Thursday, August 27, 2009

Guatemala - Chapter 2. Overall threat, organized crime and natural disasters.

With this brief post I conclude my “Guatemala” security considerations. In the previous one I described how impunity and regular criminality affect dramatically security in the country. Here are some hints about the overall threats to the humanitarian organization I was in charge of, the organized crime and natural disasters (hurricanes and volcanoes).

The Threat:
There are currently no known specified threats against humanitarian staff and interests in Guatemala other than the general threats prevalent to all organizations and civilians in the country.
Crimes of opportunity such as car theft, abduction and muggings are ever present. In essence, the high level of criminality and little or no authority and no recourse to Police action in the rural areas is a serious threat to all visitors to, and agencies. As mentioned almost in all towns (mainly in the centers) the legality and police enforcement have not been fully restored.

Terrorist Action:
Currently there are no registered incidents of IED or VBED (Vehicle Borne Explosive Device) in Guatemala. However, the authorities have expressed concern and state that they have in the past monitored Muslim extremists travelling trough Guatemala. There are no officially identified terrorist groups by the Guatemalan Government, even though there are constant confrontation with groups such as the EXPAC (ex paramilitaries), which have in the past made their dissatisfaction known through violent means. Nonetheless the security system on site is constantly in touch with local authorities and the international community to ensure that there is an early warning system in place should the terrorist threat increase. However, the terrorist threat can be assessed as low in Guatemala.

Demonstration / political:
There is no obvious potential for politically motivated violence. The activities of the recent born International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), mentioned in my previous article, backed by UN could increase the risk that international organizations could be targeted by organized crime. So far, the current threat of violent demonstration is assessed as low.

Road Accident:
Road travel in Guatemala is hazardous. Road conditions outside of town range from are generally good. The risk of a fatal accident appears to be high. The traffic is heavy in Guatemala City and the drivers have almost no discipline and respect of road regulations. Defensive driving techniques are a must for all drivers. The hazard presented by road travel is assessed as high.

Organized Criminal Activity:
This is the area of major concern in Guatemala. The Maras (youth gangs – see post dated August 16th) are of particular concern, since they are both involved with major drug operations, people smuggling syndicates and regional Mara turf wars. Additionally, they routinely control zones throughout the Capital, running extortion rackets, which include extensive involvement in the countries public transit system. As a result, it is highly recommended not to ride public buses or enter certain zones of Guatemala City and use only approved taxi companies suitable for official or personal travel. Lastly, organized crime groups have also been linked to kidnappings and “express kidnapping”, which take place frequently in Guatemala. Risk level is high.

Natural disasters/Force Majeur:
Hurricanes present a constant threat to Guatemala during the rainy season which has seen in 2005 (Hurricane Stan) approximately 2000 death. Weak government response, limited resources and a limited infrastructure all aggravate this problem. Guatemala is a geologically active country and earthquakes are also a constant concern, as well as flooding and regular power outages throughout the country. Guatemala has also 22 volcanoes, 4 of which are considered active. Volcanic activity, such as that of Fuego Volcano near Antigua in January 2003, and again in January 2006, has on occasion forced evacuations of nearby villages; the January-February 2000 activity of Pacaya Volcano near Guatemala City also briefly closed Guatemala City's international airport. The threat posed by the effects of an earthquake is assessed as high.
Map of Major Volcanoes in Guatemala. Courtesy: intute.ac.uk

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
· Crime is the biggest single threat to International Organizations in Guatemala. Sensible precautions can drastically reduce the probability of personnel becoming victims. Those most at risk are expatriates especially those recently arrived in country. Road traffic accidents are a serious problem. Sound vehicle maintenance and good driving practices will reduce the probability of accidents.
· Staff working in Guatemala City should keep the lowest profile possible while moving from/to the Capital. In this regard, it is recommendable to use magnetic logos for cars only for official missions or when it is strictly necessary in the field. This would reduce the visibility of the operators and mission and mitigate the risk.
Picture on top: Guatemalan Maras members arrested by special police - Courtesy: Noorlarnet.uoi.no

Thursday, August 20, 2009

Guatemala: affected by violent crime and impunity. Is this a never ending tunnel?

I am writing this post from the Dubai Airport lounge while I am waiting for my connection flight to New York. Just concluded a three months security mission in Sri Lanka where I was in charge of the security of staff, assets and operations of in international organization in the North of the country. I will write soon a post about the challenging security situation in the island. In the meantime, I believe it would be logic continue with the Latin American “chapter” i.e. my security experience in Centro/Latin America in order to give more uniformity to the structure of this blog.
I conducted my RSA in Guatemala in February 2008, visited Guatemala City and the field office located in Jocotan/Los Amates. In that period an interesting debate around the best method (if ever any) to reduce/eliminate the impunity was taking place. Such discussion, both intellectual and political, was stimulated by creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, its Spanish acronym). The United Nations in fact in December 2006 signed an agreement with the Guatemalan Government to set up an independent commission, to investigate illegal armed groups that have been operating in the Central American country with impunity and to help justice officials carry out criminal prosecutions against them. In February 2007, three Salvadoran parliamentarians and their driver were assassinated by senior members of the Guatemalan National Civilian Police, including the head of the organized crime unit. Four of those police officers were themselves subsequently killed while in a high security Guatemalan jail. The incident has demonstrated the extent to which illegal security organizations have infiltrated high levels of state institutions in Guatemala.
The Commission should be able to conduct its own investigations and also help local institutions, particularly the Office of the Public Prosecutor. According with the UN official press report “The Commission currently had about 20 ongoing investigations and had proceeded to criminal prosecution in four cases... One of those involved the massacre of 12 persons and related to the rivalry between organized groups; another case dealt with police corruption and concerned groups that kidnapped children”. Reality is that corruption and impunity are still dramatically affecting Guatemala and its neighbouring countries and the above Commission has noble intention but scarce power.

Author assessing flour mill security measures at Los Amates.

Violent criminal activity continues to be a problem in Guatemala, including murder, rape, and armed assaults against foreigners. The police force is inexperienced and under-funded, and the judicial system is weak, overworked, and inefficient. Well-armed criminals know there is little chance they will be caught or punished. Traditionally, Guatemala experiences increases in crime before and during the Christmas and Easter holiday seasons.
Large demonstrations occur throughout Guatemala, often with little or no notice, and can cause serious traffic disruptions. Although most demonstrations are peaceful, they can turn violent, and travellers should avoid areas where demonstrations are taking place. The use of roadblocks and/or blocking of public facilities, including the international airport, has increased and demonstrators may prevent tourists caught behind the blockades from leaving.

Poster relating human being trafficking with impunity.
In 2007 particularly virulent rumours of child stealing and of murder for organ harvesting have been reported in several different areas of Guatemala frequented by foreigners. During my visit in the country numerous Guatemalan citizens have been lynched for suspicion of child stealing, and three local women who allegedly facilitated foreign adoptions were attacked by a mob that accused them of kidnapping and killing a girl whose mutilated remains were found near Camotan, Chiquimula (near the Honduran border on the main road leading to the Copan Mayan ruins). In reaction to unconfirmed reports of babies being kidnapped in the El Golfete area of the Rio Dulce (near Livingston, Izabal), residents of small villages in the area remain mobilized and suspicious of all outsiders, including foreigners. I passed by there areas. Talking with the people I perceived an overall distress and a total lack of confidence in the Police and the institutions in general. In Sayaxche, Petén, child stealing rumours escalated into mob action against a Guatemalan couple believed to be involved in child stealing. Mobs have also targeted police, resulting in delayed or ineffective responses by law enforcement.
Due to uncontrolled drug and alien smuggling, the Guatemalan border with Mexico is a relatively high-risk area, in particular in the northern Petén Department. The most dangerous area in that region is on the north-western border in the area that includes the Sierra de Lacandon and Laguna del Tigre National Parks.
My concern was/is that the staff, above all the expatriates, could be targeted to send a clear message to the international community as such and to the UN to stop the investigations of the Commission against Impunity. No attacks have taken place so far but this remains a valid warning since general security situation has not changed. Violent crime, however, is a serious concern due to endemic poverty, an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and dysfunctional law enforcement and judicial systems.
The number of violent crimes officially reported has remained high in recent years. Incidents include, but are not limited to, assault, theft, armed robbery, carjacking, rape, kidnapping, and murder. Criminals often operate in groups of four or more and are confrontational and violent. Gangs are a growing concern in Guatemala City and rural Guatemala. Gang members are often well armed with sophisticated weaponry and they sometimes use massive amounts of force. Emboldened armed robbers have attacked vehicles on main roads in broad daylight. Travel on rural roads always increases the risk of a criminal roadblock or ambush. Widespread narcotics and alien smuggling activities can make remote areas especially dangerous. However, violent criminal activity on the highways continues, and foreigners, among others, have been targeted. Many of the robbery attempts have occurred in daylight hours on main highways. Carjacking incidents and highway robberies are often violent. Private vehicles, taxis and shuttle buses have been attacked. Typically, the assailants steal money, passports, and luggage. In some cases, assailants have been wearing full or partial police uniforms and have used vehicles that resemble police vehicles, indicating that some elements of the police might be involved. Travel after dark anywhere in Guatemala is extremely dangerous.
In conclusion, I would define as the most pernicious threats the virulent violent organized crime and the institutional failure to bring perpetrators of crimes to justice creating thus a denial attitude of the victims' right to justice and redress.
In the next post about Guatemala I will outline the external threat analysis, the organized criminal activities and the natural disaster risk (contingency plans) posed mainly by tropical hurricanes and volcanoes (22 out of which 4 active).
Photo on top: Courtesy totheroots.files.wordpress.com

Sunday, August 16, 2009

Maras: juvenile Central American gangs as outcome of poverty and deprivation. Impact on security.

When I visited El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua I had the chance to face up the phenomenon of Maras, juvenile gangs, that dramatically affects the security of these and other countries, including some areas of the United States.
There are entire territories which are under the Maras control, almost impenetrable to low enforcement agencies and regular citizens. When I conducted my RSA in Central America I discovered that to get into that zones, where permitted, a “war tall” (payment of a fee) was requested. It has been reported that those who refused to pay have been killed on site. Originally, the gang's main purpose was to protect Salvadoran immigrants from other, more established gangs of Los Angeles, who were predominantly comprised of Mexicans and African-Americans. For this reason, the gang initially allowed only Salvadorans to join, but later admitted other Central Americans as members. As I exposed in my previous post it might exist a potential collusion between the Maras and international terrorist groups. It should be noted that in 2005, Honduran Security Minister Oscar Alvarez and the President of El Salvador raised alarm by claiming that Al-Qaeda was meeting with one of the most powerful Mara, MS-13 better known as Salvatrucha and other Central American gangs to help them infiltrate the United States. FBI agents said that the U.S. intelligence community and governments of several Central American countries found there is no basis to believe that MS-13 is connected to Al-Qaeda or other Islamic radicals, although there have been security meetings at ministral level within the Central American governments. In the above picture Honduran Special Police stand over Mara Salvatrucha gang members after anti-gang operation in Tegucigalpa, Courtesy Reuters/Roberto Carlos).
During my RSA trip in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras the Maras were attacking the bus lines in order to bribe the line owners and bus drivers. Drivers and bus staff were assaulted and, in the worst case scenario killed. The most unfortunate event took place in San Pedro de Sula December 23 2004 when a gunmen opened fire on a overcrowded bus. 28 passengers died, six of those were children. In this case specifically the Mara wanted to send a clear message to the government in order to counterbalance the police successful raids anti gangs. MS-13 now has an estimated 25,000 members in Honduras, El Salvador and other Central American nations. I have been in Honduras in April 2009, just before the military coup and it seems to me that little has been done to resolve the gang security problem.To understand why maras are so popular in Central America we have to dig a little in the socio-cultural context of their members. Maras often represent the only possibility to survive in difficult, poor and violent environments. Children and adolescents living in poor deprived and literally abandoned neighborhoods see the Mara as the only possibility of achieving social recognition. To gain access to the gang an initiation ritual must be successfully completed by the aspirant mareros. They can be involved in selling and smuggling drugs, participate in fighting against opposite gangs or commit homicides. Killing is considered by Mara as “regular procedure”, it represents a success (eliminate enemies, counterparts, policemen and suspects) and a personal accomplishment for the killer.


All Central American governments have in a way or another structured and launched their own programme deemed necessary to violently respond to the Mara long arm. The programme have functioned partially since the governments wanted to reduce the imminent risk posed by the gangs but did not address at all the social-cultural-economic unease which is the base for such criminal illicit outcome. The failure to proper consider the context of unrest and poverty using an immediate armed reaction has shown that governments won the battle but not the war against maras. In other words such approach would suggest the recognition of a larger political failure in terms of lack of public assistance, proper education if any, health cares, etc.
If in the next future the governments of the gang-affected countries will not implement a wider holistic approach to their most vulnerable citizens, assisting and taking care of those less fortunate, the Maras will dramatically continue to increase their capability with an evident repercussion on the life of all citizens and on the security in general.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

RSA in El Salvador - Security Threats

I conducted the RSA in El Salvador in February 2008. I visited the Capital City San Salvador and three field locations San Lorenzo, Ahuachapán, Tacuba. In Tacuba I went to see an orphanage of undernourished/abandoned children which received humanitarian support by the Organization I was working for. It was a very touching experience.
The insecurity remains at higher levels and has become one of the most felt problems by the population. The Press and TV News report frequently about crimes, assaults, rapes and other types of violations. The travelers must be aware about risks posed by criminality and should use private vehicles, avoiding (if possible) walking and taking public transportation. Frequently demonstration and protests arise, planned by workers organizations or citizens, due to the deficiency of resources like drinking water, unemployment, high delinquency levels, etc. Such demonstrations have blocked streets and highways in several parts of the country, which can directly or indirectly affect field missions (movement restrictions, etc). The high level of impunity is an element of tension that must be taken into serious consideration as well. The number of Salvadorian deported from the US is estimated in about 200 per month. The great majority of them have been arrested for criminal actions in the United States or because of their status of illegal immigrants. Some civil organizations and NGOs, have questioned the work of the Civil National Police (PNC Spanish acronym) which is deemed generally corrupted. According to a recent country evaluation prepared by UNDP El Salvador, the country has one of the higher crime rates in the region. In fact, it has been estimated that the number of fire guns circulating are about 500.000 out of which 300.000 are illegal, and 80 % of all homicides are committed with fire guns. The above report projects that about 80% of UN personnel or their relatives, families or near friends in El Salvador have directly or indirectly been affected by delinquency acts. Regarding the natural disasters, El Salvador might suffer during the winter time, floods and water-drainages. Furthermore one of the most important natural threats is the earthquakes (last ones in 2001, two quakes). In this regards the country is very vulnerable and only few the buildings can be consider properly “anti-seismic”.

Author visiting an orphanage in Tacuba in order to assess field operators security conditions.


El Salvador participates with his military contingents to the US lead coalition in the Iraq war. The US from their part has given the country a large number of working visas for the Salvadorian people. El Salvador has recently decided to participate to the ALBA, Venezuelan lead alliance (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas), as its Spanish initials indicate, which proposes an alternative to the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, ALCA in its Spanish initials), differing from the latter in that it advocates a socially-oriented trade block rather than one strictly based on the logic of deregulated profit maximization.
The recently elected President of El Salvador, Carlos Mauricio Funes as the candidate of the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) took office on 1 June 2009. He is the first FMLN party leader not to have fought in the civil war. His presidential campaign was highlighted by statements endorsing moderate political policies. He has promised to increase taxes on the rich to pay for programs such as health care in rural areas and crime prevention.
CRIME: The criminal threat in El Salvador is critical. Random and organized violent crime is endemic throughout El Salvador. Political or economic issues in the country may give rise to demonstrations, sit-ins or protests at any time or place, but these activities are most frequent in the capital or on its main access roads. Many Salvadorans are armed, and shootouts are not uncommon. Armed holdups of vehicles traveling on El Salvador's roads appear to be increasing, and several incidents involving foreigners have been reported. The homicide rate in the country increased 25 percent from 2004 to 2005, and El Salvador has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Both violent and petty crimes are prevalent throughout El Salvador. Armed assaults and carjacking take place both in San Salvador and in the interior of the country, but are especially frequent on roads outside the capital where police patrols are scarce. Criminals have been known to follow cars leaving the international airport to private residences or secluded stretches of road where they carry out assaults and robberies. Armed robbers are known to shoot if the vehicle does not come to a stop. Criminals often become violent quickly, especially when victims fail to cooperate immediately in surrendering valuables. Frequently, victims who argue with assailants or refuse to give up their valuables are shot. Kidnapping for ransom continues to occur, but have decreased in frequency since 2001.
The “Mara” phenomenon:
On various occasions the media has linked some local “Maras” (local gangs) with Al-Qaeda activities or structures.
El Salvador has both Arab and Jewish communities, not large in terms of adherents but powerful, representative and influential. Their members are important merchants and landowners. I will write an article about Maras soon in order to analyze the risks posed by such criminal gangs to security.
Terrorist Action:
Despite the image El Salvador projects outside its borders, as Central American country, there are some factors that indicate that a terrorist action risk cannot be fully excluded. The level of crime is well known. Less, probably, the international implications related with the participation of El Salvador at the military coalition lead by the United States in Iraq since 2003. The military Salvadoran contingent is composed of approx. 380 Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada) members, who are replaced every 6 months. The mentioned Salvadoran military contingent in 4 years of participation at the Iraq campaign has had a total of 6 deaths and about 20 wounded many of them related to military actions. In 2004, El Salvador would have received a direct threat by the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization but no terrorist related incidents have took place so far. As of August 2009, all non-U.S. coalition members had withdrawn from Iraq.


San Lorenzo Church, destroyed by a recent earthquacke.

Monday, August 10, 2009

Cucuta (Colombia) – Cross border influence from Venezuela. Security considerations.

I decided to write this article about Cucuta, Colombian bordering town with Venezuela, following a declaration of the Colombian government which few days ago claimed it found in a raid on a FARC guerrilla camp three AT-4 rocket launchers with serial numbers that connect them to the Venezuelan army. The manufacturer of the weapons, Swedish company Saab Bofors Dynamics, confirmed via the Swedish Foreign Ministry that the serial numbers on the arms matched a sale it made to Venezuela in the 1980s.

Despite the fact that both sides are using such events to fuel their propaganda, I would like analyze here how these two neighbors are “unofficially” connected the and how such relation affects areas like Cucuta.
I visited Cucuta during my long RSA tour in Colombia since there was based a field office which were conducting humanitarian operations in the surrounding areas of Norte de Santander, part of Magdalena region, Catatumbo, part of Boyacá region.
Cucuta is particularly “affected” by the vicinity with Venezuela and such geographic proximity influences the life and the entire economy of the town. The most evident phenomenon is the smuggling of gasoline from Venezuela. At every corner “Pimpineros” (gas smugglers) sell their product without any fear of being caught by the police. There are no regular gas stations in town. Besides, there are several cars with Venezuelan plate owned by Colombians. Vehicles are cheaper in Venezuela due to lower taxes applied on cars.
Colombian armed groups cross the border with Venezuela in order to recover and relax, the borders appear to be porous in different unsurveilled points. Other border-related phenomena are prostitution and smuggling of precious metals and other materials.
Today, Cucuta has become one of the most violent cities in Colombia. Collective violence and organized crime left more than 1,300 people dead yearly (an average of 3.5 people per day). Cucuta’s official homicide rate is calculated at 128 per 100,000 people, nearly as high as that of Medellin, Colombia’s most violent city (184/100,000 people). The police estimate that approx 80% of homicides in Cucuta are linked to the violent conflict and another 20% to common crime. The trend has been followed in San Cristóbal, the Venezuelan border city just forty minutes from Cucuta. Numerous reasons contribute to the sharp increase in violence. First, violence has been on the rise since the early 1990s, when coca cultivation in the northern region of La Gabarra was introduced; subsequently, cultivation, production and illicit trade rose sharply. Second, as the capital of the Norte de Santander department and a border city, Cucuta has developed dynamics in which drug trafficking, poverty, licit and illicit trans-border trade activities, organized crime and common crime are thriving. Third, the escalation of war in the Catatumbo is having an impact on Cucuta. Catatumbo, located between the Colombia’s Andes mountains and the border with Venezuela, is considered one of the most dangerous areas in Colombia. There are extensive illicit coca cultivations and large logistic facilities have been established there by guerrilla groups. FARC and ELN are sharing territory and fighting to control it. This situation forced a large part of the population to leave the area and relocate to Venezuela. Interstate talks are in progress. The aim is to try to solve the dramatic condition of displaced people (IDPs). The Catatumbo area is often impossible to reach due to the high risk posed by guerrilla fighters. Each sign or indication of anything/anyone related to the United States can create an aggressive public reaction against visitors and operations due to the psychological association USA - evil State made by guerrilla activists. Such behavior has not been noted in other areas of Colombia.
Major guerrilla groups are present in the area as well as paramilitaries (former “Autodefensa”) who apparently should have taken the legal opportunity through a government programme to leave the armed groups they use to belong to. The majority of them have instead reorganized themselves acquiring the name of Black Eagle (Aguila Negra). Aguila Negra started a real mafia system which forces commercial activities and private company to pay a price in exchange of security.
To reach such illicit/violent stage they previously eliminated most of local criminals obtaining “de facto” the title of “protectors of security”. Police is not capable to eliminate/reduce this
trend.

Coca transformation laboratory in Catatumbo. Courtesy Radio Santa Fe

The paramilitaries are seeking to consolidate the entire region, including Cucuta. Conversely, urban centers such as Cucuta constitute safe havens for the guerrilla forces, in which they can further develop counterattacks and mobilize combatants. Urban militias (FARC, ELN and EPL) have a strong presence in poor shanties at the city’s periphery. At the same time, other paramilitary groups (Cordoba, Uraba, Cesar blocs) frequently patrol poor urban barrios and engage in social cleansing. There is a clear trend by the guerrilla forces to shift from rural to urban warfare, a new strategy which seeks to undermine Uribe’s security measures. Several oil pumping stations owned by state and private companies are located in this area. The Army is defending State owned facilities while private companies have to pay a price to guerrilla to secure both workers and installations. The pipeline transports oil from this region to the harbors located along the Caribbean Coast.
THE THREAT:
The main threats in the region are related to the high concentration of armed actors and are that of being caught up in the conflict between fire of armed groups, being kidnapped and car accidents.
Communication is vital here. Recommended HF, VHF radios, cellular and satellite phones
Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is medium for the Cucuta town and high for the rural areas of the region. The Catatumbo remain an almost inaccessible region (very high risk). The local communities try to deal with terrorists having sometimes the possibility to act as mediators and negotiators, facilitating the dialogue among the parts.
Road Safety:
The conditions of the roads in Cucuta town are good but worsen where IDPs are settled. A high number of motorbikes circulate in town on a daily basis, motorcyclists usually do not respect traffic regulations. The risk an accident by road travel is assessed as high.
Medical Emergency:
Medical facilities in town are good, but the rural areas suffer of lack of medical infrastructures. The risk of not receiving adequate medical attention in Cucuta is assessed as low. Risk is assessed as medium in rural areas. It is fundamental arrange in advance a Medical Evacuation air operation system (MEDEVAC) in order to evacuate eventual severe injured staff.

Saturday, August 8, 2009

Quibdó (Colombia): security challenges posed by guerrilla in a complex geographic environment.

I visited Quibdó during my last RSA mission in Colombia in 2007. The town of Quibdó is the district capital of Chocó in the north west of Colombia. The region has some of the worst national indicators in terms of poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, maternal and child health. The regional capital, Quibdó, shelters more displaced persons per capita – tens of thousands of them – than any other population centre in Colombia.
Along the banks of the nearby Atrato, San Juan and Baudó rivers, hundreds of thousands of mainly Afro-Colombians and indigenous civilians are trapped in the web of war. The armed gangs who control the waterways do not allow them to fish, hunt or gather wood. The district is of great strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its proximity to, and border with Panama and the Pacific coastline. The area is heavily used for the illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and other contraband items. The terrain is very harsh with mountains and thick jungle in abundance. The road infrastructure consists of only two access routes into the region from the east. The main form of transportation is by the complex river network. Visitors to the region are advised to only travel on essential business and by air only.
The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces. There has been an escalation in these clashes over the last two years as a result of Colombian military pressure in the region. Whilst the town of Quibdó itself is under government control, all other parts of the district are considered extremely dangerous as various armed groups struggle for control in the region.
Whilst there are no formal agreements in place and delivery missions are frequently stopped at illegal checkpoints (often our boat was stopped during navigation in the river), there have been very few incidents of antagonism, violence against staff or theft. It should be borne in mind that, as the military continue to increase the pressure on these groups both in action and logistically, the area can face up an escalation of violence.
Supplies cargos have been stopped by illegal military actors as well as government armed forces apparently to avoid that the shipment could end in the hands of guerrilla.
The phenomenon of displacement of people in this area is massive. Huge areas of wooden and cellophane made houses surround Quibdó’ town. Colombian displaced people have crossed the border to Panama looking for a better future.
The two most important ethnic communities in the area are the Afro-Colombian and the autochthonous indigenous populations. Both of them are conducting a “Pacific Resistance” to guerrilla which forces them to leave their native locations. They passively resist until illegal armed groups start taking actions, killing people. They are forced to share their space with terrorists. Both communities have a territory legally recognized by the State of Colombia.
THE THREAT
The main external threat in Chocó district remains that of domestic terrorist activity. The major internal risk to personnel is river travel and its associated hazards.
The risk of domestic terrorist actions is assessed as high (there may be cross over in this threat area to organized crime).
There is an identified threat to international staff working in the Chocó’ region. This is primarily due to the threat of kidnapping, as westerners are generally seen as a more valuable target than local nationals. The presence of international staff can significantly alter the security profile of an operation.
ORGANIZED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in Chocó in particular. Affluent nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnappings. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Chocó district including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers. The armed groups are under continuous pressure from both the military and each other and resources in the region are scarce, leading to potential threat to operations. Very few outsiders visit the region and seldom venture out of Quibdó. The threat of organized criminal activity is assessed as high. Two Army Brigades specialized in antiterrorism and counter-guerrilla are settled in town and have recently attacked guerrilla troops in the area of S. Juan (rural area).
MEDICAL EMERGENCY:
Medical facilities are rudimentary. There is a hospital in Quibdó which offers basic emergency services on a pre payment basis. There are no medical facilities outside of the main towns and very poor means of evacuation from mission areas. The risk of not receiving adequate medical attention at the Quibdó in is assessed as high.
RIVER TRAVELS:
Travel is dangerous. At least 600 people have been killed in the last few years according to the main Afro-Colombian Association, ACIA.
The requirement to travel by river presents some unique risks to the Quibdó operation. There are many diseases present in and around the river areas, including tuberculosis, pulmonary pathologies, diarrhea and yellow fever. A large amount of debris floating on and submerged in the river water can put at risk navigation and is often very difficult to see. This includes dead trees and sunken boats and creates a major hazard to river traffic. The risk of injury or severe illness as a result of river travel is assessed to be high.
I would call the Quibdó Region the hidden treasure in Colombia for its natural beauty and it geographical structure.

Monday, August 3, 2009

Cartagena (Colombia) – RSA surrounded by a beautiful colonial atmosphere.

Cartagena is a beautiful colonial town. I visited it in 2007 while carrying out my RSA mission in Colombia. Probably the nicest colonial urban area in the Caribbean. It lies along the Caribbean shores in the North of Colombia in a strategic area used by the Spaniards in the XV-XVII centuries to ship to Europe gold and precious material coming form the New World. Despite its nice appearance and its touristic vocation several are the threats to consider while preparing the Risk Assessment related mainly to its surrounding districts (organized crime, drug cartels wars, kidnapping, extortion, etc). There are different security phases for the centre and the periphery. Cartagena centre enjoys a lower secutiy phase (1 in a scale of 5). The town is well guarded and surveilled by regular and tourist police who protects tourists and the related income generated by tourism, while the situation worsens in the suburbs (phase 2). Those areas are affected by poverty and violence. Large camps of displaced people (IDPs) who were forced by guerrilla to leave their villages in the Colombian inner areas have been established here. Same threats affect the bordering districts of Sucre, Atlántico, Cordoba, La Guajira, Magdalena and Cesar. The whole area is of strategic importance to both government and armed groups alike due to its controlling influence on many strategic routes throughout the North and in particular to the ports of the Caribbean coast which are a main transit route for both legal and illegal trade.
The town of Cartagena is a very popular holiday destination for many Colombians with an historic old colonial town (Ciudad Murallada) coupled with beaches and high rise accommodation. On the other hand, the city has some desperately poor areas. The district has experienced high levels of violence over recent years between the paramilitaries, guerrillas, bandits and government forces and the pattern of the conflict follows a similar trend to the rest of the country with the main armed groups struggling for control of territory within Cartagena and control of the strategic routes, fertile drug-crop land and mineral resources in the countryside. Mines have been commonly used by the armed groups in some of the countryside areas. There has been a considerable incidence of displacement of people within these districts, as local farmers try to flee the contested areas. As said, the town itself is secure due to high concentration of police and military troops which are trying to preserve intact the flux of tourists. Tourism is the engine of the economy in Cartagena.
There is a huge economic difference between down-town Cartagena and the surroundings (very poor and extended areas). This difference causes social tensions and violence. Internationals visiting the region must be aware about the risk of kidnappings, for both political reasons and extortion. The best mitigating measure is the adoption of a low profile and low visibility while visiting the country. Accidental shooting is another element to consider while analyzing the risk. Although there are undoubtedly many illegal weapons in the region, the risk of accidental shooting in the region can be assessed as medium, low in Cartagena.
Organized Criminal Activity:
There is a high level of organized crime in Colombia as a whole and in the Northern region. Nationals and international personnel in particular are targeted for robbery and/or kidnapping. There are many illegal armed groups operating in the Cartagena district, mainly in Cordoba and Monte de Maria areas, including FARC, ELN, paramilitaries and local criminal gangs. There is little law and order outside of the urban centers, as the government forces are capable of controlling only parts of the area and only the main routes in particular.
Road Travel:
Road travel within Cartagena is normal for a large urban city. There is risk of crime, particularly at night. The road conditions within the town are good. In the rural areas, the road conditions are generally poor on main transit routes. In the project areas many of the local roads are not surfaced and in some instances operations are cancelled when weather conditions render parts of the routes too dangerous to travel. There is high risk of criminal/armed group activity in the rural areas. My recommendation is to travel only in areas with low/acceptable risk. Never take the initiative to adventure in unknown places. Travel always in group. Last but not least bring always your cell phone with you and be sure that police number is promptly available.





This map highlights (red) the high concentration of IDPs in the North of Colombia - OCHA Courtesy