Interoperable Communication as crucial emergency response tool

Georgia new interoperable communication system (Courtesy: Georgia Tech Research News)

Finally I took the time to conclude this post about one of the pillars of emergency management, interoperable communication.
Interoperability is a property referring to the ability of diverse systems and organizations to work together (inter-operate). The key aspect of the emergency response mechanism is the capability to bring together different responders and their apparatuses in order to work in a coordinated manner on the same platform or different communicating platforms.
In this post I want to debate around the importance of the interoperable communication as one of the emergency management milestones.
Interoperability is an important issue for law enforcement, fire fighting, EMS, and other public health and safety departments, because first responders need to be able to communicate during emergencies. Traditionally, agencies could not exchange information because they operated widely disparate hardware and radio apparatuses that were incompatible. Even the advanced agencies' information systems such as computer-aided dispatch systems (CAD) and records management systems (RMS) functioned largely in isolation, so-called "information islands." Agencies tried to bridge this isolation with inefficient, stop-gap methods while large agencies began implementing limited interoperable systems. These approaches were inadequate and the nation's lack of interoperability in the public safety realm become evident during the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center structures. Further evidence of a lack of interoperability surfaced when agencies tackled the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina disaster.
To reach interoperability agencies should dialog on same platform-based systems. First responders have complex needs for specialized equipment and personnel and communications infrastructure is one of several critical priorities. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) assists first responders through the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance
Program (CEDAP). Since 2005, CEDAP has provided $69.7 million in equipment and
Equipment training to law enforcement agencies, fire, and other emergency responders.
But structure is not all. Procedures and a tired approach to communication must be shared and agree upon. Communication plans at both horizontal (among agencies/operators on the ground) and vertical level (from local to regional to national) should be designed.
Other important concept related to successful interoperable communication is redundancy.
Communication means must be multiple, of different nature and connected with different networks as well as promptly available. Such approach is considered vital when the environmental conditions created by the emergency related event are such that the most common means could be out of service (land line, cellular phone, emails, etc). I remember that when I was working with the UN, every mobile unit to be compliant with the Minimum Operating Standard Security (MOSS) needed to avail the following systems: Cellular phone, satellite phone, VHF/UHF radio, HF radio. Other redundant communication means are Voice over IP, emails, land line, amateur radio etc.
Such redundant system has to be maintained operational and regular drills should be conducted to test them as well as the capability of the operators to handle them. I recall during the conduction of Risk Security Assessment, the most common problems were the most (apparently) simple once too: batteries not charged, chargers not available, missing sim cards (for sat phones), operators scarce knowledge of use of radio apparatuses as well as call signs and communication procedures, etc.
Drills are absolutely important to keep the network maintained and operators refreshed.
The impression I have is that emergency entities have accomplished great results in these recent years on the path of interoperability but a lot yet remain to be done. Just to mention one example: Hurricane Katrina (2005) death toll: 1836, Hurricane Gustav (2008) death toll: 0. Both hurricanes hit same area. I don’t want to speculate on the causes of failure and success of the mentioned rescue operations but it’s evident that interoperable communications played a key role in 2008. Analysis of responses to hurricanes and whether related catastrophic events could be interesting topics for future posts.

Hurricane Gustav - Satellite photo (Courtesy: philantromedia.org)

My role in Emergency and Preparedness

After one month of absence from this blog I finally decided to dedicate this post to my new position.
December 21st 2009, it was my first day as Deputy Director Emergency and Preparedness with New York State, Department of Health. I left the United Nations World Food Programme where I was working as Senior Field Security Officer, specialized in Security Risk Assessments and Risk Management. As you probably know reading my previous articles I have been deployed in several countries in almost all continents (excluding Oceania). I am so thrilled to have embraced this new challenge in New York.
I have finally the chance to enrich my professional expertise through a different emergency perspective/approach compared with the one I was used to while working in developing countries with the UN. As UN planner and risk assessment specialist I had to take into considerations factors like political instability, terrorism, criminality, social/economic insecurity etc, common elements in developing countries. These elements heavily influence the emergency/security/response planning and implementation. The final emergency structure which will emerge will have to provide the proper safety and security features to those humanitarian operators deployed everywhere in the world.
Here in New York the above mentioned factors are almost inexistent so that the planner can dedicate all the available resources and his/her own energies to the core business, the protection of the people, the structures, the assets under his/her responsibility when a disaster hits. The unfortunate sad events of 9/11 and the Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how important are planning, preparedness and training. I have decided to approach the concepts of emergency, safety, security and preparedness commenting real life cases, not related to my job/profession. This way the objectivity and the "right distance" from the events will be preserved in order to provide a unique perpective as my vision of the future of emergency management.

I

Sri Lanka - August 2009 - Security considerations and mitigating measures

I have been in Sri Lanka the summer of 2009, as Security Manager for a large International Organization. This post is intended to briefly describe the post war situation and analyse the best mitigating measures in order to reduce tensions and stabilize a complicated situation which affects an entire population.
After three decades of a mainly ethnic war that has seen a combination of asymmetrical warfare activities, the Government announced victory over the LTTE - Liberation Tamil Tigers of Elam (some Government officials stated victory over “terrorism”) on 18 May 2009. The latter part of the past two years has seen an intensified conventional war in the Northern part of the country (Wanni) as well as asymmetrical warfare tactics that mainly constituted suicide bombings, assassinations, disappearances, abductions, intimidation the denial of basic human rights such as freedom of movement and freedom of speech (as manifested in the suppression of the national media). The war efforts resulted in large numbers of displaced civilians across the East and the North of which the past six months was probably the most intense. It resulted in massive casualties (dead and injured of which a large percentage is maimed and disabled for life) amongst both the Tamil population in the North and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) security forces. It leaves a Tamil people highly traumatized and a population bitterly divided along the ethnic fault line.
When I was there during the summer 2009, for the 262,000 internally displaced persons IDPs confined to IDP camps in Vavuniya, security risks associated with poor living conditions – in particular insufficient water supply, sanitation and waste disposal were resulting in significant health risks and growing dissatisfaction amongst the displaced community. The capacity of health services to address the needs of both the local and displaced populations was overstretched and added to general security and protection risks. Other protection and security challenges included site congestion, military presence, limited access to justice and family separation. Further, lack of freedom of movement resulted in an almost total dependence on humanitarian assistance and extreme frustration within the IDP community.

Considerations

In the immediate aftermath of the military conflict, it was expected that the Government shifted its focus from the military campaign (which dominated their strategic approach) to a lasting and acceptable political solution. The Tamil population will not accept a position in which they will be dominated by the Sinhala majority and in which they feel that their basic human rights are ignored. It is to be expected that the Government would be reluctant to accept international cooperation to achieve this paramount objective.
The current military victory has brought some level of unsustainable stability. It would have to be strengthened by infrastructural development to stimulate economical growth which, jointly with a political solution, social harmony has a greater probability to succeed.

One of the most significant mitigating measures to counter the breeding of a new resistance would be a high trustworthy reconciliation program by the Government and a transparent/ participative process towards a new political dispensation that would accommodate the Tamil people to their satisfaction. Whether this process will be implemented and how are elements which remain to be seen.

Reinforced concrete SL Army bunker in the proximity of Trincomalee Beach (East Coast)

SL Navy Bunker facing the Mannar Lagoon (West Coast)

Ecuador part 2: Crime, Natural Disasters, Road Conditions

Crime:
The highest area of concern is the common crime though the police and the law enforcement agencies are doing their best to reduce it. Good results have been achieved but a lot remain to be done. The most common crimes are petty thefts and robberies usually following and armed aggression. The micro criminality trend in Quito is increasing despite the fact that the government has recently increased the number of police agents on the ground cutting their number from Embassies and International Organizations. The targets are usually those individuals carrying rucksacks, bags or cases. Cellulars and laptops are the most wanted objects by thieves. Cars are targeted as well. Usually victims are not killed if they do not react. The express kidnap is a “specialty” of the locations along the Pacific Ocean coast. Frauds and credit card cloning are two common crimes as well.
During my visit in Ecuador I received an interesting intelligence analysis very detailed and based on updated figures, prepared by the local branch of an international security company.
The threat from common criminal elements is considered HIGH in certain areas; violent crime is a serious and growing Movements after dark should be avoided.
An other element which can trigger social unrest is the widespread xenophobia against Colombians. Ecuador hosts 500.000 displaced Colombians, out of which 50.000 as refugees. This figure will be probably incremented up to 200.000 in the next future. The anti Colombians feeling is invigorated when crimes are organized by them against local populations in Ecuador. Along the border, the presence of Colombian prisoners in the Ecuador prisons reaches 90%.

Organized crime:
The organized crime in Ecuador is often strictly connected with drug related activities. Such international organizations are composed by Ecuadorian, Colombia and Peruan and are active in the northern areas of Carchi, Sucumbíos and Esmeraldas. These regions face infiltrations of Colombia guerrilla elements such as FARC, Aguilas Negras, etc. as well as narco traffickers. Ecuador is used by guerrilla as a place where fighters can rest since the Ecuadorian Army counter guerrilla activities are never as efficient as the Colombian ones. The guerilla presence in the northern regions of Ecuador has hugely affected the local economies. Guerilla fighters can pay cash for their accommodations, services, needs thus creating an economy fully dependent from their presence. Furthermore, part of the enormous quantity of drugs product in Colombia and Peru’ is transported via trucks towards the Ecuadorian coast in order to be shipped.
UNDSS country advisor is concerned that WFP vehicles could be used by narco traffickers hiding among the food packages some drugs. There is no evidence so far but it could be considered as potential threat. To figure it out about how big this phenomenon is, one should look at the quantity of cocaine confiscated by the Ecuadorian law enforcement agencies annually, about 30 tons.
A large number of Ecuadorian peasants live in the areas nearby the Colombian border and cross the border every day or spend a period in Colombia to cultivate coca plantations. They are skilled and relatively well paid compared with the salary earned in the mother country. Along with this group of people across the border several illegal or semi legal (tolerated by the authorities) activities take place. Particularly there is a quite large smuggling of gasoline and petroleum, stolen illegally creating holes in local pipelines, cement and sulfuric acid. These elements are vital for the drug laboratories to refine and produce cocaine. Milk is sold to those working in the laboratories in order to reduce the intoxication produced during the refining process, while inhaling intoxicating vapors. Indeed, several towns and villages rely completely on commerce, smuggling and logistic activities to support guerrilla. The gas cylinder is sold illegally in Colombia at 10 times more its price in Ecuador, which by the way has a subsidized price.

Several professional killers, Colombian and Ecuadorian, are always available to offer their services to those involved in narco activities.
A high number of arms and weapons are smuggled as well across the border.
As stressed, in Ecuador operate international criminal organizations composed by Colombian, Ecuadorian and Peruan. The FARC also improved its ties with local indigenous populations helping the drug traffic.
Young tourists are often involved in transportation of drug in their rucksacks or suitcases.
Money laundry is the most evident fact about the dependence of this region on illicit activities. New and shining luxury buildings are built in the Lago Agrio surroundings and other northern localities.
It must be said, finally, that large families are widespread in villages across the border both in the Ecuadorian and Colombian sides.

Natural Disasters:
The Earthquakes and tremors are the most concerning natural disasters in Ecuador. The last deadly one, actually two strong earthquakes with magnitude 6.1 and 6.9 affected Ecuador, March 5th 1986. It created a serious socioeconomic problem for the country and triggered hundreds of associated geologic hazards—massive landslides, subsidence, liquefaction, impoundment of rivers, and other effects common to earthquakes that have occurred in similar settings. In spite of the seriousness of this structural damage, the economic and social losses directly due to earthquake shaking were small compared with the effects of catastrophic earthquake-triggered mass wasting and flooding in the area adjacent to Reventador Volcano. Rock and earth slides, debris avalanches, and debris and mud flows E of the Andes resulted in the destruction or local severing of nearly 70 km of the Trans-Ecuadorian oil pipeline and the only highway from Quito to Ecuador's eastern rain forests and oil fields.
Another natural threat is provoked by the presence of the Volcano Guagua Pichincha whose capital Quito wraps around its eastern slopes. In October of 1999, the volcano erupted and covered the city with several inches of ash. It threats the city indirectly since its principal crater is opened towards west. Other two volcanoes are active in Ecuador: Reventador and Cotopaxi.
The landslides affect the generally country during heavy showers mainly along the highway connecting Quito and the Pacific coasts which can be affected by flooding as well.
The risk posed to WFP by natural disasters can be assessed as medium.

Red Cross volunteers, assist victims of natural disasters in Ecuador (courtesy Dipnote)

Road Conditions:
Traffic is generally chaotic in Ecuador. There is a low respect for the transit rules as well as for traffic local police.
Some cases of police corruption related with car incidents have been reported.
The phenomenon seems to be increasing after the introduction of a new stricter traffic law enforcement rule. According with it police can now arrest preliminarily a driver involved in an incident and the car be confiscated. To avoid such rigid measures some policemen can be available to “adjust” their report.
The lack of trust in the police is generally associated with their lack of action and investigation results.
The justice system appears to be corrupted too increasing consequently the level of impunity.
In Ecuador, the risk of a fatal accident appears to be medium. The hazard presented by road travel is assessed as high.

MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE AND CASEVAC PLAN
Medical care facilities are widespread in Ecuador. Adequate medical and dental care can be readily obtained in the major cities of Ecuador. In smaller communities services are limited, and the quality is variable. Ambulances, with or without trained emergency staff, are in critically short supply. Serious cases must be evacuated to the Ecuadorian mainland for treatment.

Ecuador. Beautiful country facing different degrees of insecurity.

I visited Quito, Ecuador between March and April 2009 during a Security Risk Assessment mission. I had to evaluate type and dimension of threats, the vulnerabilities of the Organization I was working for (weaknesses and strengths) and finally assess their programme characteristics and priorities. In this post I am going to describe briefly the Country form a different point of view focusing on levels of security applied to different regions. In a second post I will treat the details of threats posed by common crime, organized crime, terrorism, natural disasters, road conditions and casevac/medevac. Obviously my posts, as discussed at the very beginning of my blog, do not contain confidential information of any kind and reflect my own view of the security situation in the country.
They want to present a different approach to countries which focuses mainly on security and safety.
Ecuador is the smallest of the Andean countries. It has the highest average population density in South America and the highest percentage of Native Americans. It is one of the two South American countries (with Chile) that have no border with Brazil. As its name indicates, Ecuador extends over both sides of the equator line. It is bordered in the North by Colombia (700 km) and in the East and South by Peru (1420 km border), in the West by the Pacific Ocean (2,237 km of coastline.)
Being on the equator gives the country its peculiar weather conditions, it also allows it to have 12 hour day year round.
Ecuador has three main geographic regions, plus an insular region in the Pacific Ocean, which is the first element of heterogeneity:
La Costa, or the coast, comprises the low-lying land in the western part of the country, including the Pacific coastline.
La Sierra ("the highlands") is the high-altitude double belt running north-south along the center of the country. Between the double range of the Andes, there is a high altitude (2000-3000 meters) basin, which includes main old Ecuadorean cities (from north to south: Tulcán, Ibarra, Quito, Latacunga, Ambato, Riobamba, Cuenca, Loja.
La Amazonía, also known as El Oriente ("the east"), comprises the Amazon rainforest areas in the eastern part of the country, accounting for just under half of the country's total surface area, though populated by less than 5% of the population.
The Región Insular is the region comprising the Galápagos Islands, also on the Ecuador line, some 1,000 kilometers west of the mainland in the Pacific Ocean.

Security Phase/Security Level (at time of my visit):
In Ecuador four different security phases have been activated in different areas of the country. I am going to use a system based on letters, from A (lower level) up to F (higher level of insecurity). The level system used (created by me) here has the only purpose of showing the different degrees of security within the different regions of the country and is described as follow:

Northern Border with Colombia:

Level D:
1. Following towns belonging to Province of Sucumbíos in the Northern Border with Colombia are under level D: Palma Roja, Santa Elena, Puerto Rodríguez, Santa Rosa, General Farfán, Dureno y Pacayacú.
2. Following towns belonging to district of San Lorenzo (Province of Esmeraldas) in the Northern Border with Colombia are under phase 3: Palma Real, Ancón, Mataje, Tambillo y Pampanga.
3. All the rivers in the Northern Border with Colombia are also under level D.

Level C:
Province of Sucumbíos, with the exception of the towns mentioned in point 1, above, which are under Level D.

Level B:
1. The Province of Carchi, with the exception of the rivers in the Northern Border, is under level B.
2. City of Esmeraldas and district of Eloy Alfaro in the province of Esmeraldas are also under level B.
Volcanic activity of Tungurahua:
Province of Tungurahua:
1. The towns of Pondoa and Juive Grande, belonging to the district of Baños are under level B.

2. The towns of Cusúa and Chacanco, belonging to the district of Pelileo are also under level B.

Province of Chimborazo:
1. The towns of Bilbao, Paligtagua, Yuibug, Clocontus, belonging to the district of Penipe are under level B.
2. The towns of Cahuají, Cuso, Chazo and La Palestina, belonging to the district of Guano are also under level B.
When visiting these areas, it is recommended to get fresh informations about the actual security situation.
Level A:
The rest of the country including the capital Quito.

SECURITY SITUATION – THREAT ANALYSIS
Safety and Security – overview:
With the signing of the Peace Agreements with Peru in 1998, Ecuador overcame one of the biggest obstacles in the formulation and execution of its foreign policy since its birth as an independent Republic.
After a Colombian forces attack against an illegal guerilla camp on the Ecuadorean side of the common border, Quito severed diplomatic relations with Bogota. The tension is a political one between the two governments, since populations on both sides of the border are mixed and maintain a long tradition of brotherhood, even against their respective capitals (especially for their complicity in a large range of smuggling activities.) Nevertheless, the Ecuadorean stance is to fight against all raid or attack in its territory, either from legal or illegal forces. For that purpose, the government is reinforcing (at high cost) its military and police presence in the northern area, affecting illegal activities (of the majority of the population), but trying also to bring development with the “Plan Ecuador”, designed for peace and social and economic growth, in contrast with “Plan Colombia” (designed against illegal groups and activities.)
Ten years after establishing peace in the south, the concern is now in the north.
The diplomatic relation with Colombia was broken two days after the Colombian military attack on a guerilla camp on March 1st, 2008 in Ecuador, in which the second most important FARC commander was killed.
That event has even more urged a new Ecuadorian defense policy which included a reinforcement of the northern border area (around 8,000 soldiers) and an effort to modernize equipments.
As mentioned, Ecuador faces several security challenges listed as follow, in decreasing order:
road traffic accidents, criminality, street robbery, street assault, house break-in, office break-in, office occupation, vehicle break-in, earthquake, volcanic activity, floods, landslides, domestic violence, rape, fraud, counterfeit money, car theft, street or road blockade, kidnapping, hostage taking.

Riot Ecuadorean Police escorting a public gathering in the centre of Quito.

Author during the SRA in Ecuador.

Ayacucho - Peru. Travelling in harsh terrain conditions

The town of Ayacucho is located in the south-central Andes of the country.
It lies in quiet and calm area since Shining Path terrorist movement based once here had been defeated by Governamental forces in the eighties. In fact, Ayacucho was one of the most important strongholds of Shining Path in the past. The threat of a potential terrorist activity is low but precautions must be taken during travel missions. Traveling by road especially at night is dangerous. The areas potentially at risk are the Provinces of La Mar and Huanta. Overland travel from Ayacucho to San Francisco is not recommended.
The area has experienced some assaults by local criminal gangs of youngsters who usually prefer to operate during night time or early in the morning. The methodology used to attack buses and cars is well known: one of the members of the gang lies down in the street pretending that he had an accident so that the bus stops and get assaulted. In the meantime the local criminals rob the passengers of their belongings. The level of threat related to common criminality in the Ayacucho surroundings, is medium.
The office I visited in town during my RSA is located in an area called Huamanga which enjoys a low level of criminality.
The threat posed by earthquakes and water floods is very low in this area.
The local roads connecting Ayacucho and the neighboring rural communities, which are regularly used by local populations, are not paved and very dangerous. There are no side road protections and roads are often narrow. Several bends make the driving even more challenging. If a vehicle is coming the other way, our vehicle must stop trying to maneuver using the little road side space if present.

Ayachucho surroundings: local community involved in an UN funded agricoltural project (food for work)


In the rural areas the road conditions are even poorer than in town. Most of the local roads are not paved and in some instances operations are cancelled if weather conditions render part of the routes too dangerous for travel. There is high risk of car accidents though the number of cars circulating is scarce. The accident could be generated by landslides, or softness of terrain, as well as an impact with another car. If a mechanic problem takes place, (my recommendation) the driver must stay with the car while the passenger looks for help. The environment can be dangerous due to harsh natural conditions of the terrain and the lack of radio coverage in the Ayacucho Region. There is a high risk to be assaulted during night hours. There is no cellular network up in the mountains as well so that the only communication means is the Sat phone. The risk of an accident by road travel is assessed as high.



Author while travelling between Ayacucho and Huancavelica at around 4700 mt. above sea level, sorrounded by glaciers.

PERU: General security situation, considerations from my Risk Security Assessment

I visited Peru in February and March 2007 while conducting a Risk Security Assessment mission. The materials used to prepare this blog post have been updated and carefully reviewed in order to provide an idea about the actual security context in Peru.

SITUATION:

Peru is suffering from an increase in crime from simple muggings through to violent kidnapping; mostly confined to urban areas and within the poorer districts during the day but widespread after dark. The current government is slowly becoming increasingly popular, despite of the economic situation declining and local crime rising. Regarding the terrorism groups who used to frighten Peru, Shining Path and Tupac Amaru, both have been almost successfully fought in the Eighties and right now some old militants are trying to reorganize themselves. Those trends are channeling themselves towards the big drug traffic ants as the military-like expertise they can offer is very useful to protect illegal cocaine laboratories and the transportation of the final product. It has to be borne in mind that Peru is the second largest coca producer in South America, after Colombia. Urban driving conditions are appalling and at present they are assessed of being probably the greatest threat to staff in Peru. One of the most common security challenges to personal security is related to the use of taxis. There are almost no road regulations and police is literally not “visible” on the streets. Often illegal taxi drivers put on their car a Taxi sign. It has been reported that a massive quantity of false circulation documents as well as driving permits are fake and easy to obtain, since there is a flourishing market for false documents in Lima.
Furthermore, driving schools often “sell” driving license without performing any practical exams or oral/written tests.
Kidnapping can be considered a high risk factor in Peru, above all for foreigners travelling in Peru.
Often the victim is forced to withdraw money from ATM machines, usually before and after midnight so that the cash amount is double as it refers to two days. The phenomenon is popularly called Millionaire Walking (Paseo Milionario). It is recommended to use secure taxi company before arriving in country. Local staff is required to attend to a specialized security awareness training in addition to the basic security training. This is primarily due to deal with the threat of kidnapping and being involved in a car accident in very remote areas with no communication and close medical facilities.

SECURITY SITUATION - THREAT ANALYSIS
President Alan Garcia is at his second mandate as president of Peru. People are slowly but steadily increasing their support of his administration since he is giving clear signs that he wants to do something concrete to help the poor conditions of his country. For example, he is the author of a law which will ask the major mine companies to pay a “volunteer contribute” (several million of dollars) to organizations involved in fighting hunger in Peru since the State program organizations waist up to 40% of the available resources. If those political actions will help Peru to improve or if this will be a barely cosmetic political move it is not clear.
There are still concerns over renewed insurgency activity from the Shining Path (SL) guerrilla group having them join the drug traffickers with their support in security.

Peru is the second largest producer of cocaine in South America after Colombia. Here coca plantations are not illegal, but coca farmers must accept to sell part of the production to a State owned company. The quantity to be sold is minimal so that the great majority of it is then illegally purchased by drug dealers. The system does not help the fight against drug smugglers as the cultivations are not illegal and it is very difficult to define the line between legality and illegality.
The areas of biggest concern are, however, the common criminality and road accidents. Common criminality is widespread in the country with a peak level in the periphery of Lima. Law enforcement agents are not visible, and according to the official data, are not doing enough to fight this phenomenon. The second area of concern is related to car traffic and accidents. As said, there is a high risk of becoming a victim of a car accident, since there is little order and respect of road regulations. In Peru public transportation managed by government or local authorities does not exist, but it has been left to private companies and individuals. There is little control on authorizations and documents so that virtually anybody who owns a car or a minibus can be a taxi or public bus driver. Furthermore, a long time passes between vehicle technical inspections increasing the risk of mechanical breakdowns and incidents due to the lack of maintenance. The parliament has recently approved a law which forbids the importation of used cars older than five years. The high taxes to buy a new vehicle (50% of the price) have created a stagnant situation which do not facilitate the replacement of older models.

Author posing with a local community involved in an agriculture based project in the Handahuaylas area.

Peru has a working relationship with Brazil, although this has been strained by US aid packages to Lima. However, Peru is a member of MERCOSOR trade region, which is dominated by Brazil, bringing the countries closer together. Bolivia is a close partner, largely due to mutual concerns over Chile. Whilst Peru and Chile have been historic rivals, the current relationship is reasonably amicable, although the dispute over maritime borders is still alive. The two countries are working together on border security and anti-terrorist operations. Border disputes with Ecuador remain a source of tension, although outright combat seems unlikely.

The once special relationship with Japan has been strained, following the flight of Garcia predecessor, Alberto Fujimori, to Japan in 2000 and the associated international pressure on Japan to extradite him for murder. Fujimori undergone a trial, has been accused of several imputations and is now in prison. His daughter Keiko, actual Peruvian politician, is planning to run for President of Peru in 2011. How this element could change the feeling of the Peruvians about a possible return of the former President remains to be seen.
Peru’s relationship with the US has had a rocky past but is now close, particularly with large US funding for narcotics and security operations. However, many in Peru are critical of the US for failing to address fundamental trade and social problems within the country through their funding packages. There appears to be some credible information that international terrorists are present in the country but it is not known to which organization they belong; their activities seem to be linked with drugs, financing and false documentation.
The wave of internal terrorism, which Peru suffered in the 1980s and 1990s, has largely passed, but it has not completely disappeared. Remnants of the Shining Path (SP) movement (estimated at around 300 fighters and an unknown number of political activists) are still active in the Apurimac, Ene and Lower Huallaga Valleys. SP was responsible for the US embassy bombing in 2002. A group of terrorists also abducted gas pipeline workers near Toccate in the Ayacucho Department on 9th June 2003. In addition, the Garcia government, despite of his increasing popularity, remains disliked on basic reforms, which gives the potential for protests and strikes if the economic and social situation worsens. There have been recent protests by coca farmers over crop eradication by US-funded anti-narcotics operations and there are signs that the farmers are becoming increasingly militant in their opposition to the government’s support for US actions. In fact the project of restructuring coca plantations with other cultivations has given low results in terms of production and prices. The United Nations are also seen as a threat by the coca farmers and the SP who have an interest in coca production being the major security provider.

Off road trip on the Andean Mountains to Huancavelica.

PUERTO LEMPIRA – THE MOST FASHINATING AND CHALLENGING FIELD LOCATION IN HONDURAS

Navigating the waterways around the Puerto Lempira swampland (Honduras).

I am finally able to get back on track updating my Security Risk Assessment blog. I have been very busy lately with several professional projects and evaluations. I hope I will be able to regularly inform you through the columns of my blog about international challenges and security threats.
I visited Puerto Lempira – Honduras during my SRA in April 2009. Puerto Lempira is a very peculiar city due to its geographical and orographical conditions. It’s located in the Mosquitia Region, in the south of the country, bordering Nicaragua. A large part of this region includes swampland-like area featuring several rivers, creeks, natural canals and lakes. The large lagoon facing Puerto Lempira town represents the main water access both to open sea and internal canals.
To carry out its mission the humanitarian international organization I was working for had at its disposal two light boats and two cars. Two local indigenous communities, Uanpusirte and Auas, receive from the organization via boat food and of combustible to help with expensive navigation costs. The great majority of the assisted communities are located along water ways, few in the inner land. The weather conditions are generally good but the rainy season (between July and December). The area is normally very affected during this period by tropical storms and sporadically by hurricanes. The local autochthon ethnic group is Miskito and the most spoken language is Miskito even if the official one is Spanish. Most of the populations understand Spanish. The area is generally calm and few are the crime related episodes reported. The communities are watching their neighborhoods. During the night hours some cases of common crime events were recently reported (little robberies mainly).

Organized criminal activities:
Organized crime is present and its core business is drug trafficking. Several air, sea and land routes cross this region. Traffickers are almost invisible though everybody seems to perceive their presence.
The local communities are involved in the drug business only when a go-fast boat or a tourism private airplane loaded with cocaine coming from Colombia, crashes or faces direct threat by law enforcement agencies and their drug charge is left on the ground. Local populations rapidly take advantage of the situation catching as much content as possible. Police often remains with empty hands. Only boats or the aircrafts are recovered.
Narco traffickers lately buy at “fair” price the drug from the communities.
The general perception is that this is a great opportunity to those poor communities almost disconnected from the rest of the world.
Our local staff have never felt directly threaten from such trafficking. Our boats are clearly marked.
The threat in the Gracias a Dios region posed by organized crime can be assessed as low/medium.

Eating coconuts before the navigation mission on the Caribbean shores

Threat mitigations measures
The level of acceptance of the organization within the local populations is high. Indeed the clearly marked official vehicles and boats help to be recognized. The staff in charge of the Puerto Lempira office are well known and respected.
Contracted motorists conduct our boats along the water ways, canals, lagoon, rivers and open sea. They are very skilled and their knowledge of the area is depth. Staff travel, if possible, always with a representative of the government counterpart of the Ministry of Education who is well known as well. It is mandatory to obtain a navigation permit from the Port Authority prior every trip by boat. The permit includes names of those using the boat, the itinerary and other relevant details. Staff usually call our point of contact in the municipality they are about to visit in order to get fresh security information.
Best time frame to conduct field operation between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM.
Finally, the good and appropriate personal behavioral conduct of the staff is a further element to consider within the general mitigation measures.

Demonstration / political:
At present, there is no obvious potential for politically motivated violence.
The local departmental branch of Ministry of Education has been recently blocked by protesters, usually teachers. The protests are not violent and usually last one day. The current threat of violent demonstration is assessed as low.

Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is low.

Medical Emergency:
In Puerto Lempira is active a public hospital. The two clinics present in the region are located in Gracias a Dios and Dos Leones. Every single municipality has a health centre in which basic emergencies can be treated. Cuban doctors are working in these centers along with Honduran doctors according with an agreement between the governments of Honduras and Cuba.
Only one ambulance is available at Puerto Lempira which often is not operative. Those who need emergency medical care are transported to hospitals with private vehicles or boats. Local populations are very collaborative when a medical emergency occurs. Our staff as well has often helped to transport people to hospital putting at disposal the boat as only available transportation means in the area. In this case the procedure envisages that the passenger signs a discharge of responsibility form allowing staff to transport him/her by official boat/vehicle.
Poisoning snakes are infesting the area and everybody here can be exposed to the risk of being bite.
The risk for staff to not receive adequate medical assistance is high because of the lack of basic medical service in the region, the harsh geographic condition.
Fire
The risk of injury from fire is assessed as low.

Road Travel
As mentioned above, the most used transportation means are the boats. Nevertheless some communities are assisted visited by car since they are located in the mainland (very harsh swampland-like environment).
There are absolutely no paved roads and their maintenance is virtually inexistent. In some cases there are no roads at all and staff drive in the wildness to reach the inner communities. Driving during the rainy season can be very difficult/harmful. The organization’s cars are equipped with special “Tractor” high grip tires.
The hazard posed by road condition is assessed as high.

Boats:
Boats are stored along the lagoon shore at motorist location.
Boats, to be fully compliant must have the following features:
Ø Fire extinguishers
Ø Second emergency engine on board
Ø Bengala signaling rockets
Ø First aid kit
Ø Radio systems including sat phones
Ø Life vests suitable for adults and children.
Ø GPS system

Emergency food transported by an Honduran military helicopter after hurrican strike.

Food transported via boat to the indigenous communities within the lagoon.

San Pedro de Sula (Honduras) – National economy catalyst in light of the actual political crisis

San Pedro is definitely the most important economic centre of Honduras. In San Pedro, dynamic town famous for its brilliant economy, few successful businessmen have reached an incredible powerful economic dimension. Such success has enable them to take part at the political debate as one of the most influential lobby.

Zelaya, the ousted President, at the beginning of his Presidential career was part of the “club” of industrials and businessmen loyal to the US influence in Central America. He received their blessing and political support. During the first part of his mandate he managed the country stimulating, reinvigorating and improving the existing trade relationship with the US. The US has a specific interest in the country which hosts the largest US military base in Central America (Palmerola). But something happened. A “new” destabilizing element took the upper hand and marked a dramatic shift in the management of the foreign affairs of Honduras. Chavez and his ALBA (left wing inspired organization of Bolivarian States) entangled the Honduran political arena intoxicating first the President Zelaya who dramatically changed his set of political priorities, goals and supporters. This element triggered the famous event that forced Zelaya to leave the country.
The political dynamics behind the scenes are not the main argument of this blog post. Nevertheless it is worth reminding the importance of San Pedro de Sula as main economic site in Honduras, house of lobbyists and ghost decision makers. Which role will be played by San Pedro economic elites before and during next Presidential election remain to be seen.
I visited San Pedro de Sula in April as part of the country Security Risk Assessment, before the political crisis took place. Here some findings regarding the level of criminality, the threats and the instability factors in the San Pedro urban area and in its region.

GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION

Cortes Department (San Pedro surroundings)
General Situation - Crime
The most potentially dangerous sites in terms of presence of criminality are located in the Sulasono Valley. Only few areas can be considered moderately dangerous: Omoa, San Antonio, Santa Cruz Yohoa and San Francisco.
The most frequent criminal acts are kidnappings, express kidnappings (the victim is released in few hours after he/she withdraw money from ATM machine), extortion, assaults and violence connected with narco traffic.
There are areas too dangerous to adventure through in the region, while it is possible/recommendable visit other municipalities only if in company of somebody known in the community or local officials.
Ironically any police escort could dramatically endanger the presence of the visitor.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Organized Crime – Cortes
The crime rate is very high in this area.
People generally do not report criminal acts for two reasons: fear of retaliations from criminals and lack of trust in the law enforcement systems, both police and justice. Besides corrupted police could inform criminal about a report and trigger retaliation.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Urban Department of San Pedro Sula
General Situation – Crime
Usually two different kind of criminal aspects are present here: crime due to social frictions and delinquency (ordinary and common).
Both are fueled by the media which emphasize the culture of fear among people. This situation stimulates the lack of confidence in the police as institution and creates a subculture of isolation (one is alone against crime). This phenomenon motivates people not to report incidents and crime related events.
Drug couriers move freely in the urban departments since San Pedro is part of the large drug corridor from Colombia to the Mexican/US border. Part of the drug shipments are used locally to pay salaries to those supporting their logistic operation.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Organized crime – San Pedro Sula City
Large international organized groups of criminals are operating in town. The leaders are Colombian and Mexican. They are in charge of the transportation across Honduras of large quantity of drug. These groups use local gangs “Maras” to support and defend their activities. Several killers are recruited by drug cartels.
The Maras are used to distract police from other areas where the drug is transported.
Gangs indeed organize skirmishes or crime incidents in order to gather the police out of a different area where narco traficants are managing their operations.
The police and the judiciary system are very corrupted. The impunity reaches very high levels.
Money laundering is a widespread phenomenon as well. The great majority of the victims of homicides are connected with some criminal activities or groups. The price to execute somebody can be as low as $50.
Some peripheral areas of San Pedro represent an attraction for those populations living in other poorer regions. Those villages are the most perilous.
The risk posed by crime in this area is assessed as high.

Threat mitigations measures:
Best time frame to conduct field operation between 6:00 AM and 6:00 PM.
The Soaso area is considered at high crime risk. Nevertheless the escort of police is not recommended since can be clearly identified.
It has been reported that people has been killed in attempt to steel their cellular phone. For this reason the cellular is used only in not visible areas.
Finally, the good and appropriate personal behavioral conduct of the monitor is a further element to consider within the general mitigation measures.

Accidental Shooting:
The risk to be involved in an accidental shooting is low.

Medical Emergency:
In San Pedro are located several good medical facilities. In town are available ambulances, clinics and health centers providing basic services.
The fire fighters have an ambulance too.
The risk of not receiving adequate medical cares is assessed as low.

Fire
The risk of injury from fire is assessed as low.

Road Travel
The conditions of the roads in town are very good. The great majority of the urban roads are paved. The traffic can be chaotic. The risk of being involved in a car incident is assessed as low.

Recommendation:
Drivers should attend a 4x4 wheel drive course. Secondly, the defense/offense driving courses should be offered to drivers as advanced courses after completion of the 4x4.
Picture on top courtesy Wiki.



Author visiting a school in the surroundings of San Pedro. Field offices were located within School complex, offered by Ministry of Education.

Honduras, threat analysis just before the change of political leadership

I visited Honduras in March 2009, just before the change of political leadership in the country. New elections are expected in November. The U.S. won’t recognize a scheduled November election in Honduras without a resolution to the political crisis that began with a coup that ousted President Manuel Zelaya in June. On Sept. 27, the de facto government led by interim President Roberto Micheletti banned protests and suspended other civil rights for 45 days and denied entry to an Organization of American States delegation seeking to negotiate an end to the three-month standoff in the Central American nation.
The aim of this post is not to focus on the actual political impasse of the country but to provide a threat analysis prepared just before the crisis. I will closely follow the development of the situation from the pages of this blog providing elements and details regarding possible future new political scenarios and balance of power.

Safety and Security – overview:
The main concern remains the general crime situation which is endemic. Almost all subjects interviewed during this assessment have been involved in or has assisted to common crime actions (robberies, assaults, etc).

Crime:
The threat from common criminal elements is considered HIGH in certain areas; violent crime is a serious and growing problem, especially in zones of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, and to a less degree throughout the country. Pickpockets and purse -snatchers are prevalent in major cities, especially in parts of Comayagüela and the central market surroundings of Tegucigalpa. Movements after dark should be avoided. Highway, road and street robberies, carjacking and assault of pedestrians by armed thieves are still high. Roadblocks and demonstrations on the main highways have decreased. With a total of 3,855 murders in 2007 and a population of approximately 7.3 million people, Honduras has one of the world’s highest per capita murder rates. Two-man teams on medium-size motorcycles often target pedestrians for robbery. There have also been reports of armed robbers traveling in private cars targeting pedestrians on isolated streets.

Organized crime:
There are criminal organizations which are mainly devoted to the drug smuggling/transportation from the southern bordering country Nicaragua to El Salvador and Guatemala, towards the Mexican/US border. In the La Mosquitia area and along the Caribbean coast their activities are carried out with little obstacle posed by law enforcement agencies. Recently has been approved a law which considers the use of soldiers in support of police force. Still the general perception is that the Government has not done enough to reduce criminality and organized crime activities. Results of these activities are homicides, violent actions and revenges among criminal groups to control the drug traffic.
The “Maras” phenomenon, juvenile criminal gangs, is present and affecting peripheral locations. Often it is involved in the protection of drug trafficking routes along the Atlantic coast and in certain internal area.
The direct threat posed from the above described actions can be considered high.

Police – Security Forces:
The Honduran government conducts occasional joint police/military patrols in major cities in an effort to reduce crime. Problems with the judicial process include corruption and an acute shortage of trained personnel, equipment, staff, and financial resources. The Honduran law enforcement authorities' ability to prevent, respond to, and investigate criminal incidents and prosecute criminals remains limited. The Government of Honduras has a very limited presence in Northern Olancho, Colon and Gracias a Dios Departments, which are well known for lumber and narcotics smuggling and violence. While the support of the police to eventually escort official vehicles in at-risk areas is relatively easy to get in the field locations, in Tegucigalpa, due to a scarcity of policemen, it is difficult to obtain.

Natural Disaster:
The most common natural threat to Honduras is posed by frequent but slight earthquakes, mainly in the Southern and Central regions of the country. Hurricanes as well can be dangerous and harmful, producing flooding along the Caribbean coast, according with the season. The towns of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula are particularly weak to flooding due to the lack of properly build infrastructure and a proper urban housing plan. Peripheral towns and villages can face landslides during flooding.
The risk posed by natural disaster is assessed as high.

Social threats:
Protests can arise due to the current socio-economic conditions. This may lead to road blocking though lately this phenomenon is decreasing. Common delinquency is endemic and is becoming a social case too. Organized young gangs and drug criminal group, including immigrants trafficking, are largely affecting the population changing their social behavior and attitudes.

Road Conditions:
The road conditions are generally decent where the roads are paved. Some of the most dangerous stretches for road travel include: Tegucigalpa to Choluteca, because of dangerous mountain curves; El Progreso to La Ceiba, because of animal crossings and the poor condition of bridges from flooding; Route 39 through northern Olancho Department between Gualaco and San Esteban; and Limones to La Union, Olancho (route 41) via Salama and northward to Saba. Hondurans also refer to this latter stretch of road as the “Corridor of Death” because of frequent incidents of highway robbery.
Roads are generally unpaved and/or poorly maintained roads. The traffic in the Capital is totally unregulated and the few traffic police hardly manage it.
The threat of being involved in a car accident is high.

MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE
Medical care in Honduras varies greatly in quality and availability. Outside Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula, medical care is inadequate to address complex situations. Support staff facilities and necessary equipment and supplies are not up to international standards anywhere in Honduras. Facilities for advanced surgical procedures are not available. Wide areas of the country do not have a general surgery hospital. Ambulance services are limited in major cities and almost non-existent elsewhere.
The risk of not receiving adequate medical cares is assessed as medium.

CONCLUSION
Honduras is a great country. The high level of crime and the drug related activities unfortunately affect dramatically the everyday life of citizens, visitors and tourists. There is a general lack of trust in the law enforcement agencies as well as in the political and judicial authorities. Impunity is a major unresolved problem in the country.
I will deepen several aspects of the above analysis in my next posts as well as I will mention about interesting field locations.

Navigating the lagoon facing Gracias a Dios (Caribbean Sea)

Vehicle stock in the mud in the proximity of Puerto Lempira

Nicaragua, Rio Coco navigation conditions during food transportation op.

In this brief post I would like to share this interesting video prepared by UN World Food Programme (WFP) in Nicaragua to promote their humanitarian activities.
I was in Nicaragua (post dated Sept. 2nd 2009) in February 2008, conducting a Security Risk Assessment for WFP. Part of my job was assessing the navigation conditions, providing recommendations according with the Minimum Operating Standard Security (MOSS) adopted generally by the UN. The difficult part was connected with the applicability of the MOSS to rented vessels, not UN property. I could not force the owners of the boats to buy and install all the prescribed safety features (fire extinguishers, GPS, life vests, HF radio etc). Yes one could argue that the Organization could choose a different provider with better equipped vessels. Well, in these areas often there is only one provider, the boats are very basic and navigation can be dangerous. The high quantity of floating debris is another element to be considered while planning the operation. Said that, the staff adopt a security posture and bring own equipment (where possible) in order to mitigate the risk.
In this video the boat (Hercules) has been purchased by WFP and it was properly equipped. It seems to be too heavy and large to be able to reach the remote areas in the Rio Coco region, while it could be useful in the sea or segments of river wide and deep. Hercules have been replaced eventually with smaller and more efficient boats. These new boats comply with the safety rules. During emergencies, by the way, it could be possible that rented vessels can be used due to the dimension of the operation.
Very interesting the food cross loading operation. The community who is helping transporting the food from one point to another of the river is not the final beneficiary. Communities help themselves.
My navigation experience on Rio Coco, one entire day, was conducted on board of a rented smaller boat maneuvered by two very skilled local operators. The food delivery was successful. I am sure my visit helped to increase the navigation safety and security awareness among staff and local boat providers and I believe better safety features have been then adopted.

Panama - Security concerns related to Canal ops and Darien Province

I conducted my RSA in Panama in March 2009 in Panama City and surrounding areas.
Panama has a developing economy. Outside the Panama City area, which has many first-class hotels and restaurants, tourist facilities vary in quality. The U.S. dollar is the paper currency of Panama, and is also referred to as the Panama balboa. Panama mints its own coinage.
The current security situation in Panama presents no indications that social unrest will rise to a level that would affect its economy. Nevertheless it is advisable to monitor constantly the general security conditions in order to assess any sign that of possible instability/threat to the actual tranquil situation, as outlined below.
All areas of the country outside of the capital are considered low risk with the exception of the southern province of Darien. Darien should not be considered a high risk area but must be kept under control due to the remoteness of the area, the lack of infrastructure and communications, and the sporadic incursion into the area of illegal armed groups from neighboring Colombia. A natural forest covers the border between Colombia and Panama and there are no entry access points between the countries.

Safety and Security – Darien Province:
This area encompasses the Darien National Park as well as privately owned nature reserves and tourist resorts. It has been reported by the local law enforcement agencies that foreign nationals and Panamanian citizens have been the victims of violent crime, kidnapping and murder in this general area. Reliable communications and medical infrastructure are not readily available in the region, which makes travel therein potentially hazardous. Moreover, all around the Panama-Colombia border area the presence of Colombian terrorist groups, drug traffickers and other criminals is common, increasing the danger to travelers. There is increasing evidence that the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization, has increased its operations in Panama’s Darien Province, including in areas far removed from the immediate vicinity of Panamanian-Colombian border. UNDSS advises that the risk of UN Staff members facing dangerous situations due to the sporadic presence of illegal armed groups from Colombia can be defined as “low”. The lack of an established communication system across the region can be mitigated through satellite phones.

SECURITY SITUATION - THREAT ANALYSIS
Economic:
Panama has an economy that has been shaped around the US Dollar. It is efficient and it is based on a number of well established business and commercial activities related mostly with the service sector. This large economic sector represents the 75% of the total GDP and includes the management of the Panama Canal, banking, the Colon free trade zone, insurance, container ports, flagship registry and tourism.
The unemployment level is about 8% and reflects the large oversupply of unskilled labor.
The factor that must be taken seriously into consideration in this analysis is the enormous disparity in the distribution of wealth. In fact 35% of the population lives in poverty and could trigger a higher level of crime and social unrest.

Natural Disaster:
The typical natural disaster which affect the Central America and Caribbean region, earthquakes, flooding and hurricanes do not have a significant impact on Panama.

Social:
Some ethnic groups in Panama can be identified as disadvantaged to others. This phenomenon does not express itself through violence acts or civil disobedience. There is a very high degree of religious tolerance between religious groups.

Crime:
Crime in Panama City is moderate but increasing, particularly because of the activities of youth gangs. The city of Colon is a high crime area. Police checkpoints have become commonplace on weekends on roads in both cities. Based upon reported incidents by local police, the high-crime areas around Panama City are San Miguelito, Rio Abajo, El Chorrillo, Ancon, Curundu, Veracruz Beach, Panama Viejo, and the Madden Dam overlook. Crimes there are typical of those that plague metropolitan areas and range from rapes to armed robberies, muggings, purse-snatchings, "express kidnappings" from ATM banking facilities, in which the victim is briefly kidnapped and robbed after withdrawing cash from an ATM, and petty theft. There have been several targeted kidnappings, including in Panama City.
Several Security Advisors mention that in Panama does not exist the so called organized crime, as the dramatic phenomenon affecting other countries of the region (El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, etc). Neither exist Panamian drug cartels. An interesting trend that should be closely monitored is that of the juvenile gangs. It is growing but cannot be compared with most famous criminal gangs “Maras” existing in Salvador or Guatemala.
The police are fighting local crime with the little means available and the scarceness of resources allocated to internal security. The number of police patrols are insufficient above all in the Canal area, which is a vital asset for the country and yet vulnerable.
The official crime statistics released for the year 2008 report that the number of homicides was 27% higher than 2007 and 49% higher than 2004. The robberies increased 43% in one year.
Panama is used by the Colombian drug traffickers as a land corridor to smuggle cocaine towards the Mexican-US border. This situation brought to Panama some money laundering center intended to clean narcotic revenue.

Police – Security Forces:
Panama does not have its own Army, Navy and Air Force. Law enforcement and the control of public order is the responsibility of the Panamian National Police (PNP). The PNP are the subject of frequent allegations of corruption. PNP is limited by a chronic lack of resources.

Panama Canal:
The canal area can be considered vulnerable. In fact an attack could be carried out through a ship carrying huge quantity of toxic chemicals or other dangerous materials. If the vessel would explode while crossing the Canal, either due to a terrorist attack or an accident, the consequences are difficult to predict.

Author visiting the Miraflores Lock at Panama Canal


OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although there are currently no indications that social unrest will rise, it is necessary to monitor the following potentially dangerous situations which could, under specific conditions, influence economy and life in Panama.
· Increased incidence of illegal demonstrations.
· Growing incidence of clashes between social and ethnic organizations of government security forces
· Increasing unrest in the provinces, especially in the Darien, has been observed.

MEDICAL CARE AVAILABLE AND CASEVAC PLAN
Although Panama City has some very good hospitals and clinics, medical facilities outside of the capital are limited. When making a decision regarding health insurance, Americans should consider that many foreign doctors and hospitals require payment in cash prior to providing service.

CONCLUSION
The security situation in Panama is generally good but several factors can potentially affect stability and security. The Darien Province is the most concern area in the country. Police should increase the number of its members and improve its specialized unit dealing with drug trafficking and smuggling across the border with Colombia.
Money laundering is another factor that has to be assessed in depth since it seems that part of the hidden economy circulating in Panama City is coming from illicit activities abroad.
The Canal security is finally the strategic key to the success of the Panamian financial system. The Canal brings to the State economy between 5 and 10M USD per day. An attack on the Canal could affect not only internal but the international stability and repercussion on global economy could be dramatic.

Puerto Cabezas (Nicaragua). Challenging security conditions.

After a pause due to family reasons, here I am again describing one of most challenging field location evaluated in Nicaragua, Puerto Cabezas (including the attached area of Bilwi). This post mentions my navigation experience intended to assess security conditions of crew, staff and assets transported by boat.
In fact, the great majority of every day Organization's activities took place by boat (Rio Coco and Caribbean Sea). The article focuses as well about the importance of satellite phones as one of the most reliable - thus not totally secure - communication means.

Puerto Cabezas is a small port area located on the north east Atlantic / Caribbean coastline, at about 560 km northeast of Managua. There are approximately 27,000 inhabitants of Bilwi. In the municipality of Puerto Cabezas there are 51 Miskito (indigenous) communities which combine with Bilwi's population for a total of 51,000 inhabitants. The city is surrounded by several rivers and lagoons. The official languages of the region are Spanish, Miskitu, Sumo, and English. Spanish is predominately spoken however there is a very large segment of the population who speak Miskito. In all communities, Miskito is by far the predominant language. During the two days trip spent in the Puerto Cabezas area, one entire day has been dedicated to the river route along Coco River. This mission has been conducted to assess the condition of navigation and the quality of boats rented by the Organization. The itinerary travelled was Waspam – Sih Ba by boat (8 hour navigation time). In the above picture, Rio Coco and local communities.

Author visiting the Sih Ba Miskito community, reachable only by boat



The threat:
The main threat in the region is related to the moderate concentration of common criminals while the Mara (gangs) phenomenon is less evident in Puerto Cabezas than in the inner areas. The operations conducted by boat present a high risk due to the river conditions and the large quantity of obstacles and debris floating in the river.
The threat level in and around the Puerto Cabezas is assessed as follows:

Road Safety:
The conditions of the roads to reach the communities around the Puerto Cabezas town, up to Waspan (along Coco River) and in the inner region are very poor, not paved but kept in decent conditions. Due to the scarcity of vehicles, the risk of accidents by road travel is assessed as low.

Communications:
Communications in such complex geographical environment are essential. The four means of communications (MOSS compliant) that must be installed and functional are:

• VHF radio set
• HF radio set
• cellular phone (ideally with different SIM cards in order to maximize the use of the coverage)
• satellite phone

In this particular case a fifth communication means was deemed necessary in order to coordinate field work with local communities and improve the emergency respond. In fact, the great majority of the Miskito communities, assisted by the Organization, were using an HF “radio amateur” set which was working with different frequencies. In this case it would be useful to have a proper radio or, infringing the internal rules and agreement with government which assigned to the Organization dedicated frequencies (not recommended), change frequencies on the HF Codan radio apparatus supplied. Such measure can be considered as “preventive” since can be implemented in case of emergency to share security information gained on the ground.

SAT telephones:
There are several models of sat phones available with different features but some older models, even if technically better built, cannot be suitable for the complex environment like the one analyzed here.
In particular the sat phone evaluated in this office location was a Nera model. The Nera sat phone functions well in some circumstances (mainly as a static fixed point communicator). There are however several significant operational problems with its use in the field. It is of the type with a “laptop” type antenna which requires to be pointed directly at the satellite it is trying to communicate with. Any deviation from this line of contact will terminate the communications. This makes it difficult to use on the move. The system is not quick or easy to set up and would be difficult to use in an emergency. The system is not discreet and has caused problems in the past when used in front of naturally suspicious rebels or armed groups at checkpoints. In some cases the groups do not know what it is and this can lead to increased tension. I indeed recommend:
· the use of satellite phone system with a hand held satellite phone for the reasons outlined above. Iridium now has such a product available.
· Every field location should have at least a ready-to-use sat phone handy (SIM card must be placed properly, contract should not be expired, sat must be charged and charger (home/car adaptor) should be always carried with the phone.
· Phones must be transported in proper water-proof bags suitable for boat operations and emergencies.

In the next post I will write about security while operating boats. Puerto Cabezas (Nicaragua) along with Quidbo (Colombia) and Puerto Lempira (Honduras) are all locations which I assessed and currently use boats to carry out their daily duties. So that it is important to understand the security rules and the technical features of the vessels prior any navigation.

NERA Satellite phone with lap top style anntenna. Not recommended for at-risk environment.

Iridium 9555, very efficient sat phone and descreet desing.