PERU: General security situation, considerations from my Risk Security Assessment

I visited Peru in February and March 2007 while conducting a Risk Security Assessment mission. The materials used to prepare this blog post have been updated and carefully reviewed in order to provide an idea about the actual security context in Peru.

SITUATION:

Peru is suffering from an increase in crime from simple muggings through to violent kidnapping; mostly confined to urban areas and within the poorer districts during the day but widespread after dark. The current government is slowly becoming increasingly popular, despite of the economic situation declining and local crime rising. Regarding the terrorism groups who used to frighten Peru, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru, both have been almost successfully fought in the Eighties and right now some old militants are trying to reorganize themselves. Those trends are channeling themselves towards the big drug traffic ants as the military-like expertise they can offer is very useful to protect illegal cocaine laboratories and the transportation of the final product. It has to be borne in mind that Peru is the second largest coca producer in South America, after Colombia. Urban driving conditions are appalling and at present they are assessed of being probably the greatest threat to staff in Peru. One of the most common security challenges to personal security is related to the use of taxis. There are almost no road regulations and police is literally not “visible” on the streets. Often illegal taxi drivers put on their car a Taxi sign. It has been reported that a massive quantity of false circulation documents as well as driving permits are fake and easy to obtain, since there is a flourishing market for false documents in Lima.
Furthermore, driving schools often “sell” driving license without performing any practical exams or oral/written tests.
Kidnapping can be considered a high risk factor in Peru, above all for foreigners travelling in Peru.
Often the victim is forced to withdraw money from ATM machines, usually before and after midnight so that the cash amount is double as it refers to two days. The phenomenon is popularly called Millionaire Walking (Paseo Milionario). It is recommended to use secure taxi company before arriving in country. Local staff is required to attend to a specialized security awareness training in addition to the basic security training. This is primarily due to deal with the threat of kidnapping and being involved in a car accident in very remote areas with no communication and close medical facilities.

SECURITY SITUATION - THREAT ANALYSIS
President Alan Garcia is at his second mandate as president of Peru. People are slowly but steadily increasing their support of his administration since he is giving clear signs that he wants to do something concrete to help the poor conditions of his country. For example, he is the author of a law which will ask the major mine companies to pay a “volunteer contribute” (several million of dollars) to organizations involved in fighting hunger in Peru since the State program organizations waist up to 40% of the available resources. If those political actions will help Peru to improve or if this will be a barely cosmetic political move it is not clear.
There are still concerns over renewed insurgency activity from the Shining Path (SL) guerrilla group having them join the drug traffickers with their support in security.

Peru is the second largest producer of cocaine in South America after Colombia. Here coca plantations are not illegal, but coca farmers must accept to sell part of the production to a State owned company. The quantity to be sold is minimal so that the great majority of it is then illegally purchased by drug dealers. The system does not help the fight against drug smugglers as the cultivations are not illegal and it is very difficult to define the line between legality and illegality.
The areas of biggest concern are, however, the common criminality and road accidents. Common criminality is widespread in the country with a peak level in the periphery of Lima. Law enforcement agents are not visible, and according to the official data, are not doing enough to fight this phenomenon. The second area of concern is related to car traffic and accidents. As said, there is a high risk of becoming a victim of a car accident, since there is little order and respect of road regulations. In Peru public transportation managed by government or local authorities does not exist, but it has been left to private companies and individuals. There is little control on authorizations and documents so that virtually anybody who owns a car or a minibus can be a taxi or public bus driver. Furthermore, a long time passes between vehicle technical inspections increasing the risk of mechanical breakdowns and incidents due to the lack of maintenance. The parliament has recently approved a law which forbids the importation of used cars older than five years. The high taxes to buy a new vehicle (50% of the price) have created a stagnant situation which do not facilitate the replacement of older models.

Author posing with a local community involved in an agriculture based project in the Handahuaylas area.

Peru has a working relationship with Brazil, although this has been strained by US aid packages to Lima. However, Peru is a member of MERCOSOR trade region, which is dominated by Brazil, bringing the countries closer together. Bolivia is a close partner, largely due to mutual concerns over Chile. Whilst Peru and Chile have been historic rivals, the current relationship is reasonably amicable, although the dispute over maritime borders is still alive. The two countries are working together on border security and anti-terrorist operations. Border disputes with Ecuador remain a source of tension, although outright combat seems unlikely.

The once special relationship with Japan has been strained, following the flight of Garcia predecessor, Alberto Fujimori, to Japan in 2000 and the associated international pressure on Japan to extradite him for murder. Fujimori undergone a trial, has been accused of several imputations and is now in prison. His daughter Keiko, actual Peruvian politician, is planning to run for President of Peru in 2011. How this element could change the feeling of the Peruvians about a possible return of the former President remains to be seen.
Peru’s relationship with the US has had a rocky past but is now close, particularly with large US funding for narcotics and security operations. However, many in Peru are critical of the US for failing to address fundamental trade and social problems within the country through their funding packages. There appears to be some credible information that international terrorists are present in the country but it is not known to which organization they belong; their activities seem to be linked with drugs, financing and false documentation.
The wave of internal terrorism, which Peru suffered in the 1980s and 1990s, has largely passed, but it has not completely disappeared. Remnants of the Shining Path (SP) movement (estimated at around 300 fighters and an unknown number of political activists) are still active in the Apurimac, Ene and Lower Huallaga Valleys. SP was responsible for the US embassy bombing in 2002. A group of terrorists also abducted gas pipeline workers near Toccate in the Ayacucho Department on 9th June 2003. In addition, the Garcia government, despite of his increasing popularity, remains disliked on basic reforms, which gives the potential for protests and strikes if the economic and social situation worsens. There have been recent protests by coca farmers over crop eradication by US-funded anti-narcotics operations and there are signs that the farmers are becoming increasingly militant in their opposition to the government’s support for US actions. In fact the project of restructuring coca plantations with other cultivations has given low results in terms of production and prices. The United Nations are also seen as a threat by the coca farmers and the SP who have an interest in coca production being the major security provider.

Off road trip on the Andean Mountains to Huancavelica.

RSAs in Cali – Medellin (Colombia). Security challenges.

Why compare two different Colombian cities, with different back grounds, different developments and history? It has been deemed interesting put side by side the security contexts of Cali and Medellin for two reasons: both have similar factors threatening stability and security, and secondly I wanted to understand which kind of security measures were adopted in two diverse environments with similar characteristics. In other words, taking into account the slight difference between the two situations, which was the most successful security model adopted?
I conducted my RSA in Cali and Medellin between January and February 2007 and at the first glance both towns appeared very interesting, the people friendly and the quality and quantity of commercial activities amazing.
CALI (Valle del Cauca District): In the area several armed actors (FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, recent armed entities like Aguila Negra, local criminal gangs, etc) are conducting their operations. The town is strategic to control the illicit cultivation of coca as well as for the routes towards the sea to export the final product. The government identified an area in the region (among locations Florida, Palira, Pradera) to facilitate the exchange of rebel prisoners with kidnapped people by guerrilla, trough the programme “Humanitarian Agreement”. The operation so far has not produced the expected results and the programme is currently suspended. In March 2009, the FARC wanted to exchange 22 captured members of the security forces for 500 guerrillas currently held in Colombian and U.S. prisons. The Colombian Government rejected such an exchange and demanded the FARC to unilaterally release their hostages. The FARC is suspected to also hold hundreds of civilians hostage for extortion. They are not part of the proposed exchange.
The centre of the town of Cali is well protected by police but in the surroundings illegal armed groups are almost free to circulate and conduct their business. The main threat in the region is related to the high concentration of armed actors. This factor can endanger travelers who can be caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups. Wrong place and wrong moment.
The town of Cali has been divided in areas controlled by (at least) 20 different criminal gangs. Most of them have direct contact with organized guerrilla armed groups.
The actual government has improved greatly the security of Colombian urban areas, included Cali, leaving peripheries with little order and security. It is recommended to be properly informed about the security situation prior any movement in town since the situation is very volatile. The phenomenon of kidnapping is still high. Kidnappings take place for two main reasons: a “political” one, to put pressure on politician to obtain favors or exchange of “prisoners” or as an extortion to finance illicit activities. Often kidnapped people are sold by local criminal gangs to organized armed guerrilla groups. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high.

Author at Medellin Botero's Park

MEDELLIN (Antioquia District). The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North West. The town of Medellin is surrounded by hills and the region in general is rugged. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There are two distinct areas of conflict: the urban city of Medellin and rural areas in the surrounding district. The main armed groups are primarily struggling for control of territory and control of the strategic routes, mineral resources and infrastructure projects (e.g. hydro) in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas around the district. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of peoples (IDPs). The level of local criminality is high too. Several gangs control urban territory (with limitations in the city center “Poblado”) which are interconnected with guerrilla.
Within the district, local farmers try to flee the contested areas. Many are the illegal armed groups operating in the Antioquia district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban center. The armed groups are under continuous pressure both from the military and from rival gangs. Resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential increase of tension among populations.
Risk mitigation measures recommended for both locations:
Here a check list of recommended security measures for field offices deemed necessary to reduce the risk posed by both drug cartels activities and common criminality:
· Guards: well trained and equipped, ideally armed.
· Alarm: movement/vibration sensors should be installed throughout the office location, including parking lot, fence, etc.
· Video recording surveillance system: active on a 24/7 basis.
· Fence: ideally a proper (wall/barbed wire) high fence should protect premises. On top a signaled electric fence should be mounted.
· Dogs: If possible trained watchdogs can be used to improve security mainly during night hours. Dogs must be trained and properly managed.
· Minimal visibility: the visibility of the office and official vehicles should be minimal. Anonymity will help prevent assaults. Neither office nor vehicles should have external signs and indication about business conducted there.
· Blast Resistant Film (BRF): it is recommended that windows of the office to be treated with BRF.
· Snipers: as an extreme measure one or two member of the guard force can be positioned on top of the roof in strategic position in order to better surveil the activity in the roads in the close proximity of the building. This activity can be organized on a special occasion basis (when a special security threath occurs – political unrest and protests, violent events, criminal activities, etc) or on a regular basis.
· Vehicles: should be armored, equipped with bullet proof vests, helmets, radio communication systems (HF, VHF, cellular, sat phone), GPS tracking system, first aid kit, fire extinguisher, etc.

Lebanon 2006. Providing security during the conflict. Memories.

This is the first of a series of posts regarding my professional career and my field security experiences in different countries.
I accepted a challenging assignment offered by an International Organization the day just after the beginning of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah (a Shi'a Islamist political and paramilitary organization based in Lebanon), July 13th 2006. I was requested, as Senior Field Security Officer, to go on site and perform a security mission which would have been organized from scratch.
The Organization, in fact, closed the local office few years prior the beginning of the conflict. A huge logistic/humanitarian assistance operation was arranged virtually round the clock.
I accepted the challenge, got an entry vista at the Syrian Embassy the following day and flow to Damascus where I spent three days since Lebanon had all land access points closed. Finally, the only open way in to Lebanon was through the northern town Al Aarida, bordering with Syria.
As soon as I arrived in Beirut I joined other security professionals coming from the US, New Zealand, Australia, etc. We started a new security office within the Organization structuring operations according with humanitarian relief activities intended to transport/distribute food to the populations affected by the conflict. The task was successful nevertheless not risk free.
Particularly, I assessed the security conditions at micro and macro level. After strategizing with the team about best security options to adopt according with the evolution of the conflict, I went on the ground assessing security of public infrastructures (roads, bridges, logistic activities, assets, etc) double-checking and crossing security info.
Furthermore, I organized and provided security to convoys from the Beirut port to southern Lebanon and Beeka Valley locations still under armed Hezbollah control. Both parts involved in the armed conflict were looking at us with skepticism because the Organization was providing humanitarian assistance to the population trapped in the war and when one is “neutral” is treated with suspicion.
The most challenging operation, by the way, it has been the one carried out during a technical communication operation. I was escorting a group of ICT engineers to the top of a mountain facing the Beeka valley while harsh wide battle was taking place. We had been granted by Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) access to the area while an intense IDF artillery fire was hammering from the bottom the mountain where we were operating. Yes we had a clearly marked (armored) vehicle and security clearance but nervousness among staff was perceived.
The artillery fire was closed but the engineers succeeded to replace the repeater rapidly and we abandoned the site using an alternative route.
Beirut represents to me a milestone as security professional. I had the chance to apply some lessons previously learned during my military career. The international environment created among us and our team spirit helped to face up the rapid evolution of events as well as the escalation of the conflict.
The war continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect on August 14, 2006. Hezbollah was responsible for thousands of Katyusha rocket attacks against Israeli civilian towns and cities in northern Israel, which Hezbollah claimed were in retaliation for Israel's killing of civilians and targeting Lebanese infrastructure. In the fighting 1,200 Lebanese and 158 Israelis were killed. Of the dead almost 1,000 Lebanese and 41 Israelis were civilians.

Reached the peace, I concluded my mission and left to South America to conduct other RSAs. I love Lebanon, its people and the magic atmosphere!

Hezbollah bunkers in the proximity of the Litani River.

Visiting a community in the surroundings of Baalbek.

Just after a shelling.