offer, but started in parallel then their own local criminal gang, only few returned to legality. Both former paramilitaries and guerrillas rely on the cocaine business to finance their operations.
Colombia is widely regarded as one of the main drug producing countries of the world and a major distribution route. Drug money is used for political and criminal assassinations and for political acceptability, and clashes between guerrilla groups and the army, police and drug gangs, are almost daily occurrences within Colombia. Travel to areas reported to grow and process drugs represents a high risk to personal safety.
Illegal armed groups are accused of deliberately displacing civilians, often to benefit wealthy patrons.
These Internal Displaced People are assisted by the international community through International Organizations, NGOs, etc.
Statistically Colombia is quoted as the country with the highest rate of violent deaths in the world. These are committed every 20 minutes bringing the total to 45,000 per year of which 97% remain unsolved. 61% of all kidnappings, are also carried out in Colombia.
This was the context in which I conducted my RSA.











Ecuadorean soldiers carried away the bodies of Colombian guerrillas killed by the Colombian military during a raid of a rebel camp in Ecuador. The raid set off a diplomatic crisis. Courtesy NY Times.

Bogota’ was for me a real surprise. A very nice town modern and developed. The main threat in Bogotá area remains that of local crime (robbery, credit card cloning etc). The security in general has improved lately thanks to an agreement promoted by the Government, between the Armed Forces, Police and private security companies. Such document promote a better cooperation of the security forces on the ground, giving to thousand private security operators same prerogative as police only when an emergency takes place. In practical terms the number of security “eyes” on the Bogota’ streets tripled. The number of attempted kidnappings and crime related events and dramatically reduced.

Two suburbs of the town are considered “critical” from a crime stand point: Soacha and Ciudad Bolivar. In these two areas is high the presence of IDPs who left their homes located probably in rural areas, forced by guerrilla to leave. They relocated in very precarious conditions in the nearby of large cities, including Bogota.
Just a couple of practical suggestions for those travelling in town, besides the basic security precautions that anybody must adopt when out of home country. When catching a taxi be sure that it belongs to a known “certified” company. Furthermore, as soon as the taxi arrives, pretend to make a call (fake) to somebody saying loudly to wait for you, and that you are arriving with the taxi plated (mention the plate). You could even ask ID card to the driver, if he refuses call another (certified) taxi.
Don’t take the risk to travel between cities in Colombia by car. The car could be attacked in isolated areas. Better fly, flight tickets are generally cheap and the service on board of the Avianca, the national flight company, is very good.
Enjoy Bogota’ its people, its pure Latin brilliant night life, its food and tradition.